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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis studies the legitimacy of NGOs in supporting communities living in 
informal settlements in South Africa. The key objective is to explore how 
development NGOs derive legitimacy by using representation, participation and 
accountability. This is a difficult feat considering the challenges these NGOs face 
working in informal settlements where tenure issues are often not easily resolved.  
 
The thesis discusses two approaches to legitimacy, the prescriptive/normative 
approach and the descriptive approach, applying both in a single case study of the 
South African development NGO Planact and its activities at Zandspruit Private 
Property, an informal settlement in Johannesburg. 
 
The case study explores normative legitimacy through representation, because 
development or advocacy NGOs derive legitimacy through what Pitkin in her 
seminal work in 1967 refers to as substantive representation of communities‟ 
needs and interests.  The case study discusses descriptive legitimacy through the 
perceptions of stakeholders, namely government, the community and Planact 
itself.  
 
The thesis found that representation, participation and accountability counted little 
in establishing the NGO‟s legitimacy. Because of unresolved tenure, Planact‟s 
legitimacy was not constructed through representation, participation and 
accountability. However, Zandspruit community, local government and Planact 
itself still perceived Planact to be legitimate. The thesis concludes that the 
prescriptive/normative framework of NGO legitimacy is limited in the context of 
unresolved tenure and marginalisation. Zandspruit community being marginalised 
and desperate for assistance, the community had no power to demand greater 
accountability from Planact. The performance of Planact in Zandspruit was 
hampered by the lack of tenure security. The thesis recommends that to improve 
the performance of development NGOs in relation to service delivery, 
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governments need to limit delays in securing tenure. This, however, is a complex 
challenge in its own right and needs further research. 
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1.0 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has grown significantly in 
the past three decades. Their importance has increased and they have become 
influential in global governance. The influence of NGOs in international as well 
as local policy fora and debates is to a large extent due to their ability to reach out 
to the poor and the marginalised (Dicklitch, 1998 and Hearn, 2007). In peripheral 
countries, most NGOs work with groups of people or communities living in 
informal settlements where among other things tenure is insecure, shelter is 
inadequate and access to basic services such as water and sanitation is precarious.  
 
Some NGOs specialise specifically in addressing the underdevelopment 
challenges facing communities in informal settlements. Because of their assumed 
ability to work with and for poor communities often in informal settlements, such 
NGOs have enjoyed legitimacy locally in South Africa, as well as globally. 
However, questions have been directed at the legitimacy of development NGOs in 
representing marginalised communities. In South Africa, the introduction of a 
legitimate democratic and representative state in 1994 reduced the immediate 
need for NGOs in the eyes of many of their former donors. In some ways, the 
surviving NGOs had to redefine and reconstruct their legitimacy towards donors, 
the new government and to the communities in which they sought to continue 
their work.   
 
Although NGOs face questions regarding their legitimacy, they are still largely 
seen as important and legitimate due to their claimed appropriateness in 
facilitating community participation. In the case of informal settlements, it is not 
clear how development NGOs claim legitimacy using represention of the needs 
and interests of communities that are occupying land illegally. In this thesis, I 
examine the case of the Johannesburg-based South African urban development 
NGO, Planact. I examine the short period of time – late 2002 to 2004 – in which it 
operated in the Zandspruit informal settlement in the north-western outskirts of 
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Johannesburg, towards the northernmost point of Beyer‟s Naude Drive, in the 
vicinity of the formal upmarket suburbs of Honeydew, Northriding and Marina 
Drive. Zandspruit is accessed from the Provincial Road R1410 as seen in Figure 
1. More information on Planact and Zandspruit is provided in Chapter Four.  
 
This thesis uses the case of Planact-Zandspruit to explore NGO legitimacy within 
the recent South African context. It examines in particular, how Planact 
constructed its legitimacy using representation, participation and accountability in 
its brief period of work in this informal settlement. This first chapter provides a 
brief introduction to the legitimacy challenges of  NGOs working in informal 
settlements, before moving on to key definitions, the problem statement, 
objectives and research question, the assumptions in this research, brief 
introductory notes on the approach, the justification for the research, research 
limitations and an outline of the thesis. 
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Figure 1: Map of Johannesburg and its seven regions (A-G) locating Zandspruit 
informal settlement.  
Map compiled by Corporate Geo-Informatics, City of Johannesburg, 16
th
 
November 2009 
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1.1 Background to the research 
 
The roles and strategies of NGOs have evolved over time. Korten (1990) indicates 
that the initial focus of NGOs was on providing effective relief operations during 
humanitarian emergencies. Since then, the operations of NGOs have expanded to 
include community development, promoting sustainable development systems and 
offering support to peoples‟ movements (Korten, 1990). Today NGOs can be 
categorised in relation to their objectives or orientation, William (1991) and the 
World Bank (2001) categorise NGOs according to their objectives into charitable, 
service oriented, participatory, empowering, advocacy and operational NGOs. In 
addition, Cernea (1988), Korten (1990) and William (1991) distinguish NGOs 
according to the level of operation which range from local community-based to 
international NGOs. As noted above, and discussed further in Chapter Three, 
there are different types of NGOs with different objectives. Therefore, in this 
thesis the focus is on development NGOs working at sub-national level focusing 
on empowerment and participation of marginalised communities (in informal 
settlements) in decision making processes. 
 
Although the activities and influence of NGOs have increased, their advantages, 
accountability and representativeness are increasingly being questioned 
internationally (Lister, 2003). Much scepticism remains about their legitimacy 
with questions being levelled at their entitlement in representing communities as 
they are unelected and not directly accountable (McDonald, 2004). The NGOs 
have responded to these criticisms by claiming that their representation of 
communities‟ needs and interests makes them legitimate (Edwards, 2003; Niggli 
and Rothenbuhler, 2003; Upadhyay, 2003). Although NGOs‟ legitimacy may 
involve accountability, participation and representation, the latter is the central 
issue in NGO legitimacy (Atack, 1999; Edwards, 2003; Niggli and Rothenbuhler, 
2003; Upadhyay, 2003; McDonalds 2004). The main issue is who and how NGOs 
represent, their right or mandate to represent and consent of the represented. It 
must be noted that, although NGOs face challenges concerning their legitimacy, 
ability to represent communities and where exactly their accountability lies, 
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NGOs still remain as the best means for community participation process, 
especially in the case of marginalised communities (Abbott, 1993).  
 
Virtually all Third World cities face an acute shortage of affordable housing, 
which has contributed to a significant increase in the number of informal 
settlements. Governments‟ views and responses to informal settlements are varied, 
ranging from tolerating them and sometimes upgrading them, to seeking solutions 
for their elimination (Agevi, 2003). Informal settlements by their nature create a 
number of challenges for NGOs that seek to convey the needs of the resident 
communities to government. This is mainly because of the many barriers in these 
communities that include illegalised occupation. The illegality of informal 
settlements, according to Durand-Lasserve and Tribillon (2001) and Payne (2002) 
is often as a result of the residents of informal settlements not owning the land or 
house they occupy. They have not entered into a formal agreement with the land 
owners and they do not comply with planning and building laws and regulations. 
In some cases, they may own the shelter but the illegality of residence still 
remains as they may not comply with the local government ordinance.  
 
Locally, informal settlement dwellers are mainly South African citizens. In a few 
instances, the residents may include a few illegal/legal immigrants. Although the 
action of occupying the land may be considered illegal by the state, informal 
settlement dwellers have rights to demand better living conditions or improved 
services even if these settlements are considered illegal. In most cases, they 
demand services as citizens.  
 
In South Africa, informal settlements have been a part of towns and cities for over 
five decades. In the 1950s and 1960s the main housing policy for Africans 
ensured that „black populations did not stay in urban areas permanently. They 
commuted for work daily from the townships that were somewhat far from the 
city centre‟. During the 1970s in particular the apartheid state housing policies did 
not cater for Africans (or the so-called „black‟ population) living in urban areas 
(O‟Regan, 1992:37). With much ambiguity the apartheid state revised its policies 
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in the 1980s allowing for home ownership and serviced sites for Africans, but 
mostly on the urban peripheries. By the time the democratic government came 
into power in 1994, people could move freely to the city. This resulted in an 
increased number of people requiring housing as they sought to be closer to areas 
with employment opportunities and services in the city. This saw a rise in 
informal settlements around South African cities. 
 
The problem of informal settlements in South Africa is particularly pronounced in 
the major cities, such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. The informal 
settlements registration conducted in August 2005 by the Gauteng Department of 
Housing indicated there were about 405 informal settlements in Gauteng Province 
alone (Gauteng Department of Housing, 2005). The same number of registered 
settlements is noted in the year 2009 (Department of Housing, 2009). In 2005, the 
City of Johannesburg municipality had the highest number of informal settlements 
in the province with 134 informal settlements (Gauteng Department of Housing, 
2005). By 2009, there were about 180 informal settlements within the municipal 
boundaries of the City of Johannesburg comprising approximately 200 000 
households. Although Gauteng Province has been formalising some of the 
settlements, new settlements are developing at the same time. Therefore, the 
number of settlements is subject to change where settlements are being formalised 
or where new ones are formed (Masondo, 2009). 
 
Policies of the South African government to address the informal settlement 
problem were repressive and deterministic (providing solutions to the poor 
without consultation with affected communities) during apartheid, but have been 
tolerant during the early years of democracy. However, in the first 10 years of 
post-apartheid government the government actions have been mainly 
deterministic in terms of solutions to the problems poor communities face 
(Huchzermeyer et al., 2006). After the first 10 years of democratic rule, policies 
of dealing with informal settlements have become more responsive and realistic 
(Huchzermeyer, et al., 2006) although implementation has been varied.  
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In addressing the problem of poverty and informal settlements, the main point of 
reference for the South African government since 2000 has been the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) of the United Nations (UN). Recent national policy 
in addressing informal settlements in South Africa includes upgrading of informal 
settlements. The implementation of the policy is intended to be done through 
cooperation with different spheres of government (national, provincial and local). 
This has created problems mainly in terms of budgetary processes as they are not 
integrated or aligned effectively. This has resulted in lack of capacity in many 
South African municipalities to take a developmental role in addressing informal 
settlements (United Nations, 2004). 
 
In addition to government working with informal settlement communities in 
South Africa, NGOs have been sought to assist in development issues in the 
informal settlement. Huchzermeyer et al. (2006) note that civil society concern for 
informal settlements varied over the decades. There was strong concern in the late 
1970s and 1980s.  With increasing evictions, involuntary relocations and a 
persistence of unequal distribution of land rights in the 1980s, civil society 
organisations‟ support for informal settlements re-emerged in the form of the 
number of new urban development NGOs such as Development Action Group 
(DAG) and Planact. These NGOs were aided by some university initiatives such 
as the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) at the University of the 
Witwatersrand. In the 1990s very few new organisations such as Homeless People 
Federation/ People‟s Dialogue Alliance emerged and „a formal space for these 
movements and NGOs to influence policy, or to have a voice in policy, was not 
created‟ (Huchzermeyer, et al. 2006:31). NGOs claim success in their work with 
marginalised communities as their legitimacy is based on their ability to project 
the plight of the marginalised communities to government and donors. Robins 
(2008:24) adds that:  
 
„NGOs are especially well placed to do this work of moral intervention 
precisely because they are not run directly by government and are assumed 
to act on the basis of ethical or moral imperatives‟.  
8 
 
 
Therefore, in this thesis I used the seminal theoretical model of representation 
developed by Hanna Pitkin (1967) to explore how NGOs construct legitimacy 
using representation, participation and accountability. Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of 
representation focuses on how representatives act in the interest of the represented 
in a manner responsive to them. This according to Pitkin (1967:209) establishes 
what bad or good representation may be. Pitkin‟s theory of representation 
discusses four different concepts of representation: these are formalistic 
representation in terms of authorisation to represent and accountability to the 
represented; descriptive representation where representatives resemble the 
represented; in symbolic representation representatives stand for the represented; 
and substantive representation as „acting in the interest of the represented‟. In this 
thesis, the focus is on representation as acting for and in the interest of those 
represented. I explore how NGOs ensure participation of communities, 
accountability to the community, and representation (acting for and on behalf of 
communities), in order to claim legitimacy. 
 
Although Pitkin‟s theory of representation is a few decades old, it remains 
relevant as the most groundbreaking work on representation. Subsequent work on 
representation has mostly expanded on the concept, without seriously questioning 
Pitkin‟s fundamentals. For example, Young (1990), Phillips (1995) and Williams 
(1998a) all expanded on the standard view and mainly offered arguments of 
inclusion of different groups on the concept of representation. Another example is 
by Whitby (2000) noting that Pitkin‟s (1967) four dimensions of representation 
provide a useful conceptual framework for determining how responsive congress 
in the US really is to black people‟s policy concerns. Whitby‟s (2000) book „The 
colour of representation‟ examines congressional responsiveness to black 
interests. The book uses Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of representation to provide an 
understanding of the meaning of representation. It also uses Pitkin‟s (1967) 
substantive and descriptive concepts of representation to explore the relationship 
between descriptive and substantive representation on policies related to race by 
critically assessing the voting behaviour of members of the U.S House of 
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Representatives on a variety of important topics directly relevant to the black 
community (Whitby, 2000). 
 
Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of representation is also used by Childs (2008) in his book 
„Women and British Party Politics: Descriptive, Substantive and Symbolic 
Representation’. Childs (2008) explores what „women‟s participation means for 
ideas about and, the practice of, representation, in particular symbolic and 
substantive representation‟ (Childs, 2008: xxiv). Childs (2008) outlines and 
evaluates classic and contemporary feminist theories of political representation. 
Childs (2008) disagrees with feminist debates on descriptive and substantive 
representation of women in British politics being linked. Childs (2008) indicates 
that this relationship is complicated and other factors determine whether 
representatives act for women.  
 
Similarly, the following authors have highlighted the use of Pitkin‟s concept of 
representation: Blakeley and Bryson (2007) in their book „The Impact of 
Feminism on Political Concepts and Debates’; Connor and Oppenheimer (2003)  
in „from Concept to Context: representation in the twentieth century in Ahuja and 
Dewhirst (2003) in the book „Congress Responds to the Twentieth Century’; and 
Tuschhoff (1999) in „The compounding effect - the impact of federalism on the 
concept of representation in compounded representation in West European’.  
 
However, a few authors have challenged Pitkin‟s concept. Galligan et al. 
(2007:42) argue that in Pitkin‟s (1967) „account of political representation, Pitkin 
opts for the term representative government rather than individual 
representatives‟. Rehfeld (2006:20) argues that Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of 
accountability does not cater for „instances of representation where authorisation 
and accountability mechanisms are missing‟. Here, Rehfeld (2006) is referring to 
representation by international agencies and organisations such as UN and World 
Bank.  Rehfeld (2006:20) explains that in such agencies or organisations „there are 
no democratic structures by which the representation can authorise or hold the 
international institutions to account and yet their representative function is 
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something that many people are willing to accept and recognise‟. In this case 
Rehfeld (2006) is applying formalistic representation to these organisations. This 
is only one type of representation Pitkin (1967) discussed. For international 
organisations or NGOs the type of representation that can be applied is 
substantive representation that does not require accountability and authorisation. 
 
Another critique of Pitkin (1967) is from Wissenburg (2009:152) who indicates 
that „Pitkin introduced descriptive representation as a kind of straw man 
[argument] merely to be aimed at and shot down in the end as a confused mix of 
two more really distinct ideas – symbolic and active representation‟. Wissenburg 
raises three arguments against Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of representation. 
Wissenburg (2009:152) indicates that Pitkin‟s phrase „made present where they 
are not present, and in fact cannot be present‟ cannot work in modern democracies 
because the electorate is too large to all meet. The second argument by 
Wissenburg (2009:152) indicates that „Pitkin too easily, too optimistically, 
discards descriptive representation ... the chosen few may not even be capable of 
representing the excluded simply because they do not live their lives, do not share 
their experiences, do not know their perspectives on life‟. And the last critique 
from Wissenburg(2009:152) indicates that „Pitkin‟s model has too few 
dimensions [which] she recognised but does not solve the mandate –
independently dilemma, although translated into terms of the best interpretation of 
substantive representation, but silently passes over‟. 
 
In general Pitkin‟s (1967) work has been revised and extended „to a significant 
extent, the fundamentals of the account have remained more or less unchallenged‟ 
(Galligan et al., 2007:36). Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of representation is still being 
used as a reference point when discussing representation mainly because Pitkin 
was one of the first political science authors to describe representation using four 
different views. Dovi (2006) indicates that Pitkin has set the terms of 
contemporary discussions about representation by providing a schematic overview 
of the concept of political representation. Pitkin‟s (1967) argument is that one 
must consider the different ways in which the term is used, as different uses of the 
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term provide different views of the concept. As discussed further in Chapter Two, 
there have been some advances in the literature on Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of 
representation using the different views of representation. However, in general 
discussions by different authors before and after Pitkin‟s 1967 concept of 
representation the focus is mostly on the formal procedures of authorisation and 
accountability within nation-state formalistic representation, which is just one of 
Pitkin‟s view of representation. Pitkin‟s (1967) different views of representation 
are especially important when interrogating NGOs‟ claim to legitimacy based on 
representation. This is discussed further in Chapter Two. 
 
1.2 Definitions of key concepts  
 
This section briefly defines those concepts and terms that are most central to this 
thesis. The seven concepts that follow are complex and several definitions could 
apply. My objective here is to clarify the definition applied in this study. 
 
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
NGOs are a component of civil society. Different dimensions have been used in 
defining NGOs, such as the size, organisational structure, operational programme 
areas, geographical specificity, funding sources and membership structure 
(Bartlett, 2005). With reference to the different dimensions Farrington and 
Bebbington (1993:5) define an NGO as an organisation that „embraces everything 
outside the public and private commercial sectors‟. In Cernea‟s (1988) definition, 
NGOs are private organisations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote 
the interest of the poor, protect the environment or undertake community 
development. For the purposes of this thesis, I define NGOs as groups and 
institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government, which can be 
voluntary organisations and are mainly not for profit. Their objectives are 
primarily to relieve suffering and assist with developmental issues at the 
community level rather than commercial objectives. In very simple terms, I define 
an NGO as a not-for-profit organisation that works in communities, assisting poor 
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and marginalised groups. An in-depth review of the literature that categorises and 
analyses NGOs is provided in Chapter Three. 
 
Informal settlements 
There is limited literature defining what an informal settlement is. Most available 
literature provides characteristics of what makes a settlement informal or illegal. 
Geyer et al. (2005: 289) define informal settlements as a:  
 
„(type) of residential development with the specific characteristics: 
temporary residential structures, erected with limited or no formal 
infrastructure, densely populated, no secure tenure for occupants, no 
property demarcations, often being associated with overcrowding/limited or 
no privacy, low standard of living, and being situated in high risk areas with 
an increased risk for disease and disasters‟. 
 
Magigi and Majani (2006: 1066) describe informal settlements as settlements  
 
„ (in) which inhabitants do not enjoy rights to an adequate standard of living 
and legal rights to access occupation and use of land, and therefore [are] 
exposed to risks of being evicted, inadequate basic services, informal land 
transactions and haphazard housing development‟.  
 
In this thesis, the definition of informal settlements is drawn from Geyer et al. 
(2005), and Magigi and Majani (2006), summarised as  areas with limited or no 
formal infrastructure, densely populated, with insecure tenure, and with illegal 
or unauthorised settlement formation processes, land use and building types. 
 
Legitimacy 
It has been a challenge to define the term legitimacy because, although it is used 
in political literature and in the policy context, it is rarely defined. What is seen as 
legitimate or illegitimate depends of the two approaches to legitimacy. These are 
normative/prescriptive and descriptive approach. The normative approach which 
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is more traditional approach to legitimacy defines legitimacy according to 
systematic properties. The problem with this approach is that it depends on formal 
structures and processes. The second approach is the descriptive approach that 
defines legitimacy according to public opinion depending on people‟s attitudes 
and actions (Weatherford, 1992). Suchman (1995:574) provides a broad definition 
of legitimacy as follows: 
 
„A generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions‟. 
 
A working definition of „legitimate‟ as it applies to NGOs is provided by Edwards 
(1999: 258): 
 
„Having the right to be and do something in society-a sense that an 
organisation is lawful, proper, admissible and justified in doing what it does, 
and saying what it says, and that it continues to enjoy the support of an 
identifiable constituency‟. 
 
In the NGO context, legitimacy should be seen as complex and dependent on a 
number of variables working together. From the variables that inform the 
legitimacy of NGOs, the three key variables (also emphasised in Chapter Three) 
are representation, accountability and participation. In this thesis, the legitimacy 
of the NGOs is based on these three variables although there could be more. 
 
Representation 
The classic description of representation by Pitkin (1967) is still widely cited by 
political theorists. Pitkin‟s (1967) description of individual representation and 
political representation involves authorisation, accountability and looking out for 
another‟s interests. Pitkin‟s (1967:8-9) own definition of representation is the 
simplest and most straightforward: „making present in some sense of something 
which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact‟.  
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Birch (1971:15) identifies three main usages of representation: „To denote an 
agent or spokesperson who acts on behalf of his principal, to indicate that a person 
shares some of the characteristics of a class of persons and to indicate that a 
person symbolises the identity or qualities of a class or persons‟. Brennan and 
Hamlin (1999:109) define representation as „involving indirect decision making or 
agency‟. For Hertel (2003:41), representation is „a process by which some 
individuals select others to take their place in formal decision-making‟.  
 
Hickey and Mohan (2004:19) see representation in two ways: „speaking of‟-
constructing accounts and writings texts - or „speaking for‟- advocating and 
mediating. The simplest definition comes from Rehfeld (2006) who notes that in 
representation there are those who represent, known as representatives, and those 
who are represented. In this thesis the principle definition I apply is substantive 
representation which according to Pitkin (1967:209), is when representatives are 
„acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them‟. This 
will enable me to explore Planact‟s representativeness of the Zandspruit 
community. 
 
Accountability 
There are many types of accountability. According to Schedler et al. (1999), these 
range from political, moral, administrative, financial, professional, constitutional 
legal and other.  Across the different types of accountability, there are two main 
ways of looking at accountability, namely vertical and horizontal.  Schedler et al. 
(1999:23) explains that horizontal accountability is the relationship between 
equals „[It] refers to somebody holding someone else of roughly equal power 
accountable‟. Schedler et al. (1999:23) also indicate that „vertical accountability 
describes a relationship between unequals; it refers to some powerful „superior‟ 
actor holding some less powerful „inferior‟ actor accountable‟. In addition 
„horizontal accountability complements but is to be distinguished from vertical 
accountability through which citizens, mass media and civil associations seek to 
enforce standards of good conduct on public officials‟ Schedler et al. (1999:3).  
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The main interest in this thesis is in vertical accountability, exploring downward 
accountability mainly from the NGO to the community. However, downward 
accountability from donors to NGO also plays a role in the Planact and Zandspruit 
Private Property case study. Edwards and Hulme (1996:967) add that 
accountability as „the means by which individuals and organisations report to a 
recognised authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions‟. 
However, Fox and Brown (1998:2) emphasise the process rather than the means. 
To them, accountability is „the process of holding actors responsible for their 
actions‟. Ebrahim (2003:815) notes that:  
 
„(accountability) is [a]complex and dynamic concept and can be defined as a 
means through which individuals and organisations are held responsible for 
their actions and means by which organisations and individuals take internal 
responsibility for shaping their organisations mission and values‟. 
 
Grant and Keohane (2005:29-30) expand on the implications of accountability as:  
 
„[some] actors having the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to 
judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these 
standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these 
responsibilities have not been met… the concept of accountability implies 
that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways that 
are consistent with accepted standards of behaviour‟. 
 
In this thesis, the focus is on NGO accountability to the marginalised communities 
which NGOs work with and seek to represent in relation to, and in competition 
with, other accountability demands from donors and internally to the NGO itself. 
The general assumption is that NGO accountability is associated with 
participation and representation because limited participation by the community in 
decision-making processes affects the level of representation of the community by 
the NGO and the accountability of the NGO to the community (Moncrieffe, 
1998).  
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Participation 
Participation is defined by the World Bank (2006) as a process through which 
stakeholders influence and share control over priority setting, policy making, 
resource allocation and access to public goods and services. In the context of 
informal settlement upgrading projects, Imparato and Ruster (2003:20) define 
participation as „a process in which people, and especially disadvantaged people, 
influence resource allocation and policy and program formulation and 
implementation‟. Beyond people‟s involvement in individual projects, the United 
Nations (UN) sees participation as a development strategy and as a democratic 
process where the weak and poor identify and voice their demands especially 
through civil society and civic engagement (UNDP, 2009). 
 
Arnstein (1969) in the seminal article „A Ladder of Citizen Participation’, argues 
that participation is the redistribution of power that enables poor citizens who are 
excluded from political and economic processes to be deliberately included in 
future decision-making processes. For NGOs, participation of communities is 
seen as a critical variable in ensuring representation and accountability and as a 
means for NGOs to claim legitimacy of their activities (Edwards and Hulme, 
1995; Saxby, 1996; Eade, 1997; Pearce, 1997; Hudson, 2000).  
 
In this thesis, effective participation is defined as a process in which all 
community members, including the weak and poor, have the power to affect the 
outcome of the process. In the case where NGOs represent communities, 
participation refers to the process whereby information about a project is made 
available to the public or „community‟, where community members are involved 
in the decision making and the weak and poor can bargain over decisions with the 
government, with some form of assistance from the NGO. In this thesis, the main 
activity of the case study NGO Planact regarding participation was to ensure 
effective involvement of the community in the statutory participatory processes of 
local government.  
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Community 
For a few decades, political scientists, historians and philosophers have been 
divided on the definition of „community‟. Nelson et al. (1960) note that 
„community‟ is a complicated and often mysterious set of relationships among 
people, groups and institutions. They argue that the term „community‟ refers to 
different things, depending upon who is using it and the context in which it is 
being used. Plant (1974) explains that „community‟ has been linked to locality, 
identified functional interests, a sense of belonging, shared cultural and ethnic 
ideas and values as well as to a way of life or in opposition to the organisation and 
bureaucracy or modern mass society.  
 
Agbola (1994) defines community as a geographical unit. For example, it could be 
a group of people living in the same area, such as a village, town or urban 
neighbourhood. Agbola (1994) also notes that there are functional communities, 
such as religious, ethnic and occupational groups whose members interact but 
who do not live in the same geographical area. Members of the community share a 
common identity which sufficiently distinguishes them from other communities 
(Agbola, 1994). 
 
Delanty (2003:3) argues that „community has a variable nature and cannot simply 
be equated with particular groups or a place. Nor can it be reduced to an idea, for 
ideas do not simply exist outside social relations, socially structured discourses 
and a historical milieu‟. Delanty (2003) describes four broad positions of the term 
community relating to social, political, cultural and technological issues.  
 
Drawing on all of the above, community can be seen as a group of people in a 
specific geographical area (informal settlement) organising themselves along a 
broadly common identity (being marginalised) for collective action (improved 
services and housing) and requiring support from NGOs and government.  
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1.3 NGO legitimacy in informal settlement work 
 
NGOs are seen as being better equipped than local government to implement 
community participation in minority or marginalised communities (Clark, 1995). 
It is argued that NGOs have this advantage over government because the size of 
any country and its population makes it difficult for direct involvement of all 
individuals in decision-making processes in governance. In government, 
individuals‟ interests are only represented by their vote. This type of 
representation does not allow for minority needs and interests to be heard, as it 
only covers majority interests. Therefore, Morrill (2004) argues that for minorities 
to be heard, they must organise themselves into small groups with organisation 
such as NGOs representing them. The arguments of Clark (1995) and Morrill 
(2004) are further supported by ideas from Abbott (1993) and Dicklitch (1998) 
who indicate that NGOs are better agents of community participation than 
government in representing poor and marginalised people‟s needs and interests.  
 
According to Fowler (1995) NGOs are in a better position to adapt their 
organisational structure, methods and processes to enable them to engage with 
communities in ways that gain a greater degree of participation and local input in 
providing the services they need. There is a body of literature on NGOs and the 
work they do with marginalised communities in general and in informal 
settlements in particular, for example Otiso (2003) indicate the important role 
NGOs play in mobilising and assisting communities articulate their needs to 
government and other agencies, and act as intermediaries between government, 
businesses, donors and communities. Winayanti and Lang (2004) also add that 
NGOs play a crucial role in mobilising the resources of the urban poor 
communities. But there is no literature exploring how these NGOs claim 
legitimacy using representation, participation and accountability. There is a gap in 
the literature on whether NGOs working within the context of unresolved tenure 
security can substantively claim legitimacy using representation, participation and 
accountability.  
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Even though there is general acceptance of the advantages NGOs enjoy in relation 
to representation, there are also doubts raised in the literature pertaining to NGO 
legitimacy in their activities in marginalised communities (Fowler, 1997; Edwards 
1999, 2001; Marschall, 2002; Lister, 2003).  MacDonald (2004) adds that NGOs 
are not elected and therefore cannot claim a representational role. However, this 
criticism is based on only one dimension of representation (namely formal 
representation) and ignores other forms of representation. To defend their 
legitimacy, NGOs emphasise their representation of poor and marginalised 
communities. In addition to formal representation, Pitkin (1967) notes that there is 
descriptive representation based on the extent the representative mirrors the 
characteristics of the represented; symbolic representation as the extent to which a 
representative is accepted by the represented as one of their own; and substantive 
representation which depends on the responsiveness of the representative to the 
expectations of the represented. Looking at the other forms of representation, 
NGOs do still claim legitimacy using substantive representation. 
 
The problems which need to be addressed and answered in this thesis are whether 
the advantages enjoyed by NGOs in terms of their claims to legitimacy through 
representing marginalised communities that are considered legal can also be 
realised when representing communities in informal settlement. In the context of 
marginalised informal settlements with unresolved tenure, can NGOs claim 
legitimacy by ensuring assistance to communities in participation in relevant 
decision-making processes and in representing their real needs and aspirations 
adequately while satisfying multiple accountabilities to their donors, the 
community and themselves?  
 
In this thesis I chose the specific case of the development NGO Planact‟s work in 
the Zandspruit informal settlement from the end of 2002 to 2005, because Planact 
made a relatively abrupt decision to withdraw from this work. This decision 
related to a number of factors, including the NGOs inability to facilitate resolution 
of the tenure security - a key aspiration of the community. And despite Planact‟s 
exit from Zandspruit, the NGO continues to enjoy legitimacy, even within the 
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Zandspruit „community‟. This case, therefore, explores how NGO legitimacy is 
constructed in such a situation, to what extent representation, participation and 
accountability are used, and whether there were other factors at play.  
 
1.4 Justification for the research 
 
My review of the prescriptive approach to legitimacy in Chapter Three indicates 
that NGOs are seen as legitimate by claiming representation of marginalized 
communities. An organization can claim representation by ensuring the 
represented communities participate in the decision making processes and the 
organization is accountable to the representatives. While reviewing this literature, 
I observed that conclusions on the prescriptive legitimacy of the NGOs are based 
on NGO work in communities that do not face the obstacle of illegal occupation. 
There is an urgent need for empirical research in the context where settlement 
status is not certain or easily resolved. NGOs are generally assumed to be 
effective in implementing representation and participation in marginalised 
communities and thereby achieving the improvement in people‟s lives. In reality, 
most „marginalised communities‟ in the Third World cities occupy land 
informally or without authorisation, are often under threat of eviction or are with 
extended indecision over their future or over the prospects of development.  
 
This research, which builds on information in a single case study, will clarify 
issues on the legitimacy of NGOs‟ representational role in relation to communities 
they may work with that occupy land without authorisation. The research provides 
a window into the complex interface between a small and under-resourced NGO 
and a marginalised informal settlement in which development is seemingly unable 
to be unlocked or resolved due to tenure insecurity. The particular socio-political 
context of South Africa around 2002 to 2004, during which the NGO Planact 
worked with the Zandspruit community is illustrated. With the contribution from 
both the prescriptive and descriptive approaches to understanding legitimacy, this 
research hopes to begin to provide a deeper understanding for the academic 
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community, governments, NGOs and donors on the legitimacy of NGOs working 
with marginalised communities in informal settlements.  
 
1.5 Objectives of the research 
 
There are few NGOs helping communities in informal settlements to engage with 
local governments in South Africa. Planact is one of the few development NGOs 
working with a small number of informal settlement communities in 
Johannesburg and its surrounds. The City of Johannesburg lists 182 informal 
settlements. It aims somewhat unrealistically to eradicate, formalise or relocate all 
of these by 2014 (Davie, 2008). Zandspruit is one of these 182 informal 
settlements which in 2008 was not yet linked to either relocation or a 
formalization programme, private owners of the land being the main obstacle. 
Zandspruit is one of many similar informal settlements around Johannesburg and 
Planact is one of only a few NGOs working with such settlements. Most of 
Johannesburg‟s informal settlements do not have the assistance of a development 
NGO, and Zandspruit enjoyed this status only for the short period from 2002 to 
2004.  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore how development NGOs such as 
Planact, working in this particular context of vast need and very limited NGO 
capacity, construct their legitimacy using representation, participation and 
accountability, given the challenges they face working in unauthorised informal 
settlements.  
 
The specific objectives of the thesis are: 
 To explore how NGOs that support communities in informal settlements 
towards the goal of development construct their legitimacy using 
representation, participation and accountability. 
 To explain challenges NGOs face working in informal settlements with 
unresolved tenure.  
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 Using prescriptive approach, to establish how Planact constructed legitimacy 
working with Zandspruit informal settlement 
 
1.6 Research questions 
 
What is the role of representation, participation and accountability in constructing 
legitimacy of NGO support to informal settlement communities? 
 
Sub-questions 
 How did Planact facilitate participation of Zandspruit residents in the 
decision-making process? 
 To what extent did Planact represent the actual interests, needs and 
aspirations of Zandspruit residents? 
 What challenges did Planact face working with the illegally occupied section 
(„Private Property‟) of Zandspruit? 
 What accountability challenges did Planact encounter working with the 
Zandspruit community? 
 How did Planact construct legitimacy in Zandspruit? 
 
1.7 Hypothesis  
 
The assumption in this research is that the legitimacy of the NGOs working with 
communities in informal settlements can be secured through substantive 
representation by ensuring responsiveness to the expectations of the communities 
represented. For an NGO to be responsive to a community‟s needs, priorities and 
aspirations, the people or members of that community must be able to participate 
effectively and influence policy and decisions on matters affecting them. In 
addition the NGO must be accountable to the people and advocate people‟s 
interests, needs and aspirations. Based on the theoretical and literature review, in 
this case study I expected to find that Planact legitimacy working with Zandspruit 
informal settlement is determined by Planact representation, Zandspruit 
participation and Planact‟s accountability to Zandspruit community. The 
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assumption here is that if people participate effectively, and Planact is accountable 
to the people and represent and advocate real interest, needs and aspirations of the 
people, then Planact is legitimate in its activities. In the final chapter I return to 
these assumptions showing that the Planact-Zandspruit case opened up 
complexities and realities beyond what I was expecting to find. 
 
1.8 Introductory notes on the research methods  
 
NGO legitimacy is explored using both normative/prescriptive and descriptive 
approaches to legitimacy. Therefore, in this exploratory research, the decision was 
to apply qualitative research methods in constructing the Planact and Zandspruit 
case study as this allowed for a discussion of legitimacy in many dimensions and 
layers to portray the role and challenges in a multifaceted form (Leedy, 1997). It 
was expected that in-depth interviewing with open-ended questions would give 
the participants an opportunity to respond in their own words and provide 
responses that were unanticipated, meaningful, salient, rich and explanatory. It 
would also allow follow-up and elaboration on answers. 
 
After initial review of literature about NGOs and legitimacy challenges, I 
discussed the topic with a few NGO staff in South Africa working in informal 
settlements in search of relevant phenomena to investigate. Recognising the need 
for understanding the role of NGOs and legitimacy challenges they face working 
in informal settlements, the research continued into the next stage of reviewing 
international literature on the role of NGOs in general and how NGOs construct 
legitimacy using prescriptive approaches to legitimacy as discussed in Chapter 
Three.  
 
1.8.1 Qualitative Case Study Approach 
 
To explore the legitimacy of NGOs working in informal settlements, this thesis 
applied a case study strategy because it is useful in understanding a particular 
problem in more details (Patton, 1990:54). Patton (1990:54) supports the use of 
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qualitative case studies indicating that this enable the research to describe the 
units of analysis in depth, detail and context. Patton (1990) further indicates that 
although there are criticisms of the use of qualitative inquiry, namely that such 
research is subjective; it is still useful as a research method tool. To deal with the 
limitations of the qualitative case study approach, researchers must adopt a stance 
of neutrality.   
 
In defending qualitative research practice, especially the case of subjective bias in 
a single case study, Flyvbjerg (2004) indicates that it is not only case studies that 
face subjectivity challenges. In the case of other methods, for example a 
structured questionnaire used across a large sample of cases in quantitative 
research, there is a possibility of subjectivism. This happens when the categories 
and variables remain without being corrected with a large sample in quantitative 
study (people being interviewed just fill the questionnaire without follow up 
questions) because the researcher does not get as close to the under study, 
compared to qualitative case study where the researcher gets close to study objects 
and the subjectivism can be corrected by the subjects talking back (Flyvbjerg, 
2004). 
 
In this research, the use of a case study on Planact‟s work in Zandspruit is 
important because it provides an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon of NGO legitimacy within its „real-life context and 
allows the use of multiple sources of evidence‟ (Yin, 2003:13). In choosing a case 
study approach, I was aware of its challenges, namely not having grounds for 
generalisation, case biases due to intense exposure, the possibility of „taking too 
long and resulting in a massive, unreadable document‟ and only being useful as an 
exploratory tool. In selecting this research methodology, I focussed on the unique 
strength of the case study approach, namely its ability to deal with a range of 
evidence at the same time, when compared to other strategies such as surveys, 
experiments and analyse of archival records (Yin, 2009:15). In addition Flyvbjerg 
(2004:428) argues that „the advantage of the case study is that it can „close in‟ on 
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real life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomenon as they 
unfold in practice‟. 
 
1.8.2 Empirical methods 
 
In this qualitative case study, empirical methods have been used, guided by 
preliminary theoretical exploration. Qualitative techniques used for collecting 
empirical data include questionnaires and structured interviews, recorded details 
about the context surrounding the settlement, information about the physical 
environment, and direct observation in community meetings and fieldwork. 
Secondary data sources included published and unpublished documents, such as 
Planact reports and articles. Data was collected through interviews with 
government officials, Planact and Zandspruit community leaders and members to 
understand the background and context. As I am exploring NGOs legitimacy and 
donor funding contributes to the ability of NGOs implementing their objectives, 
one would expect donors to be interviewed too in this thesis.  
 
However, donors have not been interviewed because of the sensitivity of NGO 
funding topic with both NGOs and donors. My research on NGO legitimacy 
depended on the NGO openness in discussing its activities in different 
communities. I believed inquiring about specific details on funding and 
interviewing the NGOs donors would have limited the openness and willingness 
of the NGO in providing the needed information. Chapter Five sets out the 
methodology and scope of the interviewing in detail. 
 
1.8.3 Data analysis 
 
Analysis of the data will be carried out by identifying the major themes and sub-
themes and understand the relationship between the data and the conceptual 
framework. The classification of qualitative data into themes and patterns will 
facilitate content analysis within a particular setting and across variables. This 
approach is supported by Patton (1990:384) who notes that „the case study 
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approach to qualitative analysis is a specific way of collecting, organising and 
analysing data. The purpose is to gather comprehensive, systematic, and in-depth 
information about each case of interest‟.  
 
According to Patton (1990:376), there are two types of case study analysis: case 
analysis and cross-case analysis. Patton (1990:425) defines cross-case analysis as 
„grouping together answers from different people to common questions or 
analysing different perspectives on central issues‟. In addition, Patton (1990:425) 
points out that „for scholarly inquiry, the qualitative synthesis is a way to build 
theory through induction and interpretation‟. Miles and Huberman (1994) also 
stated that cross-case analysis deepened understanding and explanation of a 
certain phenomenon. In this research, although it is a single case study strategy, 
the case study analysis is done using cross-case analysis by grouping answers 
from different people to common questions or topics from the interview guide. 
Before doing the cross-case analysis, I wrote a pre-case analysis using all the data 
for each person interviewed. 
 
1.8.4 Limitations of the study 
 
According to Yin (2003:37), „the common complaint about case studies is that it 
is difficult to generalise from one case to another‟. In this research, this limitation 
is more pronounced due to the fact that only one case study was used. The 
argument against using only one case study, according to Yin (2009:15), is that it 
„provides little basis for scientific generalisation. How can you generalise from a 
single case? This is a frequently heard question‟. To counter this argument, Yin 
(2009:15) indicates that „single case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to 
theoretical propositions and not to population or universes‟. In constructing a case 
study, one‟s goal is to expand and generalise to theories and not to enumerate 
frequencies (ibid.). However, Flyvbjerg (2004) notes that formal generalisation is 
not the only legitimate method of scientific inquiry. Flyvbjerg (2004:424) 
indicates that  
 
27 
 
„formal generalization is only one of many ways by which people gain and 
accumulate knowledge. That knowledge cannot be formally generalized 
does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge 
accumulation in a given field or in a society. A purely descriptive, 
phenomenological case study without any attempt to generalize can 
certainly bring value in this process and has often helped cut a path towards 
scientific innovations‟.  
 
This is what this thesis attempts to do, namely to add insight on how an NGO 
constructs legitimacy working with informal settlements. Therefore, the findings 
from this thesis will not be extrapolated from the experiences of Planact to those 
of NGOs in South Africa generally. 
 
Yin (2003:40) argues that the rationale for using a single case include that a 
 
„[single] case can represent the critical case in testing a well-formulated 
theory. The single case can then be used to determine whether a theory‟s 
propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations 
might be more relevant‟.  
 
In addition, Yin (2009:48) explains that  
 
„[a] case study may present a typical „project‟ among many different 
projects, [can be applied in situations where the] investigator has an 
opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to 
social science inquiry, [and can also be used] in longitudinal case[s] 
studying the same single case at two or more different points in time‟. 
 
Although there are numerous justifications for using a single case, multiple-case 
designs may still be preferred over single-case designs. Multiple case studies are 
considered more compelling than a single case study (Yin, 2003). In this research, 
I have used a single case study with one NGO (Planact) selecting one informal 
settlement that it works with (Zandspruit) in Johannesburg because as an in-depth 
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case study, it displayed all the conditions for exploring the relevant theory. 
Zandspruit settlement had no prospects of being legalised despite Planact‟s 
attempt at improving the informal settlement community‟s standing in relation to 
the participatory governance processes of the municipality. This case study, 
therefore, could raise relevant questions in relation to substantive representation, 
accountability, participation and, ultimately, legitimacy. Multiple case studies of 
this depth would have required extensive resources and time, and would still not 
have allowed me to generalise. 
 
1.9 Outline of the thesis 
 
Chapter Two presents the theoretical review and begins with principles of 
legitimacy and then examines the concept of representation, theories of 
participation and the concept of accountability. These concepts are discussed to 
provide the relevant theoretical context for an exploration of how NGOs construct 
their legitimacy using representation, accountability and participation.  
 
Chapter Three provides an international literature review on NGOs, discussing 
theories of NGO existence, types of NGOs, their role in communities and the 
challenges they face in terms of their legitimacy, representation, accountability 
and participation. I have separated the discussion of NGO theories from the 
theoretical chapter (chapter two) because a more in-depth discussion of NGOs (in 
this chapter) was necessary, before engaging with the conceptual framework in 
Chapter Four. This chapter also covers international literature on the advantages 
and challenges of community participation because participation is a core tool in 
constructing legitimacy. The chapter is concluded by a review of literature on 
informal settlements by discussing issues concerning their tenure insecurity and 
informality, government policies and strategies in addressing the problem of 
informal settlements and the role NGOs play in community participation 
processes in informal settlements.  
 
Chapter Four provides a historical development of informal settlements and the 
role of NGOs in South Africa. The discussion then moves to the transition to 
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democracy and the resulting shift in NGO accountability and legitimacy. I then 
discuss post-apartheid strategies in addressing the challenge of informal 
settlements and the role of NGOs after the end of apartheid. In the last section, I 
introduce Zandspruit informal settlement, present its history and background, 
explain its location and its characteristics and discuss Planact‟s involvement and 
role in the informal settlement.  
 
Chapter Five focuses on the conceptual framework for assessing how a small, 
localised development NGO such as Planact constructs its legitimacy by ensuring 
representation and participation of communities it supports and balancing its 
accountability to its donors with that to communities, government and itself. The 
conceptual framework indicates how these variables are explored in the context of 
unresolved tenure and marginalised informal settlements, exploring the 
dimensions of settlement illegality in relation to the definition of informal 
settlements provided earlier in this chapter. The research methodology and 
questions are further discussed in this chapter, indicating how I approached and 
interacted with the community in conducting the fieldwork and challenges that I 
encountered in this process. 
 
Chapter Six presents the findings on how representation, participation and 
accountability were implemented to construct Planact‟s legitimacy. The first 
section discusses structures of representation in Zandspruit as implemented by 
government and Planact (through the Joint Committee). The second section shows 
how participation was implemented and facilitated by local government and 
Planact. The last section discusses Planact‟s multiple accountabilities to donors, 
government, community and Planact itself and implications for Planact‟s 
legitimacy. 
 
Chapter Seven expands the empirical discussion in chapter six. Firstly, I discuss 
the complex context of unresolved tenure and marginalisation of Zandspruit and 
how it limits the use of prescriptive approach to legitimacy in this case study. 
Using the descriptive approach to legitimacy I discuss how Planact constructed its 
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legitimacy in Zandspruit legally and morally, from the view of the community, 
government and Planact.  
 
Chapter Eight provides a brief summary of what the thesis set out to do in 
assessing NGO legitimacy working with informal settlements. The chapter then 
articulates the main finding in relation to the extent to which representation, 
participation and accountability establish Planact‟s legitimacy. Combining 
prescriptive and descriptive approaches to legitimacy I demonstrate that in the 
case of Planact and Zandspruit the conceptual framework using a prescriptive 
approach to legitimacy has limits. These limits were demonstrated by the 
descriptive approach indicating that Planact enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of 
community, local government and itself although there was limited representation, 
participation and accountability. This was mainly due to the context of unresolved 
tenure and marginalisation of the Zandspruit community.  
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2.0 CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL REVIEW OF FACTORS 
DETERMINING NGO LEGITIMACY 
 
The influence of NGOs on global politics has increased, and this has raised 
questions about their legitimacy (Dicklitch, 1998). There are arguments that 
NGOs are not elected and have no direct accountability, and as such they cannot 
speak on behalf of communities or a wider population (McDonald, 2004). NGOs 
defend themselves by insisting that they represent marginalised communities and, 
at the same time, empower communities to participate in policies that influence 
people‟s lives (Niggli and Rothenbuhler, 2003). In defending NGO legitimacy 
Young (2000:5) indicates that „a democratic spirit and practice inspires many 
voluntary organisations, and movements composed of such groups sometimes 
influence government actions and the actions of other powerful institutions‟. 
Young (2000) argues that democracy is necessary to promote legal, administrative 
and social changes towards greater justice.  Young (2000:6) further indicates that 
„the normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to 
which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes 
and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes‟.  
 
In most democratic processes there is under-representation of minorities and some 
sections of society are marginalised in the decision making processes. Therefore, 
to ensure greater inclusion in the decision making processes, there is need for 
measures that encourage more representation of the marginalised. Young (2000:6) 
notes that some organisations of the twentieth century have mobilized around 
demands for oppressed and marginalized people to be included as full and equal 
citizens in their polities. For organisations to legitimately mobilise and represent 
marginalised communities, communities must be able hold the representatives 
accountable and engage with both each other and their representatives (Young, 
2000:8).  
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As already mentioned, there are two main approaches to assessing legitimacy, 
namely prescriptive and the descriptive approach. These are discussed further in 
this chapter under principles of legitimacy. The concept of democracy is 
introduced to establish the position of NGOs in a democratic process and their 
capacity to represent marginalised communities. Then I discuss the principles of 
legitimacy, the concepts of representation, participation and accountability and 
how these are all interlinked in constructing the legitimacy of NGOs.  
 
2.1 Principles of legitimacy 
 
As Birch (1970:45) points out „[t]he word democracy comes from the Greek and 
literally means rule by the people‟.  Other definitions of democracy include 
„government by the people‟ or by the people‟s elected representatives‟ (Arblaster, 
1987:2); „popular control over collective decision making and equality of rights in 
the exercise of that control‟ (Beetham and Boyle, 1995:1); and „a form of 
government in which the people rule‟ (Ellingsen, 2004:3). The different authors 
above indicate that democracy involves decision making processes that allow 
participation and control by the people. However, not everyone can participate or 
is represented in a democratic society. 
 
In both democratic and non-democratic societies, NGOs often fill the institutional 
vacuum where other participatory political institutions are weak or absent and 
form the basis for many social movements, empowering local communities 
(Wiktorowicz, 2002:77). In the case of undemocratic societies Kuzio (2006) 
observed that NGOs played a vital role in representing communities during the 
democratic revolutions in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). It 
has also been noted that in Asia, Africa and Latin America, NGOs have made 
significant contributions to political change Clarke (1998). Wiktorowicz (2002) 
indicates that NGOs may be central to the advent and consolidation of 
democratisation.   
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Ndegwa (1994) and Clarke (1998) note the potential for NGOs to positively affect 
democratisation and governance. A few examples of countries in Africa in which 
NGOs played a role in challenging undemocratic governments include Zambia 
and Kenya. In these countries, NGOs challenged the government and contributed 
to the democratization into multi party systems (Ndegwa, 1994). In South Africa, 
civic organisations played a similar role during apartheid by creating and 
sustaining an oppositional role to apartheid government. Young (2000:154) notes 
that in South Africa „civil society served as a school of democracy for citizens to 
activate democratic legal process‟. Young (2000:155) further indicates that civil 
society promotes trust, choice and virtues of democracy. Because this thesis 
explores NGO legitimacy in contemporary South Africa, the discussion will be on 
the role and legitimacy of NGOs in a democratic sphere. 
 
In a democratic society NGOs claim legitimacy in representing marginalised 
groups. The argument is that marginalised groups are under-represented even in 
most contemporary democracies and this undermines promises of equal 
opportunity and political equality implied by democratic commitments (Young, 
2000). Szazi (2009:20) indicates that  
 
„democracy requires the engagement of several constituencies presenting 
their opinions and debating the issue at stake. The NGOs‟ role is to enhance 
the debate with different points of view, concerns, and alternative models, 
qualifying the decisions that will be made‟.  
 
Hanberger (2001:214) warns that although civil societies may play an important 
role in a democratic society, they‟re not an alternative to democratic government, 
but they participate in a free space in which democratic attitudes are cultivated 
and democratic behaviour is conditioned. This view is supported by Young 
(2000:156) who avers that „state institutions have unique capacities for co-
ordination, regulation and administration on large scale that well-functioning 
democracy cannot do without. Young (2000:153) argues that, in addition to the 
democratic government, strong, plural and aggregated activities of civic 
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associations offer individuals and social groups, in their own diversity, maximum 
opportunity to be represented in public life. Although there is general agreement 
on the role of NGOs representing marginalised communities, NGOs still face 
questions regarding their legitimacy.  
 
Legitimacy is seen as a central concept in political science and has received 
sustained attention over more than a decade. The term legitimacy has both 
theoretical and methodological challenges. This is because measures of what is 
considered to be public legitimacy are scattered and unsystematic (Weatherford, 
1992:149). As the concept of legitimacy is complex, most scholars break it down 
into different tenets, exploring legitimacy in different contexts (Weatherford, 
1992:149). This argument is supported by Beetham (1991:15) who argues that to 
„understand the concept of legitimacy there is a need to recognise that legitimacy 
is multi-dimensional in character‟.  
 
Weatherford (1992; Steffek‟s 2003) explore the concept of legitimacy by using 
two approaches: the traditional system level approach (prescriptive) and the more 
recent approach focussed on the relevance of public opinion (descriptive). The 
traditional approach distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate governments by 
focussing on constitutional provisions that establish the opportunity for wide 
participation and ensure procedural regularity, especially provisions dealing with 
majority rule, minority rights and accountability in regular and frequent elections 
(Weatherford, 1992: 150). The legitimacy of an institution (whether it is a 
government or an NGO) in this system depends on how effective the 
implementation of the democratic system is. 
 
This approach formulates legitimacy in systematic properties that facilitates 
comparative analysis. According to Weatherford (1992: 150), these include:  
 
„1. Accountability. Are rulers accountable to the governed via a process that 
allows wide, effective participation? 2. Efficiency. Is government set up to 
accomplish society‟s ends without undue waste of time and resources? 3. 
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Procedural fairness. Is the system structured to ensure that issues are 
resolved in a regular, predictable way and that access to decisional arenas is 
open and equal? 4. Distributive fairness. Are the advantages and costs 
allocated by the system distributed equally‟? 
 
According to Weatherford (1992:150) the weakness of this approach is that it 
tends to concentrate more on formal structures and aggregate processes. 
Nevertheless, it is important in assessing legitimacy of an institution because it 
provides analysis of accountability, participation and efficiency of an institution. 
 
Steffek‟s (2003) prescriptive approach to legitimacy indicates that legitimacy can 
be assessed using political philosophers and legal theorists who have already 
reflected on the conditions under which an institution is seen as legitimate. An 
institution is judged to be legitimate or not depending on certain rules and 
principles (for instance, democratic principles). This approach does not ask why 
people accept an institution as legitimate. 
 
Other forms of prescriptive/traditional legitimacy have been formulated by Max 
Weber‟s initial description of legitimacy. According to Weber, an institution is 
seen as legitimate through traditional grounds (in accordance with custom), 
charismatic domination (extraordinary quality of a person) and rational or legal 
belief in the legality of rationally established rules (Matheson, 1987). Matheson 
(1987) agrees with Weber but adds that instead of three, there are eight forms of 
legitimacy based on command and obedience. Among these are: conventional or 
prescribed by norms, contract, conformity with universal principles, sacredness of 
authority, and personal quality among others. Beetham (1991:15) introduces the 
concept of „different dimensions of legitimacy‟, by noting that there are three 
different elements/levels of legitimacy: conformity to rules (legal validity), 
justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs and legitimating through expressed 
consent. Although Beetham (1991) discusses levels/elements of legitimacy in 
terms of power, these arguments also apply to the legitimacy of organisations 
such as NGOs. Beetham (1991:16) indicates that „power is said to be legitimate if 
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it is acquired and exercised in accordance with established rules‟. This is seen as 
the most basic level of establishing legitimacy.  
 
In relation to NGOs, an organisation is considered to be legitimate by following 
the rules and regulations of the government policies. In most cases this is 
demonstrated by registering the organisation. Legitimacy of NGOs‟ is poorly 
theorised in development studies literature (Lister 2003). Legitimacy of NGOs in 
most cases, according to the prescriptive approach to legitimacy, is dependent on 
accountability, performance and representation, „which masks deeper questions 
about legitimacy for whom, for what and how it is constructed‟ (Lister, 
2003:175).  
 
In addition to the rules, Beetham (1991:17) notes that „legal validity is insufficient 
to secure legitimacy. Power is legitimate to the extent that the rules of power can 
be justified in terms of beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate‟. The 
legitimacy of NGOs in representing communities is seen as an agreement between 
NGOs and communities; communities being in agreement with NGOs in terms of 
the interests and needs to be represented. Lastly, the final element according to 
Beetham (1991:19) involves „demonstrable expression of consent on the part of 
the subordinate to the particular power relation in which they are involved, 
through actions which provide evidence of consent‟. Beetham (1991:19) further 
explains  
 
„If the public expression of consent contributes to the legitimacy of the 
powerful, then the withdrawal or refusal of consent will, by the same token, 
detract from it. Actions ranging from non-co-operation and passive 
resistance to open disobedience and militant opposition on the part of those 
qualified to give consent will in different measure erode legitimacy‟.  
 
For NGOs, this level of legitimacy is demonstrated by communities allowing an 
NGO to work with them and their willingness to work with the NGO. However, 
for NGOs representing marginalised communities, the „expression of consent‟ by 
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marginalised communities, especially communities occupying land illegally in 
informal settlements, may not be an effective variable to assess legitimacy of 
representation. This is because communities consent may be given to NGOs 
without communities really questioning NGOs on what their mission is. 
Moreover, communities may not be in a position to refuse assistance from NGOs 
even if what is offered is not really what they want.  
 
The second approach to the concept of legitimacy according to Weatherford 
(1992) is from the grass roots. The focus of this concept is on the views of the 
public on what they consider to be legitimate. In this view, legitimacy is not about 
how effective the system is but on what people feel or think is legitimate. This 
idea was introduced by Tocqueville in the nineteenth century when he indicated 
that democracy faced great dangers concerning legitimacy if citizens voluntarily 
withdrew from political life. If citizens withdraw from political life and do not 
participate at all, it means the democratic government is not legitimate 
(Weatherford, 1992:150). According to Steffek (2003), the descriptive approach 
to legitimacy depends on peoples‟ views as to why they accept and support an 
organisation as legitimate.  
 
In this thesis, the two approaches of legitimacy are used in exploring how NGOs 
construct legitimacy working with informal settlements. I expand on the 
prescriptive approach in this chapter and Chapter Three on what makes an 
institution legitimate. The two approaches are used because the prescriptive 
approach provides the theoretical debates that are used to create the conceptual 
framework for assessing Planact‟s legitimacy. The descriptive approach provides 
an understanding of legitimacy as encountered on the ground according to 
different views. Therefore, by combining the two, I am able to assess whether or 
not NGOs can claim legitimacy using representation, and if not, what it is that 
makes an NGO legitimate in the eyes of communities they work with.  
 
As noted, authors have indicated the different ways in which legitimacy can be 
constructed in various institutions and what makes an institution legitimate in 
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different contexts. The judgements on legitimacy are essentially judgements on 
the degree of legitimacy. This makes theorising the concept of legitimacy 
challenging. There are many ways organisations construct legitimacy, because 
there are many sources of legitimacy. To avoid these challenges in this thesis, I 
focus on the context of the legitimacy of development NGOs 
representing/working with informal settlement communities.   
 
2.2 The concept of representation 
 
As noted above, representation is an important concept that is normally used by 
NGOs to claim legitimacy. In this section, representation is explored using 
Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of representation. Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of 
representation provides a foundation for a discussion of representation because it 
offers comprehensive and classical views on representation. As mentioned in the 
introduction, it is also one of the most influential and often cited works in 
literature on representation.  
 
Discussions on political representation began when representative government 
emerged in England in the seventeenth century in America and France during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century and in other European countries in the 
nineteenth century (Birch, 1971:30). Dovi (2006:5) notes that since then, political 
representation has become a way of establishing legitimacy for democratic 
institutions and creating institutional incentives for governments to be responsive 
to citizens.  
 
The writings on political representation began in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries with three theorists who wrote about political obligation. These are 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke (both seventeenth century philosophers) and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (an eighteenth century philosopher). They believed that 
authority is something that had been conferred upon the government by the people 
and their exploration of authority and obligation led them to the concept of 
representation (Birch, 1971:31).  Hobbes (as explained in Birch, 1971), saw a 
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representative as an agent who had the right to commit his principal to whatever 
actions or policies the agents thought appropriate, and on this basis it was asserted 
that citizens of an ordered society were morally obliged to accept and obey 
whatever rules their governing authority made. Hobbes‟s focus on a representative 
relationship was, however, one sided. This resulted in his concept of 
representation not being accepted as a general guide to the nature of 
representation in political life (Birch, 1971:32). 
 
Hobbes‟s idea of representation left no room for deliberation. Once the agent had 
been selected to represent a community, the community would not be able to 
question the agent. The only way of expressing their needs would be withdrawing 
the representative when the need arose by electing or selecting a new agent.   
 
John Locke, at the end of seventeenth century, pointed to society‟s „belief in 
trusteeship and a belief in government by consent‟ (Birch, 1971:33). Locke argued 
that for a government to be legitimate there has to be consent from the governed 
(Birch, 1971:33). The process of government by consent involves two steps: first, 
„men would agree to form a society and accept the decisions by majority and, 
second, the majority would establish a government to make laws and execute 
them‟. The weakness in Locke‟s theory is that it does not provide „any 
institutional process by which the consent could be granted or withheld‟ (Birch, 
1971:34).  
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau‟s concept of representation during the middle of the 
eighteenth century shows that governmental decisions should reflect the will of 
the people. Rousseau believed that a representative might only be able to look 
after another persons‟ interests if these interests were clearly known, but a 
representative could hardly formulate another person‟s will as this is something a 
man could do only for himself (Birch, 1971:34). All these theorists looked at one 
type of representation, formalistic representation as noted by Pitkin (1967).  
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In the twentieth century, Hannah Pitkin (1967) developed a breakthrough in 
theory arguing that there are different types or forms of representation. Pitkin‟s 
book „The Concept of Representation’, was published in 1967 and has been in 
print continuously since. This book is the most cited work in political science 
journals (Rehfeld, 2005). Rehfeld (2005) argues that Pitkin‟s (1967) concept of 
representation has survived for so long because her arguments on representation 
are correct and still applicable today. Rehfeld (2005:2) notes that Pitkin‟s 
discussion „began by unpacking theoretical development of political 
representation to discussing what the concept of representation means in the 
context of democratic government‟. 
 
As already briefly explained in Chapter One, Pitkin (1967), a political scientist, 
provided a revolutionary theory on the concept of representation. First, Pitkin 
(1967) indicates that in order to understand representation, one has to consider the 
different ways in which the term is used, which provides a different view of the 
concept. And the different views of representation can also provide different 
standards for assessing representatives and the relationship they have with the 
represented. Pitkin‟s theory of representation is focussed on what is good and bad 
representation. Although Pitkin‟s work is over four decades old, it remains 
relevant in contemporary discussions of representation as a foundation for 
discussions on representation.  
 
Pitkin (1967) presents four views of representation: first, the formalistic view, 
which initiates representation using authority and accountability. Pitkin indicates 
that representatives have to be given authority to act on behalf of the represented 
and they must be accountable to the represented and act in accordance with their 
wishes (Pitkin, 1967). In this scenario, authority and accountability make 
representation legitimate. Second, the symbolic view means a representative 
„stands for‟ the represented. Third, the descriptive view means representatives 
resemble those being represented in terms of looks, common interests or sharing 
same experiences. Finally, the substantive view means representatives take action 
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on behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of and as a substitute for the 
represented (Pitkin, 1967).  
 
Pitkin‟s (1967) argument on substantive representation is that representatives 
must ensure deliberation for the more general good of all. This means the 
representative will range through the extremes of mandate and independence -
pluralists and republicans- limited by free and fair elections. With substantive 
representation, representatives advance policy preferences that serve the interests 
of the represented. This is the type of representation that NGOs use to justify 
legitimacy by claiming to be representatives of marginalised communities‟ 
interests. Pitkin‟s focus has been more on the actions of representatives than on 
their identities. This thesis uses Pitkin‟s substantive representation to assess how 
NGOs act in the interest of the represented in a manner that is responsive to their 
needs and interests.  
 
After Pitkin‟s (1967) writings on the concept of representation were further 
studies on representation. For example, Birch (1971) adds on Pitkin‟s (1967) 
concept of representation by indicating that in addition to the types of 
representation, there are different roles played by representatives. Birch (1971:15) 
agrees with Pitkin‟s (1967) fundamentals of what makes an institution 
representative. As already briefly mentioned in Chapter One, Birch (1971) 
provides three main usages of the term „representative‟ that are similar to Pitkin‟s‟ 
description of representation. Birch notes that representatives can denote an agent 
or spokesperson who acts on behalf of his/her principal (the represented). A 
representative can be used to indicate that a person shares some of the 
characteristics of a class of persons, and a representative can be a person that 
symbolises the identity or qualities of a class of persons. In terms of the 
relationship between the representatives and represented, Birch (1971:19) notes 
that representatives generally act as spokespersons for their electors. However, the 
nature of the proper relationship between elected persons and their constituents 
has been a matter of dispute. On that note, Pitkin (1967) asserts that the ability of 
representatives to represent the needs of the represented is influenced by many 
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factors. In addition to the type of representation, Birch (1971) indicates that 
representation fulfils a variety of functions. There are general and specific 
functions according to Birch (1971:107-108) that include  
 
„.1. Popular control: to provide for a degree of popular control over 
government. (a) Responsiveness: to ensure that decision makers are 
responsive to the interest and opinions of the public.  
(b) Accountability: to provide a way of holding political leaders publicly 
accountable for their actions.  
(c) Peaceful change: to provide a mechanism for replacing one set of leaders 
by another without violence.  
2. Leadership: to provide for leadership and responsibility in decision 
making.  
(a) Leadership: to provide for the recruitment of political leaders and the 
mobilization of support for them.  
(b) Responsibility: to encourage political leaders to pursue long-term 
national interests as well as reacting to immediate pressures. 
3. System maintenance: to contribute towards the maintenance and smooth 
running of the political system by enlisting the support of citizens. 
(a) Legitimation: to endow the government with a particular kind of 
legitimacy. 
(b) Consent: to provide channels of communication through which the 
government can mobilize consent to particular policies. 
(c) Relief of pressure: to provide a safety valve through which aggrieved 
citizens can blow off steam and to disarm potential revolutionaries by 
engaging them in constitutional forms of activity‟. 
 
In the twenty-first century, there have been some new challenges to the concept of 
representation. The inadequacies of traditional representation are noted by 
different authors. Urbinati (2000) indicates that representation should not be the 
aggregation of interests, and that the preservation of disagreement is necessary for 
preserving liberty. She emphasises the importance of disagreements and rhetoric 
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to the procedures, practices and the ethos of democracy. This account expands the 
scope of theoretical discussions of representation away from formal procedures of 
authorisation to the deliberative and expressive dimensions of representative 
institutions. According to Mansbridge (2003) and Grant and Keohane (2005), this 
means there is a need to broaden the understanding of representation to keep up 
with recent empirical research, contemporary democratic practices and 
contemporary realities in the international arena.  
 
Warren and Castiglione (2004) note that there are new actors considered in the 
representation debates, such as international, transnational and non-governmental 
organisations who act as representatives in advancing public policies on behalf of 
democratic citizens. These new actors/representatives „speak for‟, „act for‟ and 
can even stand for individuals within a nation; and the political representation is 
no longer in the hands of elected representatives, and representatives of the 
marginalised groups are no longer located in the formal political arena. This 
argument is supported by Dovi (2006:6) who indicates that the traditional 
representation has been focussed on formal procedures of authorisation and 
accountability within the nation state, and that this is not satisfactory any longer 
due to political transformations. This new view raises questions on how legitimate 
representation is constructed in the informal political arena with different 
representatives, who are not necessarily elected, being involved. Thus NGOs are 
seen as „new‟ representatives who are not accommodated in the formal 
procedures. There is need to explore these new actors‟ claims of representation. 
How do they implement representation to claim legitimacy? 
 
Given these changes in the new political arena, authors such as Mansbridge 
(2003), Grant and Keohane (2005), and Dovi (2006) stress the need to change the 
conceptual understanding of political representation, specifically of democratic 
representation, to reflect contemporary realities in the international arena. In her 
article „Rethinking Representation‟, Mansbridge (2003:515) argues that there is 
more than one way to be represented legitimately in a democracy. She identifies 
four forms of representation in modern democracies.  
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Firstly, with promissory representation, representatives act to further the interests 
of the represented. Secondly, with anticipatory representation, representatives 
focus on what they think the people they represent like and would reward in the 
next election. Such representatives try to please future voters so that they are 
elected again (Mansbridge, 2003:516). Thirdly, with gyroscopic representation, 
voters select representatives who can be expected to act in ways the voter 
approves of, without external incentives (Mansbridge, 2003:520). Lastly, in 
surrogate representation, representatives have no electoral relationship with the 
voter. This form of representation caters for minority groups who do not feel 
represented by the majority winners in the formal district representation, and 
therefore they get together, e.g. as labour unions or organisations (Mansbridge, 
2003:522). NGOs fall into the category of surrogate representation as they also do 
not have an electoral relationship with the voter. 
  
With all the different forms and views of representation, Dovi (2006:1) lists four 
key components of political representation. These include, firstly, the party that 
represents (the representative, an organisation, movement or state agency); 
secondly, the party that is being represented (the constituents, the clients); thirdly, 
the issue that is being represented (opinions, perspectives, interests); and fourth, a 
setting within which the activity of representation is taking place (the political 
context). In this case study, the party representing communities is the NGO 
Planact, the party being represented is the Zandspruit community, what is being 
represented is access to basic services, land and housing and all this is taking 
place in a democratic South Africa with particular structures for decision making 
and participation. 
 
The discussion above on representation indicates that ensuring that marginalised 
communities or minorities are included in the decision-making process seems to 
be the main challenge of the representation process. The different principles of 
democracy and representation seem to all face challenges in ensuring the voices or 
needs of minorities and marginalised communities are represented. In support of 
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marginalised or minority communities, Dovi (2006) suggests the use of Pitkin‟s 
substantive representation because it is useful in representing people who have 
been marginalised in the past. Substantive representation as discussed above 
means representatives taking action on behalf of, and in the interest of the 
represented who are in this case marginalised communities. This form of 
representation helps compensate for the past and continued injustice, allowing 
historically excluded people to get onto the political agenda. Pitkin‟s (1967) 
substantive representation can be useful in assessing an NGO‟s legitimacy 
through representation of marginalised communities in informal settlements in 
South Africa, given the history of marginalisation in the past (during apartheid). 
This thesis is analysing substantive representation (Pitkin, 1967) because it can be 
applied by NGOs to claim legitimacy by acting in the interest of the represented. 
 
In support of marginalised communities, Williams (1998b:14) recommends an 
understanding of representation as mediation. He identifies three dimensions: 
voice of disadvantaged groups in legislature; trust,   (due to previous experiences 
of betrayal, disadvantaged groups need to be represented by their own members); 
and memory (due to the fact that the boundaries of groups are partially established 
by past experiences and they therefore need institutional mechanisms to guarantee 
presence). Williams (1998b) supports this form of representation against the 
traditional conception of representation, because the latter fails to take into 
consideration injustices experienced by marginalised groups. 
 
The challenge in the representation process is to ensure effective representation, 
and representation of marginalised communities. NGOs claim that they have 
advantages in representing marginalised communities because they have access to 
these communities and they focus on specific sectors. NGOs that claim to 
represent communities are mostly aligned to Pitkin‟s three forms of 
representation: descriptive, symbolic and substantive representation, as they 
represent interests and take action on behalf of communities (Pitkin, 1967). 
Representation by NGOs echoes the recent debates on NGOs‟ voices, namely 
whether they speak as the poor, with the poor, for the poor or about the poor 
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(Slim, 2002). These questions on the role of NGOs in communities are mainly 
about what gives NGOs the legitimacy to represent when they face challenges 
regarding who they are accountable to; communities, donors, governments or 
themselves.  
 
To defend themselves, NGOs claim that because they are more effective in the 
community participation process, they are able to represent communities‟ needs 
more effectively and this makes their role in communities legitimate. All 
institutions face challenges when it comes to ensuring representation. Young 
(2000) notes that a normative problem of representation is the disconnect between 
the representatives and the represented. Young (2000:132) argues that  
 
„establishing and maintaining legitimate and inclusive process of 
representation calls up responsibilities for both officials and citizens. 
Citizens must be willing and able to mobilize one another actively to 
participate in processes of both authorizing and holding to account‟.  
 
This is where representation and participation come together. Young (2000:132) 
indicates that „without such citizen participation, the connection between the 
representatives and constituents is most liable to be broken, turning the 
representative into an elite ruler‟. The question then is how do representatives 
ensure participation to claim legitimacy? In the next section I relate this to the 
concept of participation. 
 
2.3 Theories of participation 
 
There is need for more rights to participation beyond the traditional voting and 
political rights (Gaventa, 2004:30). Hickey and Mohan (2004:19) note that 
participation is important because there are „difficulties in ensuring direct 
participation and ensuring people‟s voices are heard due to limited institutional 
channels and resources in many governments‟. The available institutional 
channels within political systems and resources required to participate at higher 
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levels means that much of what is considered participatory is in fact a process 
whereby large numbers of people are represented by a relatively small group of 
participants (Hickey and Mohan, 2004, 19). A paradigm shift in mainstream 
development thinking stresses the active participation of local people in the 
development process and the inclusion of other actors in the representation 
process. Due to this shift, NGOs are seen as agents with potential to put 
participation into practice, because they claim to be innovative, flexible and not 
weighed down by bureaucracy. As NGOs also operate at the grassroots level and 
have access to marginalised communities, this suggests that the approach of 
NGOs fits naturally with the emphasis on participation (Lane, 1995:181).  
 
The idea of making democracy more inclusive has created new spaces for 
representation and participation. The focus has been on increasing citizen 
participation in political processes to improve democracy. Gaventa (2007: xiii) 
indicates that „in democracy, a robust civil society can serve as an additional 
check and balance on government behaviour, through mobilisation, advocacy and 
playing watchdog role‟. NGOs have these advantages in representing 
communities‟ needs and interests in direct participation because, in most cases, in 
a democratic government, the only means of participation available to the citizens 
is voting for leaders (Lane, 1995). However, Pateman (1970) notes that the 
electorate does not have the means to control its leaders after elections if these 
leaders do not represent its needs anymore. In most cases, the electorate may only 
have a chance to replace its leaders in the following elections.  
 
2.3.1 Participatory development 
 
Participation has been at the centre of discussions and concerns in the discourse to 
development. Participatory approaches to development are aimed at making 
people more involved in decisions that affect them. Cooke and Kothari (2001: 5) 
explain that „participatory development is conventionally represented as emerging 
out of the recognition of the shortcomings of top-down development approaches‟. 
Hickey and Mohan (2004:9) add that „several approaches to participation emerged 
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in an era of state failure, panic over top-down modernization approaches, 
proclamations of the end of grand explanations and a measure of post-colonial 
guilt‟. Cooke and Kothari (2001:5) explain that the „aim of participatory 
development is to increase the involvement of socially and economically 
marginalised peoples in decision-making over their own live‟. Hickey and Mohan 
(2004:3) also explain that „participation has actually deepened and extended its 
role in development, with a new range of approaches to participation emerging 
across theory, policy and practice‟.  
 
Hickey and Mohan (2004) see an evolution of participation from an obligation of 
citizenship, in the 1940s and 1950s, to participation as a right and an obligation of 
citizenship in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s and 1970s, participation was also 
seen as a means of challenging subordination and marginalisation. In the 1980s 
participation focus was in projects rather than broader political communities. In 
the 1990s to the present, participation is again seen as a right and obligation, very 
much like it was in the 60s and 70s (Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Although there 
are critiques on the participation process, participation is still an important vehicle 
in development and it has its advantages. The advantages and challenges of 
participation are discussed further in Chapter Three.  
 
As Hickey and Mohan (2004:5) note participation has a longer and more varied 
genealogy in development thinking and practice. The focus of this thesis is not on 
participation as a process that emerges from the grassroots, but rather on whether 
the level of participation implemented is considered real participation to ensure 
representation of people‟s needs and interests. 
 
2.3.2 Levels of participation 
 
Participation to non-participation can be viewed as a continuum. Arnstein (1969) 
is one of the early authors to provide structure to the concept of participation in 
the work titled „A ladder of Citizen Participation‟. Arnstein (1969) noted that 
participation is about the influence of power in decision-making processes where 
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the redistribution of power allows people who are excluded from economic 
processes to be included. This redistribution of power is between representatives 
and the represented. 
 
Arnstein (1969) lists eight rungs or types of citizen participation as indicated in 
Table 1. Degrees of participation range from no power (manipulation and 
therapy), which is considered non-participation, to some degree of tokenism 
participation (placation, consultation and informing) (Arnstein, 1969:218). In the 
latter, those represented still do not have the power to negotiate in the decision-
making process in terms of putting forward their interests and needs to the 
representatives. Tokenism participation can, however, be considered a step 
towards legitimate participation (Arnstein, 1969:219). Citizen power (partnership, 
delegated power and citizen control) is what is considered real participation where 
there is negotiation between citizens and power holders (Arnstein, 1969:221). 
Arnstein adds that, in reality, there could be more rungs of citizen participation 
than the listed eight.  
 
Table 1: Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation 
Ranking* Type of participation Degree of partition 
1 Manipulation 
Non participation 
2 Therapy 
3 Informing 
Degree of tokenism 4 Consultation 
5 Placation 
6 Partnership 
Degree of citizen power 7 Delegated power 
8 Citizen control 
*Ranking – levels of participation; Source: Arnstein (1969:218) 
 
Although Arnstein‟s model has been used in different cases in assessing the 
process of participation, Abbott (1993:56) notes that Arnstein‟s concept of citizen 
participation is not very clear on the context in which this ladder can operate. He 
notes that it may be limited in different contexts, especially in underdeveloped 
countries, because the model was based on urban renewal programmes in the US. 
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There are arguments that power alone is not enough in deciding the level of 
participation as indicated below by different authors.  
 
Choguill (1996) indicates that Arnstein‟s (1969) model is useful but cannot be 
applied in developing countries.  Choguill (1996) differs with Arnstein (1969) 
regarding the extent to which power determines the end product. Choguill (1996) 
argues that a general ladder of community participation will not apply in 
developed and underdeveloped countries alike. He argues that Arnstein's ladder of 
citizen participation is based on „the extent of citizens' power in determining the 
end product (of public policy).  
 
In underdeveloped countries, Choguill (1996) adds that residents from low-
income communities need more than power for decision-making processes. They 
are in need of urban services and housing from a government that may not have 
the resources or the will to provide them. Hence, they may need more than power 
to influence the end product in decision making processes. For citizens in 
underdeveloped countries to get the benefits, they may be willing to contribute 
their labour, time and money.  
 
Choguill (1996) suggests that, if a participation ladder were to be constructed for 
an underdeveloped country the terminology and descriptions used would have to 
be amended. For Choguill (1996), a key element of such a model is the strategic 
input of outside assistance, whether it comes from government or non-
governmental sources, and the approach should be based on the progressive 
improvement of infrastructure. Choguill (1996) argues that the scale of 
participation for underdeveloped countries is based on the degree of governmental 
willingness in carrying out community mutual-help projects.  
 
Choguill (1996) indicates that apart from power, effective participation of 
communities is influenced by outside help, willingness of governments to support 
communities and communities‟ ability to add their time, money and labour. Power 
alone will not result in effective participation and making a positive change to the 
51 
 
lives of the poor. Choguill (1996) discusses participation in developing countries 
with poor communities in mind. His description on effective participation does 
not state whether power is also a limiting factor to participation in middle-class or 
affluent communities. Table 2 illustrates what Choguill (1996) recommends as the 
model of citizen participation for underdeveloped countries 
 
Table 2: Ladder of community participation for underdeveloped countries 
Hierarchy level Participation  Role of outsider 
1 Empowerment 
Support 2 Partnership 
3 Conciliation 
4 Dissimulation  
Manipulation 5 Diplomacy  
6 Informing 
7 Conspiracy Rejection 
8 Self- management Neglect 
Source: Choguill (1996).  
 
Choguill‟s (1996) ladder of participation for underdeveloped countries is useful 
but also has some limitations. Although it indicates the role of the outsider, this 
does not determine whether there is participation or not. Support does not 
necessarily mean empowerment or partnership. For example, in the case of NGOs 
working with marginalised communities in informal settlements, the support of an 
outsider may not result in participation. An NGO could be supporting a 
community with a certain cause but the community does not necessarily 
participate in the decision-making process of the project. 
 
Paul (1987) asserts that the level of participation in a developing-world context 
depends on the three concepts. Firstly, the intensity of participation which 
indicates the level of participation; secondly, project objectives indicating the 
focus of the community participation process, and thirdly, instruments that 
indicates who will be used to implement the participation process. The weakness 
of Paul‟s concept of participation lies in the fact that it does not indicate who 
decides on the level of intensity and objectives of the community participation 
process (Abbott, 1993). The intensity, project objectives and instruments of 
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participation are all decided by the outsider. Communities need to be involved in 
deciding project objectives, which instruments would work best and the intensity.  
 
Abbott‟s (1993) concept of participation in the developing countries context is 
based on a combination of actors and needs with appropriate instruments of 
participation. Abbott (1993) indicates that the level of participation depends on 
the combination of the following: openness of government to the inclusion of the 
community in the decision-making process; nature of decisions to be made; 
technical involvement of the decision-making process, homogeneity of the 
community; the arena or surrounding within which the participation process 
operates and identification of primary actors. Abbott adds that the roles, agendas 
and relationships of the different actors; the point of input into the participation 
process; the practical implementation of the participation process framework as 
well as and the differing needs of the communities and the needs of the other 
actors are also important determinants of a proper citizen participation. 
 
Abbott‟s (1993) concept of participation is expanded on by Imparato and Ruster 
(2003), who focus on the role and relationship between community and outsider. 
In their research for the World Bank on slum upgrading and participation in Latin 
America using Goethert‟s (1998) concept of participation, Imparato and Ruster 
(2003) indicate that the level of community participation in informal settlement 
upgrading projects ranges from absence of participation to full control of the 
decision-making process. They add that the level of participation is influenced by 
the relationship between communities and outsiders as seen in Table 3.   
 
Goethert‟s (1998) levels of participation are somewhat similar to Arnstein‟s 
(1969) ladder of citizen participation. In addition to the level or degree of 
participation in the Arnstein‟s Model, Goethert (1998) adds the different roles 
played and relationships between community and outsiders.  
 
Among the different ways of assessing whether there is participation or not by the 
different authors above, Goethert‟s (1998) framework of different levels of 
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participation is the more comprehensive approach to assessing participation 
especially of marginalised communities. This approach emphasises that 
participation really depends on the role and relationship between community and 
outsider. When outsiders play a surrogate role, there is no participation and 
communities either play a small role or no role at all in decision-making 
processes. When outsiders only provide resources, the communities are assumed 
to have more power and full control of decision-making processes. This rarely 
happens though, especially in the case of NGOs working in marginalised 
communities. In most cases, the funding comes from donors and is implemented 
by local or national NGOs. The community rarely has any power in decision-
making processes. This power is between donors to a large extent, and NGOs. As 
this study investigates the interaction between communities, NGOs and 
government, Goethert‟s (1998) framework is the model most suited for it. 
 
In this thesis a combination of different models of participation is used to assess 
participation.  Goethert‟s (1998) framework is used to  establish the role and 
relationship between community and outsider, and the different levels of 
participation according to Arnstein (1969) and Choguill (1996) are used  to 
establish whether or not participation takes place. The relationship and role of the 
outsider and community determines whether the level of participation will be 
informing, manipulation or in fact citizen control.  
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Table 3: Levels of participation influenced by the role of community and outsider 
Level of 
participation 
Community 
role 
Relationship between community 
and outsider 
Outsider 
role 
None 
 Communities do not play any role 
in decision making, and outsiders 
stand in for them in negotiations 
with government or donor 
institutions  
Surrogate 
Indirect 
 Communities play a very small role 
in communication and negotiation 
of strategies 
Consult 
Interest 
group 
Outsiders have more power than 
communities in negotiating 
community strategies 
Advocate 
Shared control Stakeholder 
Equal partners  in community 
management strategies in decision 
making 
Stakeholder 
Full control Principal 
Communities have more power 
than outsiders in community 
management strategies. Outsider 
only provides recourses 
Resource 
Sources: Goethert (1998) in Imparato and Ruster (2003:23) 
 
The influence in decision making by local communities could increase, depending 
on the relationship between the communities and outsider representatives. There is 
a need to develop strategies which will enable communities to decide what should 
be on the agenda in terms of intensity, objectives and instruments that should be 
used for implementation. NGOs in developing countries are not free in terms of 
deciding the level of participation, because by the time they begin working with 
communities in project implementation, everything is fixed according to the 
proposal to the donors in terms of budget and time. So when it comes to 
participation, NGOs might not allow a lot of influence from the community to 
avoid project delays and budget increases. The question, then, is how do NGOs 
ensure participation and representation of communities‟ interests and needs to 
claim legitimacy?  
 
Marginalised communities in underdeveloped countries also require government 
support and a framework for participatory governance that allows accountability 
from outsiders to the communities they represent. As noted above, legitimate 
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representation depends on authority, accountability and participation in the 
decision making processes. For representatives to be seen as legitimate they must 
be accountable to the represented and ensure the represented participate in the 
decision making process.  
 
2.4 The concept of accountability 
 
In a democratic society, accountability is as important in ensuring legitimate 
representation as is participation.  Pitkin (1967) indicates that what makes a 
representative legitimate is the fact that he or she is authorised to act by the 
represented. In addition legitimate representatives must be accountable to those 
whom he or she represents; otherwise the representative is acting on his/her own.  
The concept of accountability is not new in political theory, although it has gone 
through some changes as debates revolve around who should be held accountable. 
The evolution of the concept of accountability has been from a traditional concept 
to a more recent concept that has been influenced by the need for more direct 
participation in decision-making processes. Paul 1992:1048) notes that the  
 
„[original] thrust of government accountability to the public rested with the 
political leadership at the macro level, but recent developments have 
brought about attention to accountability as a means of controlling the 
behaviour of individual civil servants of public service [at the lower level of 
government]‟.  
 
In South Africa, there has been increased dissatisfaction with the performance of 
institutions and delivery of services. As a result, there have been calls for 
accountability by means of holding individuals or organisations responsible for 
their performance measured as objectively as possible (Paul, 1992:1047). NGOs 
and other civil society organisation have been in the forefront, „holding 
governments and corporations accountable to policies and promises, [therefore] 
their continued effectiveness will turn on their capacity to live up to their own 
standards‟ (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007:4).  
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On the part of government, the traditional public accountability, such as 
expenditure audits and legislative reviews are seen in a different perspective from 
the task of ensuring accountability for public services at the lower level of 
government (Paul, 1992:1047). The instruments and measures used to implement 
this accountability are based on inputs rather than outputs, as outputs are too 
complex and diverse to measure. This higher level accountability tended to be top-
down with leaders holding accountable those reporting to them through a 
controlled system. With expansion of the public sector, higher level accountability 
systems have become overloaded and ineffective (Paul, 1992:1048). Kovach et al. 
(2003) indicate that traditional accountability is an end-stage process where only 
those who have formal authority over an individual or organisation can hold them 
to account. For example, citizens hold their elected leaders formally accountable 
during elections. This concept requires clearly defined roles, responsibility, 
regular reporting and monitoring of behaviour against these roles and 
responsibilities (Kovach et al., 2003:3). 
 
To address the limitations of accountability at higher level, Paul (1992:1048) 
suggests that accountability mechanisms should be focussed at the lower public 
level by seeing that  „the public [are] ... customers to be served, who have 
access to a number of other alternative suppliers of services and there is 
potential to exit‟ when they are not happy with the service. Another option for 
the public to ensure accountability at the lower level is to „ensure there is 
participation to influence the final outcome of a service irrespective of whether 
the exit option exists‟.  
 
Then there is a second approach to accountability known as a „stakeholder 
approach to accountability‟ which is ongoing and dynamic. This approach 
expands on the traditional approach by adopting a more open and participative 
concept of accountability. The difference here is that this approach does not 
depend on formal authority. It is assumed that anyone who is affected by an 
organisation can hold the organisation responsible (Kovach et al. 2003:3).  
 
57 
 
Brown and Jagadananda (2007) describe three forms of accountability.  
Representative accountability is applied in government where public sector actors 
are required to be accountable to the voters.  The second form of accountability 
they consider is the principal-agent accountability which is applied in the business 
world and implemented by contracts and formal agreements. The third form of 
accountability according to Brown and Jagadananda (2007) applies to NGOs and 
is referred to as mutual accountability which is based on shared understanding, 
respect, trust and mutual influence.  
 
Brown and Moore (2001:570) state that an actor is accountable when that actor 
recognises that it has made a promise to do something and accepted a moral and 
legal responsibility to do its best to fulfil that promise. This means accountability 
involves a promise to perform and this promise is made by one person to another. 
For this to happen it means there has to be a relationship between the person or 
organisation making the promise and the person/persons they are making a 
promise to. Hence, accountability may be defined by a relationship that is not only 
morally and legally important, but is also important in enforcing the agreement. 
This relationship and the extent to which the parties can hold one another 
accountable are influenced by power differences and degree of trust (Brown and 
Moore, 2001:572). 
 
In 2003, the global accountability report came up with the refinement of the idea 
of a move away from the traditional approach to accountability. Brown and 
Jagadananda (2007:10) indicate that since 
 
„accountability relations involve specific relationships and expectations, 
they are more subject to direct influence by CSOs [Civil Society 
Organisations] than legitimacy perceptions. After an elaborate analysis of 
accountabilities for intergovernmental organisation, multinational 
corporations, and transnational civil society associations, the Global 
Accountabilities Project identifies four core accountability mechanisms‟.  
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The Global Accountability Project (GAP) developed a model of accountability 
called the GAP model of accountability drawing on the stakeholder approach. 
This model identifies key dimensions affecting an organisation‟s accountability 
(Brown and Jagadananda, 2007). As seen in Table 4, these mechanisms are a 
starting point for ensuring accountability with both external and internal 
stakeholders. These categories are influenced by member control, appointment 
of senior staff, compliance mechanisms and evaluation processes, 
consultations, complaints mechanisms, corporate social responsibility and 
access to information (Kovach et al., 2003:3). 
 
Table 4: GAP Model of Accountability 
Mechanism Internal/external stakeholder accountability 
Participation mechanisms  Enable internal and external stakeholder to be 
involved in organisational decision making. Could be 
through consultations or inclusion of stakeholder 
representatives on boards of directors. 
Transparency mechanisms  Allows free flow of information between 
organisation and stakeholders in decision making, 
performance and reporting. For example, audited 
accounts and annuals reports. 
Complaints and redress 
mechanism  
Vehicles for raising questions about performance 
especially when stakeholders are not in a position to 
do so due to power inequality 
Evaluation mechanisms Make it possible for stakeholder to assess activities, 
outputs, outcomes and impacts. Can be done by the 
use of organisational monitoring and evaluation 
systems, independent programme evaluations and 
social audits 
Source: Table created from Kovach et al (2003); Brown and Jagadananda (2007)  
 
The stakeholder approach indicates that anyone can hold an organisation 
accountable and formal authority is not necessary in some cases. This creates what 
Ebrahim (2003) calls multiple accountabilities. This happens in the case of NGOs 
where the organisation has to deal with internal and external stakeholder 
accountability to the community, donors and in some cases government. The 
multiple and sometimes conflicting accountability requirements NGOs face from 
the community and donors are created by the gap between what is needed by the 
poor and what is done by the aid agencies (Satterthwaite, 2001). Satterthwaite 
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(2001:137) explains that there is „limited capacity of most international agencies 
to support local initiatives and institutions that respond to the needs and priorities 
of the urban poor, to support organisations they have formed, and to have some 
measure of accountability to them‟. Aid agencies do not implement projects. 
Hence, they fund organisations such as NGOs to do the implementation. While 
implementing the projects, NGOs are usually „constrained by difficulties of 
managing donor finance, with its emphasis on short-term project funded, on 
financial accountabilities and on tangible outputs‟ (Mitlin, 2001:164). This limits 
the contribution of communities who might want to do things differently. It 
creates multiple accountability demands on NGOs funded by aid agencies and 
working with poor communities. 
 
Accountability and legitimacy of NGOs is important as Brown and Jagadananda 
(2007:5) indicate that  
 
„CSO often mobilize people and resources through commitments to social 
values and missions that enhance the public good. Their reputation as 
legitimate and accountable stewards of those missions is vital to their ability 
to recruit staff and allies to their causes‟.  
 
Hence, accountability is a challenge to NGOs because they are accountable to 
many stakeholders. At the same time accountability is important in claiming 
legitimate representation. How do NGOs then claim legitimacy in representing 
communities if they have accountability challenges?  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a prescriptive approach to legitimacy by explaining the 
theoretical arguments on how NGOs can construct legitimacy through 
representation of communities by ensuring participation and accountability. It has 
been noted that in any democratic or undemocratic system there is always a group 
of marginalised people or a minority that is not represented in the majority‟s 
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interests. NGOs earn legitimacy in representing these marginalised groups by 
claiming that due to their focus on small communities and specific issues, they 
can ensure representativeness of marginalised communities through participation. 
Although NGOs claim these advantages they still face questions on their actual 
representation, participation and accountability. The legitimacy of NGOs in this 
thesis has been assessed using representation because NGOs claim a 
representational role when working with communities.  
 
Prescriptive approaches to legitimacy indicate that NGOs claim legitimacy as 
representatives of the marginalised communities, but to legitimately claim this 
role NGOs have to ensure communities participate in the decision-making 
processes and are accountable to the communities they represent. In order to claim 
representation there has to be participation and accountability. Due to different 
forms of representation, in most cases whether in democratic or undemocratic 
systems, representatives face challenges representing the interests of minority or 
marginalised communities. NGOs claim to have an advantage representing these 
groups but their representativeness is questioned due to challenges these NGOs 
face in ensuring participation and accountability to communities they represent. 
There is a need to include other actors outside of governments, such as NGOs and 
recognise the representational role they play. This is necessary because the formal 
procedures of representation tend to leave out marginalised communities and 
minorities.  
 
Although NGOs have a role to play in representing marginalised communities 
they still face questions regarding their legitimacy. This is mainly due to the 
accountability and participation challenges that NGOs face. When it comes to 
accountability, although mechanisms for ensuring accountability are in place, the 
implementation of accountability is a challenge for many organisations. 
Accountability requires representatives to be accountable to the represented and to 
hold the representatives accountable to the promise to perform.  
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3.0 CHAPTER THREE 
NGOS, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND 
INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS 
 
For the past six decades informal settlements have featured in development 
debates, with arguments ranging from issues such as to demolish, redevelop or 
relocate the informal settlement to ways of improving the quality of life of people 
living in these settlements. However, there is limited academic discussion on 
NGO legitimacy representing informal settlement communities that are occupying 
land illegally. This chapter provides background on the legitimacy of NGOs 
working in „legal‟ communities or on legally neutral challenges. It explains the 
importance of community participation and introduces informal settlements as a 
concept. This background provides the basis for exploring how NGOs construct 
legitimacy while working with communities in informal settlements, or with those 
occupying land without legal authorisation. 
 
The first section of this chapter discusses theories explaining the existence of 
NGOs, types of NGOs, their roles and challenges. It is important to discuss 
theories about NGOs because these theories provide an understanding on 
questions relating to views from government and communities on NGO 
legitimacy. The legitimacy challenges NGOs face differ depending on the type of 
NGOs and the role that an NGO plays in society. Therefore, I begin with a broad 
discussion on the different types of NGOs, and then indicate the type of NGO 
explored in the case study. This chapter serves as a backdrop for the work of 
development NGOs in informal settlements in South Africa, which is the focus of 
Chapter Four. 
 
3.1 NGO theories, types, roles and challenges 
 
In the past 25 years, Africa has seen a huge growth in both numbers and influence 
of national NGOs (Hearn, 2007). Idahosa (2008) notes that the growth of NGOs 
in Africa has mainly been due to Africa‟s economic crisis. During the 1970s and 
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1980s the state was often viewed as a major source and cause of development‟s 
uncertainty and/or decline (Idahosa, 2008:77). In addition to the economic crisis, 
governments have failed to promote development. This resulted in NGOs being 
seen as a more effective option to deliver certain types of programmes. NGOs also 
became important channels for the funds of official development agencies 
(Idahosa, 2008).  
 
In South Africa, the trajectory was the reverse of what happened in other African 
countries. NGOs in South Africa began working against the apartheid government 
then shifted to working alongside the democratic government where donors have 
come to fund the government directly. With the current challenges such as the 
housing backlog facing the new democratic government, NGOs are facing similar 
legitimacy challenges as they do in other African countries.  
 
3.1.1 Theories explaining the existence of NGOs 
 
A number of theories have been developed to explain the existence and role of 
NGOs. Tvedt (1998) warns against generalisation and transferring these theories 
from one field to another and one country to another. Applicability may depend 
on a number of issues, including the variety of NGOs types. Debates on theories 
explaining NGOs are focused on different forms of failure either by the state, the 
market or both. Using Tvedt‟s (1998) study „Angels of Mercy or Development 
Diplomat? NGOs and Foreign Aid‟ I will select and discuss some of the main 
theories on NGOs, namely public goods theory, contract failure theory, and 
functionalist and political functionalist theories. Theories explaining the existence 
of NGOs indicate that NGOs emerge when governments fail, when the private 
sector fails and because of the availability of political and financial initiatives 
(Tvedt, 1998).  
 
Public Goods theory 
The existence of NGOs is explained by the „public goods theory‟ as being a result 
of government failure. According to the „public goods theory‟ NGOs exist to 
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satisfy the residual or unsatisfied demand in societies by supplying the public 
goods that are not provided by the government.  The public goods theory implies 
that the state tends to provide public goods at the level which satisfies the median 
voter where there is majority support (Tvedt 1998:41). Hence, if public goods are 
supplied conventionally, then a significant minority may be excluded. NGOs then 
step in to fill the gap left by government by providing services to the excluded 
communities. For example Idahosa (2008:83) adds that  „the weakening of the 
African state has further re-enforced the complementarities of non-state actors like 
NGOs, who have made themselves attractive to global institutions because they 
appear to be able to fill policy and practical lacunas‟. This relates to the role 
development NGOs play when working in informal settlements. Informal 
settlements could be seen as marginalised or minority communities and NGOs 
working in these settlements could claim to fill the gap left by government in 
assisting these communities to access services. The question is, by filling the gap 
left by the state, can NGOs claim legitimacy by representing communities with 
insecure tenure? The legitimacy of NGOs is questioned in representing the 
interests and needs of communities because for representation to be considered 
legitimate there has to be participation and accountability.  
 
NGOs working at national level, ensuring participation of the represented and 
accountability to the represented is a challenge. This is largely because in most 
cases when it comes to filling the gap left by the government in terms of service 
provision, funding is from other international or northern NGOs and from donors 
that fund projects in developing countries. As national NGOs only play an 
implementing role, they are not in a position to ensure the participation of 
communities represented and their accountability mainly lies with the funding 
organisation (Hellinger, 1987). Nevertheless, NGOs are still seen to be playing an 
important role in representing marginalised communities.  
 
Contract Failure Theory 
The second theory on existence of NGOs is the „contract failure theory‟ which 
addresses situations where the private sector fails to provide its services 
64 
 
efficiently, or where communities mistrust the private sector motives for the 
service delivery. Indeed Tvedt (1998:42) notes that: 
 
„NGOs arise where ordinary contractual mechanisms fail to provide the 
public with adequate means to access the services firms produce. When 
contractual mechanisms fail, people will trust NGOs more than commercial 
firms, because the former are seen as having fewer incentives to take 
advantage of the consumers‟ ignorance‟.  
 
Idahosa (2008:83) adds that:  
 
„because of the reality and the perception of the failure of (the) market (in 
Africa) and the inability of the weakened state to compensate for their 
deficiencies in the face of the problems created by market adjustments ... 
NGOs are viewed as being able to carry out primarily project-based tasks 
that neither the state nor the market can achieve‟.  
 
Informal settlements in many countries including South Africa are a result of 
government and private sector failure. Therefore, development NGOs working in 
informal settlements in South Africa, as elsewhere have sought to address this 
challenge. 
 
Functional and Political Functionalist theories 
Functionalist theory argues that NGOs emerge as a response to growth in political 
and financial initiatives of the donor community and ongoing competition among 
donors for suitable and good local partners (Tvedt, 1998:53). This means the 
existence of NGOs is influenced by the availability of willing sponsors to provide 
funding for their activities in communities. Igoe (2003:870) notes that „the shift of 
donor money away from African states toward the NGO sector made African 
NGOs one of the few growth industries in a continent where most economic 
sectors were shrinking at an alarming rate‟. The more funding that is available 
from international donors the more local and national NGOs emerge. This means 
65 
 
the existence and role of NGOs in society depends on donor funding. This may 
explain the growth in NGOs in East Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Hearn (2007:1095) describes the 1980s as the „NGO decade in Kenya, where 
between 1996 and 2003 alone, the number of registered NGOs grew from 511 to 
2511. In Tanzania there were 41 registered NGOs in 1990 and by 2000 the 
number of NGOs increased by more than 10000 (ibid.). This growth was 
motivated by the availability of donor money as NGOs were no longer seen as gap 
fillers, but as important members of civil society. The focus shifted away from 
international NGOs to national NGOs as these were seen to be closer to 
communities and able to address development problems (Hearn, 2007).  
 
Political functionalist theory indicates that „NGOs and other non-profit 
organisations provide the state with unique opportunities to solve social problems 
which, although may be politically risky, are important in furthering government 
interests and policies (Tvedt, 1998:58). This means governments‟ views on NGOs 
may influence the existence and role NGOs play in communities. For example, a 
government may outsource contracts to NGOs to implement some of its 
objectives.  The functionalist and political functionalist theories raise questions on 
the independence of NGOs in representing communities, which in turn raises 
further questions on how NGOs construct their legitimacy. 
 
According to the two theories above, public good theory and contract failure 
theory, NGOs exist or emerge as „angels‟ rescuing marginalised and minority 
communities in terms of providing services and speaking on their behalf to donors 
and governments. However, functionalist theories argue that NGOs exist to carry 
out agendas of international governments instead of merely being „angels of 
mercy‟. All three theories described above are important is explaining the 
existence of NGOs in this research. Therefore, the theoretical framework for 
discussing NGOs in this thesis is a combination of all the three theories.  
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Public goods theory is important because it indicates that NGOs exist to provide 
unsatisfied demand as governments tend to only provide for large majority and 
leave minorities out (Tvedt, 1998). This theory explains the role of NGO working 
in informal settlements trying to assist marginalised communities. Contract or 
private sector theory is also useful in explaining NGOs mainly because the failure 
by the market creates the need and existence of NGOs in informal settlements as 
communities tend to believe NGOs are there to help them as opposed to private 
businesses who they think do not have their interests at heart. Lastly, the 
functional theory is important in describing how NGOs emerge as without the 
provision of funding by international donors and government NGOs will not be 
able to provide the services that they do to the marginalised communities.  
 
Furthermore political functionalist theory is important in explaining the need for 
government support to NGOs, which creates an environment conducive for NGO 
activities. With governments contracting NGOs to implement some of its work, as 
noted by political functionalist theory, the state creates the space for NGOs to 
survive or sometimes to thrive. Funding by government in contracting NGOs is 
contentious among activist NGOs. Activists fear the funding from government 
might divert NGOs‟ missions. In order to deal with this challenge, NGOs have to 
decide whether funding from government will improve their missions or create 
contradictions with their commitments to serve the needs of the poor (Rugendyke, 
2007). As noted by Tvedt (1998) generalising and transferring theories on the 
existence of NGOs from one field to another and across different countries will 
not provide a true picture of the role of NGOs and how they construct their 
legitimacy. Robins (2008:24) agrees with the theories above with his two schools 
of thought on NGOs „as benevolent agencies that provide solutions to political 
and humanitarian crises that states and markets cannot and/or are unwilling to 
address [and as] ideological conduits of neo-liberal capital‟.  
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3.1.2 Types of NGOs 
 
The wide range of NGOs can be broadly grouped into three main criteria, namely: 
the level of operation or location of NGOs; their objectives or orientation; and/or 
the period they came into existence. This has implications for their objectives and 
role in relation to communities. Cernea (1988), Korten (1990) and William (1991) 
use different terms in describing these three categories of NGOs. 
 
a. Level of operation  
As indicated in Table 5, the level of operation refers to the geographical location 
of the work of NGOs. William‟s (1991) first category is CBOs, which refers to 
NGOs that are mainly devoted to helping people understand their rights in gaining 
access to needed services.  Korten (1990) describes these organisations as 
individual or community NGOs and Cernea (1988) refers to them as 
grassroots/local NGOs that grow out of local communities and are committed to 
having an impact on their constituents‟ lives.  
 
The second category of NGOs refers to city-wide organisations (William, 1991), 
or national NGOs (Korten, 1990). Cernea (1988) refers to them as 
southern/national NGOs. The third category according to William (1991) covers 
international NGOs, Korten (1990) refers them as NGOs operating at global level, 
and Cernea (1988) refers to them as northern/international NGOs with activities 
covering a number of different countries other than their home country.  
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Table 5: Types of NGOs by level of operation 
Level of 
operation 
Description Examples 
Community 
NGOs 
Arise out of peoples‟ own initiatives e.g. sports clubs, 
women‟s organisations, neighbourhood, religious or 
educational organisation. 
Community 
Based 
Organisations 
(CBO) 
 
Individual 
NGOs 
  
Large variety supported by NGOs, national or international 
NGOs, or bilateral or international agencies, and others 
independent of outside help. 
Devoted to raising the consciousness in communities, or 
helping them understand their rights in gaining access to 
needed services, while others are involved in providing 
such services. 
National 
NGOs 
Include organisations such as the Rotary or Lion‟s Club, 
chambers of commerce and industry, coalitions of business, 
ethnic or educational groups and associations of 
community organisations. 
Citywide 
organisations 
 
Southern 
NGOs 
Some exist for other purposes and become involved in 
helping the poor, and some are created explicitly with 
purpose of helping the poor 
International 
NGOs 
Range from secular agencies such as Save the Children 
organisations, OXFAM, CARE, Ford and Rockefeller 
Foundations to religiously motivated groups. 
 
NGOs 
operating at 
global level 
 
Northern 
NGOs 
Their activities vary from mainly funding local NGOs, 
institutions and projects, to implementing the projects 
themselves. 
Sources: Compiled from Cernea (1988), Korten (1990) and William (1991). 
 
b. Objectives of the NGOs 
 
A categorisation by objectives or orientation mainly differentiates NGOs 
according to their different roles in communities. Based on William (1991) and 
the World Bank (2001) there are six categories of NGOs. These include charitable 
NGOs which provide relief with little participation by the beneficiaries; service 
oriented NGOs which are programme oriented and provide services such as health 
and education and participatory NGOs focusing on self-help projects helping 
communities identify their needs and contribute to the implementation of the 
project Other categories are empowering NGOs which make people aware and 
understand factors affecting their lives and help them to take control of their lives; 
advocacy NGOs which defend, promote and lobby for people and their rights and 
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operational NGOs which focus on design and implementation of projects. Table 6 
shows that most of the roles of NGOs overlap and create a continuum from 
service delivery to advocacy.  However, the focus of this thesis is on NGOs with 
advocacy, participation and empowerment as their main objectives.  
 
Table 6: Types of NGOs by objective and/or orientation 
Type of 
NGO NGO objective/orientation 
Charitable  
Top-down effort with little participation by beneficiaries. 
Goal is meeting the needs of the poor e.g. food, housing, transport, 
schools, clothing or medicine. 
May undertake relief activities during natural disasters. 
Service 
oriented 
Activities such as provision of health, family planning or education 
services. 
Programme designed by NGO. 
Participatory 
Self-help project where local people are involved in the implementation 
of project by contributing cash, tools, land, material labour. 
In classical community development projects, participation begins with 
the need definition and continues to planning and implementation. 
Empowering 
Help people develop clearer understanding of the social, political and 
economic factors affecting their lives. 
Strengthen awareness of their potential power to control their lives. 
Sometimes these groups develop spontaneously around a problem or 
issue. 
Advocacy 
Defend or promote specific cause. 
Seek to influence the policies and practices. 
Raises awareness, acceptance and knowledge by lobbying. 
Operational 
Focus on design and implementation of projects. 
Stress on service delivery and participation. 
Sources: Compiled from William (1991) and World Bank (2001) 
 
c. NGOs according to different generations  
NGOs can also be categorised according to the period that they came into 
existence. The first generation of NGOs focused mainly on relief and welfare 
where the scope was to deal with individuals or families as seen in Table 7. For 
example,  
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„many of the large International NGOs such as Catholic Relief Services, 
CARE, Save the Children, and World Vision began as charitable relief 
organisations to deliver services to the poor and unfortunate, [but with] 
limitations of relief and welfare approaches in the stress of local self-
reliance ... with intent that benefits would be sustained beyond the period of 
NGO‟ (Korten, 1987:147).  
Table 7: Strategies of development-oriented NGO: Four generations  
  Generations 
FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH 
Relief and 
welfare 
Community 
development 
Sustainable 
systems 
development 
People’s 
movements 
Problem 
definition 
Shortage Local inertia Institutional and 
policy constraints 
Inadequate 
mobilising 
vision 
Time frame Immediate project life 10 to 20 years Indefinite 
future 
Scope Individual or 
family 
Neighbourhood 
or village 
region or nation National or 
global 
Chief actors NGO NGO + 
community 
all relevant public 
and private 
institutions 
Loosely 
defined 
networks of 
people and 
organisations 
NGO role Doer Mobiliser Catalyst Activist/educat
or 
Management 
orientation 
Logistics 
management 
Project 
management 
Strategic 
management 
coalescing and 
energising 
self-managing 
networks 
Development 
education 
Starving 
children 
community self-
help 
Constraining 
policies and 
institutions 
Spaceship 
earth 
Korten, D. (1990:116)  
 
Due to the „limitation of relief and welfare approaches as development strategy 
many [second generation] NGOs took community development to improve 
self-reliance and sustained benefits after NGOs leave the community‟ (Korten, 
1987: 147). The second generation of NGOs dealt with community 
development involving neighbourhoods or villages. The third generation of 
NGOs focussed on sustainable systems development with a regional or national 
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scope. The fourth generation are people‟s movements with a national or global 
scope. It should be noted that these different generational NGOs can evolve 
from one level to another and no generation has completely disappeared. All 
generations of NGOs co-exist together even today (Korten, 1987). 
 
In terms of these generations, my research is focussed on an NGO with 
characteristics that are found in the second, third and fourth generation as seen in 
Table 7. Hence, I define these NGOs as advocacy, empowering and participatory 
NGOs which operate at the city level, and belonging in either the second, third or 
fourth generations of NGOs. From now on, when I refer to NGOs I mean the 
NGOs with these characteristics.  
 
Selection of the NGO for the study 
 
The type of NGO is here defined by the level of operation, the objectives and 
generations. Three levels are identified as community NGOs, national NGOs and 
international NGOs. Community and international NGOs are eliminated and the 
national/city level NGOs selected. National NGOs are appropriate in terms of 
their scale and scope, as well as in testing legitimacy issues in terms of 
participation and representation. NGOs operating at this level are mostly funded 
by international NGOs.   
 
Of the six types of NGOs based on objectives/orientations as listed by William 
(1991) and World Bank (2001) (charitable, service, participatory, empowering, 
advocacy and operational NGOs), I choose not to explore charitable, service and 
operational NGOs. For a more focused analysis I consider NGOs whose 
objectives include participation, empowerment, and advocacy in the broader 
context of development. These NGOs claim legitimacy in representing the 
interests of communities. To claim legitimacy they have to ensure participation as 
discussed under section 2.3 and accountability section 2.4 and this is a challenge 
for national NGOs due to their dependency on donor funding as already discussed 
under the section on accountability. This makes national NGOs useful in 
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exploring how NGOs ensure accountability and participation in order to be able to 
claim representational legitimacy. 
 
The objectives of NGOs operating at international to local levels have been 
changing over time with some objectives carried over different generations. There 
are mainly four NGO generations as discussed above. As the objectives of NGOs 
are evolving from one generation to another, it is difficult to clearly separate NGO 
objectives/activities strictly according to individual generations. In this thesis the 
chance of finding a purely first generation NGO was low and was eliminated. As 
already mentioned, the focus in this thesis is on an NGO with objectives that fall 
between the second to fourth generations. The NGO selected has characteristics 
that demonstrate activities in promoting community development in a 
neighbourhood or village, or in the case of this thesis, a community in an informal 
settlement, where the NGO plays the role of a „mobiliser‟. This NGO also has 
characteristics of a third generation NGO because it also has an influence on 
policy formulation. Its fourth generation characteristic includes an attempt to 
address the inadequate mobilisation vision.  
 
Therefore in this thesis looking at all types of NGOs using the level of operation, 
objectives and generation, the focus is on what I call development NGOs, 
operating at national level with the aim of improving participation, empowerment 
and advocating for marginalised communities. Therefore, in Chapter Four when 
introducing the South African case study I focus on development NGOs. I will 
specifically explore the legitimacy of NGOs in the development sector seeing as 
Abbott (1996) indicates that the involvement of NGOs in development is 
changing the nature of NGOs activities and their relationship with communities.  
 
3.1.3 The roles and challenges of NGOs 
 
Different types of NGOs play different roles in communities. There are different 
views on the role of NGOs. Ley (2009:64) explains that  
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„the experience of global interrelated problems has stimulated the 
emergence of an international civil society characterised by NGOs entering 
in international policy arenas. [And] globalisation has influenced NGOs 
which have become actors on multiple levels with multiple linkages. More 
recently also locally based NGOs from the Global South are representing 
their constituencies in international arenas‟. 
 
NGOs have grown in importance and numbers for the past few decades. 
According to Dicklitch (1998) they have become influential in global governance 
with the arguments that they are capable of reaching the poor/marginalised 
communities, and could therefore be used as agents of community participation to 
represent poor people‟s needs and interests. Dicklitch (1998), looking at NGOs in 
Africa, indicates that the recognition of the important role of NGOs began in the 
early 1990s, when NGOs were considered to have closer links with the 
communities. Hence NGOs became important in poverty alleviation, and 
humanitarian and emergency aid provision initiatives. Hearn (2007:1095) states 
that „when NGOs emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in Africa they were seen as 
„magic bullet‟, the solution to top-down development and the means to poor 
people‟s empowerment‟. Dicklitch (1998) argues that since then, NGO activities 
have expanded and by the late 1990s were being heralded as important vehicles 
for empowerment, democratisation and economic development. This has resulted 
in the increasing funding and the number of NGOs, especially in East Africa 
(Hearn, 2007). 
 
In addition, NGOs play an important role of service providers (Fowler, 1995) in 
filling the gap left by government and the market. The World Bank (2004) notes 
that NGOs can play a role in increasing project-reach and sustainability by 
making it easier for communities and government or other institutions to have a 
dialogue with local communities, which in turn helps in promoting participation 
and creating ownership of development projects. Other roles NGOs can play 
include being catalysts for change and playing a key role in creating a civic 
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culture, pluralising the political, economic and social arena, and bridging the gap 
between the masses and the state by acting as intermediaries (Dicklitch, 1998: 3).  
 
Although NGOs seem to have an advantage in representing marginalised 
communities through advocacy, empowerment and participation, there are 
arguments that NGOs have problems reaching the poor. For example, Mokbul 
(2003) and William (1991) list some of the problems NGOs face as: lack of 
sustainability and cost-effectiveness; problems of legitimacy and accountability; 
problems concerned with advocacy; problematic relationships with states and 
problems concerning scaling up their projects. These all limit the effectiveness of 
NGOs. On paper, or according to the prescriptive approach to legitimacy, the roles 
of NGOs seem clear-cut, but on the ground the situation is different. NGOs have 
been criticised for being motivated by careerism and funding. Robins (2008:22) 
notes that  
 
„NGOs are also routinely challenged for introducing processes of 
individualism and depoliticisation that undermine the possibility of 
collective mobilisation and promote the interests of the state and neo-liberal 
capital‟.  
 
Robins (2008: 22) further explains that  
 
„some have argued that the term franchise state accurately describes the new 
relations between NGOs and the state in neo-liberal contexts wherein NGOs 
subcontract the management and administration of essential services from 
the state‟. 
 
„mainstream NGO literature tends to portray NGOs as autonomous, 
participatory and accountable [but this has changed and] „such description 
of NGOs are [now being]… routinely deconstructed as NGOs myths ... 
[with] critics claim[s] that NGOs have lost their critical edge as they have 
become increasingly under pressure to manage their programmes on a 
75 
 
profitable basis, with state subsidies cut and soft loans and grants for 
development programmes being minimised‟ 
 
South African NGOs have also faced similar challenges and criticism, this is 
discussed further in Chapter Four. 
  
Dicklitch (1998) further notes that even though NGOs are allowed to function as 
gap-fillers, they are often discouraged by the state and the international financial 
institutions from performing politically-sensitive advocacy or empowerment roles. 
This has direct implications for the perceived legitimacy of NGOs because it 
affects their role as representatives of communities‟ needs and interests. 
International NGOs have greater influence in influencing policies and 
organisation‟s agendas and as a result there are questions about the legitimacy of 
their influence. International NGOs are accused of expanding their global 
influence with no expanded accountability or representation (Collingwood, 2006). 
This does not mean it is only international NGOs that face legitimacy challenges. 
All NGOs face these challenges one way or the other.  
 
a. Legitimacy of NGOs 
 
Development NGOs have integrated characteristics of state, market and civil 
society and have anchored themselves in civil society without really belonging 
into it.  
 
„Towards state [NGOs] are characterised as policy influence and watchdog 
in return for demand for legitimacy and accountability. Relationships to 
civil society are characterised by [NGOs] receiving legitimacy and 
accountability and resources through grassroots, in exchange for 
innovations, articulation of interests, mediation and negotiation‟ (Ley, 
2009:65).  
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Questions regarding NGO legitimacy are increasing as NGOs speak out to 
challenge governments, corporations, armed factions and other non-state actors 
and this does not only apply to international NGOs but also to national and local 
NGOs (McDonald 2004). McDonald (2004) argues that questions of legitimacy 
arise mainly due to the fact that NGOs are not elected and not directly 
accountable. For international NGOs it is a challenge to ensure normative 
legitimacy, because in an international arena what one country might see as 
legitimate might differ from another. There are no global agreements on what is 
legitimate (Collingwood, 2006). Therefore, the source of legitimacy for the 
activities of international NGOs are rooted in notions of universal human dignity 
or global justice, international norms such as the international convention on 
Human Rights or the convention on the rights of the Child, political/financial 
independence, extensive membership, or giving voice to or empowering abused or 
marginalised groups such as children or refugees. International NGOs use their 
expertise as a form of legitimation as well as their partnerships with or support 
from powerful actors, such as governments, international organisations, funding 
bodies or corporate institutions (Collingwood, 2006). In addition, international 
NGOs also justify their legitimacy in individual countries by partnering with 
national NGOs (Idahosa, 2008).  
 
„International NGOs have especially had to construct grounds for their 
legitimacy, or justification for their participation in development; and they 
have done so by locating their legitimacy within being in partnership with 
southern [national] NGOs and representing southern views‟ (Idahosa, 
2008:73).  
 
Partnerships between international NGOs and national NGOs have not eliminated 
questions of NGO legitimacy.  
 
National NGOs also face questions regarding their legitimacy. Brown and 
Jagadananda (2007) have provided four reasons why NGOs face legitimacy 
questions. Firstly, NGOs have a diversity of stakeholders which may contribute to 
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competing accountability claims. NGOs are generally not accountable to any one 
clearly defined stakeholder. Secondly, when NGOs support poor and marginalised 
communities in some instances they may be required to challenge some „powerful 
constituencies whose interests may be harmed by proposed changes‟ (Brown and 
Jagadananda, 2007:5). Thirdly, descriptive legitimacy questions arise due to 
problematic behaviour in some NGOs. This resulted in all NGOs motives being 
questioned. Lastly, NGOs‟ roles have grown „in the sphere of social development 
and change ... [NGOs] have always been seen as gap fillers ... now taken on 
capacity building and policy advocacy roles that make them participants in multi-
sectoral governance processes‟ and this raises questions regarding NGO 
legitimacy (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007:6).  
 
According to Bratton (1989:570), the relationship between governments and 
NGOs is at the base of the policies that impinge on the legitimacy of different 
types of institutions to exercise power, with questions such as who has the right to 
assert leadership, to organise people and to allocate resources. This basically 
means the legitimacy of national NGOs will differ from one country to the next, 
depending on government policies and the relationship between government and 
NGOs.  
 
There are several ways NGOs could obtain their legitimacy depending on their 
working environment or, in particular, depending on how they relate to 
government. The relationship between NGOs and government could be positive or 
oppositional. An oppositional relationship prevails in cases where the government 
refuses to acknowledge the role of the NGOs and makes their working 
environment more difficult as compared to NGOs that enjoy a positive working 
relationship with the government. When NGOs play an oppositional role in 
relation to government their legitimacy is doubted, especially by national 
governments. However, they may at the same time derive legitimacy from playing 
the same oppositional role based on the following criteria.  
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On the one hand, Atack (1999) notes that in connection with the state there are 
two types of criteria for legitimacy: formal procedural and substantive-purposive. 
On the other hand, Slim (2002) and Edward (2003) note that in most cases NGOs 
establish their legitimacy morally and legally. Although the criteria provided by 
the above authors are differently worded, they basically come to the same 
argument. For example Atack‟s (1999) formal procedural criteria mean that the 
legitimacy of NGOs depends on their representivity (the extent to which they are 
transparent, accountable and acting in a spirit of genuine partnership with others) 
and they should have distinctive value associated with their work. The 
substantive-purposive criteria means the legitimacy of NGOs depends on their 
effectiveness in achieving goals and their ability to empower individuals to take 
direct control over their lives (Atack, 1999).  
 
Atack (1999) considers two criteria for NGO legitimacy which are based on 
representation, effectiveness, distinctive value and empowerment. These are 
similar to Edwards‟ (2003) criteria for legitimacy as being derived legally and 
morally. Edwards (2003) indicates that legally NGOs can establish their 
legitimacy when registered according to the country‟s laws. Legally derived 
legitimacy is mainly implemented by governments and recognised by 
governments. This means legal legitimacy can only be derived in situations where 
government policies towards NGOs are not repressive. 
 
In situations where government policies are repressive, NGOs tend to derive their 
legitimacy morally rather than through the law. This does not mean that when 
they have legal legitimacy they do not claim moral legitimacy. In cases where 
NGOs are seen as useful organisations by governments, they have to register 
according to the law and also claim legitimacy morally (Edwards, 2003).  
 
Edwards (2003) indicates that NGOs derive legitimacy morally through 
representation, when they have formal membership that can hold leaders 
accountable for the positions they take. In this case, Edwards and Hulme 
(1995:14) indicate that „NGOs do not have to be member-controlled to be 
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legitimate, but they do have to be accountable for what they do if their claims to 
legitimacy are to be sustained‟. McDonalds (2004) indicates that NGOs can claim 
a representational role and obtain their legitimacy through non-electoral 
mechanisms of authorisation and accountability. Another morally derived 
legitimacy according to Edwards (2003) is through competence and expertise or 
meeting certain norms for performance (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007). When 
NGOs are recognised by other legitimate bodies as bringing valuable knowledge 
and skills to the table they are seen as legitimate because NGOs are often value-
based. In addition Brown and Jagadananda (2007) note that NGOs are also seen as 
legitimate when promoting public interest by meeting interests of their 
stakeholders or at least being in sympathy with large segments of public (Edward, 
2003). NGO activities that are seen as appropriate causes the NGO to be seen as 
legitimate (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007). 
 
NGOs could also construct or improve their legitimacy by using the media to 
improve their public relations. The use of the media for legitimacy of 
organisations really falls under public relations. Public relations scholars have 
identified a gap  in theorising the role of media or public relations in the 
legitimation of organisations (Patel et al., 2005). Available literature demonstrates 
that NGOs make use of new media tools in their public relations activities to 
promote an organisation‟s image and to encourage fund raising (Hyunjin et al., 
2009). 
 
The debates on NGO legitimacy are based on NGOs working in environments that 
are considered secure from a tenure perspective. The question is how do NGOs 
working in informal settlements that have insecure tenure construct their 
legitimacy? Large segments of the public do not support the existence of informal 
settlements, in particular their informality and perceived or actual illegality. The 
popular understanding is that they are breeding grounds for crime and affect 
property values negatively (Mumtaz, 2001). These perceptions are discussed 
further in Section 3.4. Therefore, what legitimacy challenges do NGOs working in 
informal settlements face, considering the fact that they are not promoting public 
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interests as perceived by certain (dominant) sectors of societies? Or are these 
NGOs seen as legitimate by governments because in some way they are assisting 
governments in discharging their responsibilities towards poor urban 
communities? Whose perception of legitimacy matters in this case - governments, 
the communities they serve or the wider public? NGOs claim legitimacy by 
claiming to be representatives of the communities they serve (Edwards, 2003 and 
Upadhyay, 2003).  
 
b. Are NGOs legitimate representative? 
 
NGO representation and legitimacy are interlinked. Upadhyay (2003) indicates 
that the watchdog role of NGOs has raised questions as to who these groups 
represent. NGOs in turn claim legitimacy due to their representation of 
marginalised communities (Edwards 2003; Upadhyay, 2003). In response to an 
attempt made by NGOs in defending themselves, Niggli and Rothenbuhler (2003) 
note that NGOs insist that they „represent‟ civil society and thus lay claim to a 
representational function which, besides trade unions or farmers‟ organisations, 
virtually no NGO actually has.  
 
In support of the NGOs claim of representation role, Frantz (1987:122) argues that 
theoretically there are limits to NGOs‟ representivity compared to the state, as  
„governments reach society as a whole, both in social and spatial terms, NGOs 
respond to the specific interests of discrete parts of the civil society‟. NGOs might 
not be able to reach the whole society as government does, but their representation 
of small communities is more effective than that of government. The depth of 
reach of NGOs is particularly relevant in informal settlements, as the latter have 
different characteristics that require different strategies. Where NGOs also involve 
communities in decision making processes, NGOs intervention and representation 
could be more effective than that of government. However, Marschall (2002:2) 
argues, that „NGOs and governments should be seen to be complimentary, not 
rival...‟. In communities where the government lacks a deep penetration into the 
lowest community level, NGOs can complement government activities by their 
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ability to reach deep into small communities. This way, both the government and 
NGOs are able to deliver effective development to disadvantaged communities.  
 
Marschall (2002:2) argues that the community participation role is claimed by 
advocacy NGOs and „carries its own self-originated legitimacy; it does not need 
to borrow legitimacy from representation‟. He argues that NGOs become 
legitimate through what they do, and representation alone does not make an NGO 
legitimate. Marschall (2002) further indicates that NGOs are legitimate through 
participation and not representation. Marschall (2002) is supported by Niggli and 
Rothenbuhler (2003) who argue that NGOs are not essentially about representing 
anyone in the way governments do. Rather they are there to provide a voice to 
groups that cannot successfully project their interests and which risk being 
bypassed in the struggle between the dominant interests. The argument here is that 
NGO representation should not be compared to government representation. 
Upadhyay (2003:1) also notes that from a human rights perspective, NGOs 
represent the conscience of a society and act in the interests of those represented; 
a legitimate, alternative force that questions the consequences of government 
action, and inaction.  
 
Marschall (2002) argues that civil society and representative democracy should be 
complementary and not rival to each other. Marschall (2002:2) explains, „civil 
society is about participation, while parliamentary democracy is about 
representation‟. Most NGOs are focused on a single issue and the representation 
they claim is based on that particular issue (Marschall, 2002). Therefore, for 
NGOs to claim representation, the important factor in judging this representation 
for NGOs is the participation of the sector that an NGO claims to represent.  
 
Representation and participation are important issues to NGOs because without 
effective participation (Elster, 1998), representation and accountability (O‟Neill, 
2001) the decisions made in these processes will not be considered legitimate. For 
NGOs to address challenges they face in terms of their legitimacy in representing 
communities, they have to ensure communities participate in the decision-making 
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process (Moncrieffe, 1998). They should also be accountable to the communities 
they serve (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Moncrieffe, 1998). Moncrieffe (1998: 
397) argues that „limited participation affects the level of representation and 
accountability which the democratic state is able to achieve‟. A study by Igoe 
(2003) found that donor agendas in Tanzania influence the types of programmes 
NGOs choose to undertake, and that communities are not involved in the 
decision-making processes when deciding what project is most important. In that 
study, Igoe found that an NGO implemented a water project without the target 
community being involved in the project. National NGOs are largely funded by 
foreign donors and do not have the power to influence decisions made, or agendas 
agreed upon, by these donors. For example, Bebbington (2005) notes that national 
or local NGOs in Peru and Bolivia were funded by Dutch NGOs which, in turn, 
were funded by the Dutch government, and as such, it is the Dutch government 
that influenced how the money was spent and the programmes implemented.  In 
addition, these Dutch NGOs had to demonstrate to the Dutch government how 
their work reduced poverty in these countries. This means that these NGOs are 
preoccupied with accountability to the Dutch government, and in turn, they 
demand accountability from the national NGOs in Peru and Bolivia, that they 
fund. Hence, national NGOs are sometimes so focussed on accountability to 
donors that they fail to focus on participation of communities (ibid.).  NGOs 
cannot claim to be legitimate representatives of communities‟ if they do not 
involve communities in the decision making process. For NGOs to be able to 
provide the voice on real problems for groups that cannot represent their own 
interests (Upadhyay, 2003), these communities have to participate in the 
deliberation of ideas to be represented by NGOs to other institutions. So unless 
NGOs ensure accountability and participation of communities they claim to 
represent, they cannot claim legitimate representation.  
 
c. The dilemma  of NGO accountability  
 
Accountability can be distinguished in terms of functional accountability 
(accounting for resources, resource use, and immediate impacts), and strategic 
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accountability (accounting for the impacts that an NGO‟s activities have on the 
actions of other organisations and their wider environment) (Ebrahim, 2003). 
Increased influence of NGOs has resulted in closer scrutiny and accountability 
demands. Brown and Jagadananda, (2007:12) note that „questions about the 
legitimacy of Civil Society Organisation [CSO] are often raised in terms of who 
elected them and who holds them accountable. There are different forms of 
accountability that apply to different sectors. For example, in government circles 
it is representative accountability, which emphasises the obligations of 
representatives to their constituents ... [In the] business world [it is] principal-
agent accountability, which focuses on motivating agents to achieve the goals of 
their principal [and for CSOs it is] on creating mutual accountability compacts 
that bind members through shared values, aspirations and social identities‟ 
(Brown and Jagadananda, 2007:10). 
 
Questions on the accountability of NGOs arise mainly because NGOs are faced 
with multiple and sometimes competing accountability demands (Ebrahim, 2003). 
For example, donors demand „integrity, efficiency and impact of programmes‟. 
Beneficiaries demand that „locally determined development‟ is fostered rather 
than donors imposing „their own priorities‟. NGOs staff wants to live up to the 
higher purpose of objectives that „drew their commitment to the enterprise‟. Other 
partners that work with NGOs demand that NGOs „live up to promises they made 
in forging their partnership‟. Many different stakeholders call NGOs to account 
for their activities (Brown and Moore, 2001:1).  
 
NGO-patron accountability or „upward‟ accountability refers to relationships with 
donors, foundations and governments (Ebrahim, 2003). In contrast, NGO-
accountability to clients or downward accountability primarily to relationships 
with communities NGOs provide services to although it may also include 
communities or regions indirectly impacted upon by NGO programmes. The third 
category of accountability concerns NGOs themselves. This is an internal 
accountability including NGOs‟ responsibility to their mission and staff (Najam, 
1996). 
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The different activities of NGOs require different structures of accountability. 
This means NGOs need different structures for making themselves accountable to 
different stakeholders, depending on their role. Brown and Moore (2001) analyse 
NGOs with different roles and accountability demands and indicate that welfare 
and service delivery NGOs face dual accountability to financial contributors and 
clients. Given these premises, the accountability system an NGO establishes ought 
to change whenever the role of the NGO changes (Brown and Moore, 2001). 
NGOs are obligated by donors to use the financial resources effectively. The 
accountability of capacity building NGOs‟ should mainly be to clients, but there 
are complications where other powerful stakeholders have strong interests. Due to 
multiple and conflicting accountability demands, the best way NGOs can make up 
the natural „accountability gap‟ is to generate public trust by full transparency and 
high standards of performance (Marschall, 2002). 
 
In order for NGOs to derive both upward and downward accountability there are 
five broad mechanisms that can be used. According to Ebrahim (2003) these are: 
1. Disclosure of statements and reports; 
2. Performance assessment and evaluation that includes internal and 
external evaluations; 
3. Participation, which is a process rather than a tool - it includes 
distinctions between different levels of participation; providing 
information to the communities at public meeting, surveys and formal 
dialogue, public involvement in actual project-related activities, 
citizens being able to negotiate and bargain over decisions with NGOs, 
and people‟s own initiatives which occur independently of NGO and 
state-sponsored projects; 
4. Self-regulation where NGOs develop standards or codes of behaviour 
and performance;  
5. Social auditing, which refers to a process through which an 
organisation assesses, reports, and improves upon its social 
performance and ethical behaviour through stakeholder dialogue. 
85 
 
 
NGO accountability mechanisms are also influenced by the form/type of 
accountability. Representative accountability is applied in government, „voters 
need mechanisms that enable transparency and evaluation of representative 
performance, such a publication of votes or a free press that investigates and 
publishes representatives activities‟ (Brown and Moore, 2001:11). Principal-agent 
accountability is mostly used in business - „principals must negotiate contracts 
that specify performance expectations, reporting arrangements, and rewards and 
punishment for various outcomes‟ (ibid.). Mutual accountability applies mainly 
between different NGOs working together - „the parties must develop shared goals 
and perspectives and relationships of mutual respect and trust that can underpin 
their compact‟ (Brown and Moore, 2001:12).  
 
NGOs should be subjected to some form of regulation (Niggli and Ruthenbuhler, 
2003). There are different legal requirements NGOs are supposed to meet, and 
these differ from one country to the next. In addition to the legal registration 
requirements, there are additional basic legal requirements NGOs have to comply 
with to ensure accountability. At the same time it is acknowledged that NGOs do 
need „some freedom‟ for their work. This argument is based on the assumption 
that „unelected‟, advocacy NGOs could represent civil society, provided that they 
conform to certain guidelines (Niggli and Ruthenbuhler, 2003). 
 
Although there are mechanisms to ensure NGO accountability, NGOs still have 
problems ensuring their accountability to communities. For example, a case study 
found that, although NGOs were aware of the importance of accountability for 
empowerment and had accountability mechanisms, they never saw accountability 
mechanisms as central to their functions (Kilby, 2006). These NGOs argued that a 
shift in accountability to communities would weaken their control over programs 
and derail them from fulfilling a broader community and public roles. In a 
separate study in Tanzania on an NGO representing pastoralists land rights, Igoe 
(2003:863) noted that with time the   
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„NGO leaders [had become] less accountable to their constituent 
communities, and the movement [or NGO objectives] itself lost momentum 
as its energies have been diverted into activities that can be justified in 
donors funding reports‟.  
 
The discussion in this section indicates that one of the mechanisms NGOs use to 
construct legitimacy is through representation of communities‟ voices and 
interests (Edwards, 2003; Upadhyay, 2003). For representation to occur, NGOs 
have to be accountable to the communities they to serve and ensure communities 
are involved in the decision-making process (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; 
Marschall, 2002). This means that without community participation, NGOs will 
not be considered to be representative or accountable and therefore not legitimate. 
What creates problems for NGO legitimacy is the argument that NGOs depend on 
donor funding for survival therefore they face multiple accountability, to donors, 
communities and other stakeholders.  
 
3.2 Instrumentality of community participation for NGOs  
 
Community participation has become a pivotal concept in community 
development and accepted in theoretical discourses in development fields (Abbott, 
1996). Although participation may be seen as an important tool in the 
development process, and NGOs are often seen as the best agents in implementing 
participation, there are challenges and advantages of using participation. In the 
implementation of community participation, Abbott (1993) and Clark (1995) 
argue that NGOs as instruments of participation, whether invited or not by 
governments, emphasise the participation of the poor.  
 
In emphasising the importance of NGOs in community participation and 
representation, Morrill (2004) indicates that minorities or marginalised people 
have to organise themselves to ensure their voices are heard. In order for 
marginalised groups to organise themselves they need NGO assistance, as NGOs 
are seen as good agents of community participation (Abbott, 1993; Dicklitch, 
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1998) due to their ability to adapt their organisational structure and gain relevant 
community input (Fowler, 1995). NGOs have potential to contribute to 
development because of  
 
„(a) their scale – northern NGOs act as conduits for 12% of total 
development assistance ... ; (b) their ability to reach the poor especially in 
inaccessible areas; (c) their capacity for innovation and experimentation, 
which are difficult for official agencies ...; their representivity – often 
having close links with poor communities and (e) their skills of participation 
...‟ (Clark, 1995:594). 
 
John Turner‟s 1960s perception of aided self-help as response to informal 
settlements (adopted by the World Bank in 1972) helped create a positive 
attitude in assisting the community from the government‟s point of view. In the 
early 1970s, communities‟ voices were heard when a non-government pressure 
group called Social Action in Lusaka (SAIL) engaged in various activities. The 
NGO‟s press campaign managed to lobby various responsible authorities in 
support of upgrading, as the urban council was reluctant to cooperate in illegal 
settlement affairs (Tait, 1997). 
 
There are many debates on the merits and demerits of community participation. 
The aim of discussing these in this section is not to assess whether community 
participation is effective or not as a process, but to inform my later discussion on 
how NGOs implement community participation effectively to claim 
representation and prescriptive legitimacy in their activities in informal 
settlements.  
 
3.2.1 Advantages of using community participation 
 
The debates that support community participation strategies indicate a number of 
benefits in using it as a development strategy. Imparato and Ruster (2003) support 
the process of participation in slum upgrading as important in order to support 
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communities and help sharpen the focus of communities‟ vision. Imparato and 
Ruster (2003: 16) list three main advantages of using community participation 
indicating that participation „improves project design and effectiveness; enhances 
the impact and sustainability of projects; and contributes to overarching goals 
such as good governance, democratisation and poverty reduction‟. 
 
The World Bank (2006) sees community participation as the only means of 
meeting objectives, and it has the potential of increasing efficiency and cost 
effectiveness of the project. Daniels and Uys (2006) argue that there are numerous 
advantages to community participation. These include enhancing understanding 
and commitment by involving communities in the preparation of plans. As a 
process of empowerment, participation helps communities that have no other 
platform for their voices to be heard. 
 
Involving local communities in decision-making processes helps in gaining 
insights into existing conditions. Their involvement helps to break the mentality 
of dependence and promotes self-awareness and confidence. Raco (2000: 574) 
indicates that most „governments place great importance on the real involvement 
of local communities ... [and] this can lead to better decision-making, enhance 
programmes delivery and improve sustainability‟.  
 
Although community participation is seen as important, it is not clear what is 
meant by participation (Abbott, 1996). Different parties interpret community 
participation in ways which meet their own interests and perceptions. For 
example, development professionals may see it as a way of mobilising community 
support; NGOs may see it as a way for local communities to take control of the 
development process and bring about political change; development agencies may 
see it as a method of improving project performance; and government departments 
may see it as threatening and subversive (Abbott, 1996). 
 
As different parties interpret community participation in ways which meet their 
own interests and perceptions, they are likely to implement participation 
89 
 
differently, and in this way they may not always be able to attain the stipulated 
advantages of using community participation. This is because these advantages 
are not clear but are diverse and depend on different objectives. Therefore, when 
assessing participation in the case of NGOs it is important to establish what the 
NGOs‟ objectives are in ensuring participation. 
 
3.2.2 Challenges of community participation 
 
There are challenges in implementing community participation which often lead 
to NGOs ignoring and failing to consider community participation as a 
development strategy in their projects. Sarkission et al. (1997) argue that these 
challenges are mainly due to the problem of bridging the gap between the theory 
and practice of community participation. Failure in bridging this gap often leaves 
planners struggling with how best to engage with the communities.  
 
This argument by Sarkission et al. (1997) is supported by Abbott (1993) who 
points out that the inability of government, NGOs or any other institutions to deal 
with the heterogeneous nature of communities can affect the effectiveness of 
community participation. The inability to define geographical boundaries of 
communities especially with physical infrastructure also contributes to the 
problem. Furthermore, the process of community participation lacks rigorous 
academic foundation or conceptual structure. As a result there are different 
perceptions of what community participation is, and a lack of understanding of the 
relationship between community participation and infrastructure provision 
(Abbott, 1993).  
 
Shirlow and Murtagh (2004) also agree that community participation problems are 
due to the simplistic construction of community as a distinctive stakeholder with a 
shared set of values and clear identity. The nature of decisions to be made might 
also have a negative effect on the community participation process. Abbott (1993) 
notes that the particular approach to decision making could have social, political, 
financial, economic and technical components that make the decision-making 
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process more complex and time consuming. This results in conflicts among 
individuals and groups.  
 
Abbott (1993) also indicates that instruments of community participation can 
hamper the effectiveness of community participation. The instruments used in 
community participation may involve audio-visual aid materials, but may reach 
out only to dominant community groups.  
 
Gaventa (2007) argues that spaces of participation such as institutions, channels 
and opportunities are not neutral; they are shaped by power relations around and 
within them (Abbott, 1993; Sarkission et al., 1997; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2004). 
Thus power creates challenges in the participation process in terms of whose 
voice can be included and whose voice is excluded. How power influences 
effectiveness of community participation is further explained by Arnstein (1969) 
who noted that when participation is defined as re-distribution of power, not 
everyone agrees it is the best practice, and that participation without redistribution 
of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless.  
 
Wilcox (1994) notes that participation requires an understanding of power as 
power depends on who has information, money, skill and confidence. Imparato 
and Ruster (2003) indicate that in order to deal with power struggles and conflict 
in community participation, the focus should not be on maximising participation 
because there are different levels of participation that are determined by different 
situations and times.  
 
Effectiveness of the participation process depends on power relations between 
individuals in a community and between community and other institutions such as 
local governments and NGOs (Lyon, 1987). This means in order to improve the 
quality of life in a community there is a need to understand power relations in the 
community. In order to understand power relations, knowledge about the 
community in terms of education, demographic structure such as population size, 
work force, age, and residential and business land-use patterns is important (ibid.). 
91 
 
Arnstein (1969: 217) argues that attention must be paid to the fact that although 
there are different blocs of people with power, neither the have-nots nor the power 
holders are homogenous blocs as each group encompasses a host of divergent 
points of view, significant cleavages, competing vested interests and splintered 
subgroups.  
 
Emphasising Arnstein‟s (1969) point, Raco (2000) posits that even when 
community representatives are recognised as equal partners in negotiations in the 
decision-making process, they often lack power, resources and technical 
knowledge to operate on equal footing with other stakeholders. In this situation 
Raco (2000:577) argues that without power, resources and knowledge, 
communities will have minimal influence in decision-making processes. 
Communities will be „used to obtain legitimacy through incorporation in public 
sector programmes‟ although they will have no power in the decision-making 
processes (Raco, 2000:577). This means, emphasis on participation and new 
programmes for participation „will not necessarily result in greater inclusion or 
pro-poor policy change‟ (ibid.).  
 
The relationship between donors, NGOs and communities demonstrate how 
power, resources and knowledge affect participation. Donors offer financial 
resources, which give them the power to influence the decisions that are made; 
NGOs provide knowledge on how to implement projects in the communities and 
how to access funding for the community. The community is a beneficiary which 
is meant to „participate‟ in the development decisions that are going to affect it. 
But because the community has not contributed in terms of resources or 
knowledge, their participation is limited. For example, Igoe (2003) tells of a 
project in Tanzania which was initiated because donors were offering money and 
the women only participated because they did not want to be seen as people who 
did not like development and would be bypassed in future. NGOs leaders 
implemented the projects and advised the community because their interests were 
in accessing any possible funding, which would assist in the NGO‟s survival. The 
funding agencies working with the NGO‟s leaders did not consult and involve the 
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community in the decision-making processes on what project would benefit them. 
The community in turn did not have the power to demand participation, as they 
were not contributing any resources (ibid.). 
 
For the informal settlement context, Imparato and Ruster (2003) emphasise the 
importance of community participation in different interventions. Imparato and 
Ruster (2003:37) note that in upgrading informal settlements, some people might 
have to be moved or relocated to create public or private spaces within the 
settlements. If the people concerned are not involved in the decision making 
processes in deciding alternatives and goals of the project, implementation will be 
very difficult if not impossible (ibid.). 
 
The observed challenges in community participation in turn affect representation. 
When the level of participation of the represented (communities) is very low, the 
chance to project their interests and needs to government or donors is likely to be 
limited.  
 
3.3 The state of informal settlements  
 
Durand-Lasserve (2006) argues that the term informality is difficult to define in 
reference to settlements and economic activities. He notes that informality in the 
human settlement context may be defined negatively when the borderline between 
formal and informal is blurred. Thus whether a settlement is formal or informal 
depends on different policies regarding land, urban planning and housing. 
 
As with the term informality, Durand-Lasserve (2006:1) notes that the  
„…term illegality poses similar definitional problems, but with distinctively 
more repressive connotations. When this term is used by governments‟ 
authorities it reveals a clearly repressive intention and the most visible 
expression of repression is eviction‟.  
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Although the action of occupying the land is considered by government as illegal, 
informal settlement residents have the same basic rights in law as other citizens. 
For example the Republic of South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) 
contains the right to adequate housing. For example Section 26(1) indicates that 
„everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing‟; Section 26 (2) directs 
that „the State must make reasonable legislative and other measures within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right‟; Section 26 
(3) states that „no one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions‟ (South African 
Government Information, 2010). In some instances governments do attempt to 
provide services to the settlements as Durand-Lasserve (2006) notes, but these 
basic services are normally provided using temporary service-providers especially 
for water and transport. Moreover, these services are often provided at higher cost 
compared to what other city dwellers pay. 
 
Residents of informal settlements face problems such as illegal tenure and public 
health challenges. As the land is occupied informally, public authorities often do 
not recognise or acknowledge the existence of these settlements and they do not 
plan for service provision for the residents. Azfar and Rahman (2004) and 
Durand-Lasserve (2006) indicate that service provision such as public health and 
safety are major issues and remain largely uncatered for in informal settlements, 
as governments are reluctant to intervene because such action might be viewed as 
a first step towards legal recognition of the settlements and tenure.  
 
The problem of informal settlements, which results from widespread poverty and 
inequality and shortages of affordable housing, is experienced both in developed 
and developing countries though to different degrees. This is due to differences in 
economic, social, political, ecological and demographic characteristics that 
influence the rates of urbanisation and formal housing production (Aldrich and 
Sandhu, 1995). Housing shortages in sub-Saharan African countries are mainly 
the result of the historical development of African cities, immigration and high 
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rates of urbanisation (Tait, 1997). Housing policies during the colonial era or 
apartheid in South Africa ensured that formal housing in towns was selectively 
provided to the white population, while relegating most Africans to temporary 
residences in the peripheries of the towns (Schlyter, 1995; Tait, 1997). Lack of 
affordable housing for the urban poor resulted in significant growth of informal 
settlements in most urban centres (Agevi 2003). Furthermore, rapid urbanisation, 
and other socio-economic problems combined with the incapacity of most 
national or city authorities to undermine the provision of adequate serviced 
infrastructure to their growing urban population (Agevi 2003). 
 
In countries where governments have repressive policies towards informal 
settlements, participation of citizens in these settlements via government channels 
is significantly limited. Most governments see an informal settlement as a 
problem, which needs a solution and most of the time the solution is to remove 
people from these types of housing to a „better‟ standard of living. For example, 
between 2003 and 2007 more than 800 000 residents in Nigeria were forcefully 
evicted from informal settlements in Abuja without adequate consultation, written 
notice, compensation or alternative housing (COHRE, 2008). Also, in 2005, the 
Zimbabwean government demolished a number of informal settlements in Harare, 
leaving thousands of people homeless (Du Plessis, 2006). Du Plessis (2006:180) 
further notes that „every year millions of people around the world are forcibly 
evicted, leaving them homeless and in the process entrenching patterns of poverty, 
discrimination and social exclusion‟. These kinds of evictions have been 
happening despite international law explicitly recognising the right to adequate 
housing. These forced evictions result in entrenched patterns of poverty, 
discrimination and social exclusion and it is a violation of human rights that 
contradict human development (Du Plessis, 2006).  
 
Pithouse (2009) explains that although there has been progress with development 
of policies in South Africa, such as the „Breaking New Ground‟ policy in 2004, 
some municipalities still act unlawfully to evict, demolish and forcefully remove 
people from new settlements. Apart from the government views on informal 
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settlements, Mumtaz (2001) notes that ordinary people who are themselves 
formally housed are against informal settlements due to the „NIMBY (not-in-my-
back-yard) principle‟ as informal settlements are perceived to bring down the 
market value of their properties due to the disorderly layout, ramshackle, 
makeshift construction, lack of services, and fear that these settlements are 
breeding grounds for crime and prostitution. 
 
The question then is, can NGOs‟ advocacy work enable communities in informal 
settlements to engage with government more effectively to improve their standard 
of living in terms of service provision? Can NGOs claim representation and 
legitimacy by ensuring participation of these communities in decision-making 
processes? Following this brief synopsis of views on informal settlements and 
opposing attitudes towards these settlements, I turn to government policies and 
strategies in response to the next section explores South African strategies on 
solving the developmental problems in informal settlements. It will also 
investigate the role of NGOs play to represent the interests of urban poor in 
informal settlements in South Africa. 
 
3.4 Government policies and strategies on informal settlements 
 
There is no question that informal settlement residents have rights to basic 
services like other citizens, but the fact remains that informal settlements are seen 
as a problem by the majority of the other town dwellers.  
 
Governments‟ views of and responses to growth of, and problems in, informal 
settlements are varied. Some governments tolerate the existence of informal 
settlements while others aim to eliminate them. Harrison (1992) indicates that 
negative attitudes towards informal settlements are supported by an argument that 
they blur the image of modernisation that developing countries are trying to 
portray.  Informal settlements are regarded as symbols of the loss of control by the 
central authorities, and as breeding grounds for crime and disease. Apart from 
perceptions that informal settlements spoil the image of modernisation, Agevi 
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(2003) indicates that governments and public organisations have refused to 
recognise that informal settlements are indeed a productive and creative solution 
to shelter needs, preferring instead to treat them with suspicion and downright 
opposition.  
 
Durand-Lasserve (2006:2) notes that the views towards informal settlements have 
undergone a significant transformation in public debate, from non-recognition in 
the 1960s, to repression in the 1970s and 1980s, to tolerance in the 1990s. More 
recently, there are concerns also noted by Huchzermeyer et al. (2006:6) that some 
governments have gone back to repressive measures that are being implemented 
as proactive policies. The change in perception of informal settlements in the late 
1960s and early 1970s have been influenced by theorists such as John Turner who 
asserted that informal settlements are not a problem but are part of the solution to 
the housing crisis and that informal settlements represent the creativity and energy 
of the poor. This new perception has successfully established a far more positive 
approach to informal settlements. Governments‟ and donors‟ attitudes toward 
informal settlements have been changing from positive attitudes to repressive 
measures and back to positive attitudes (Huchzermeyer et al., 2006). For example, 
as noted by Harrison (1992), governments‟ stand on informal settlements tends to 
differ with political and economic influences from within government and from 
other organisations. Harrison (1992) further indicates that in some instances 
governments change their policies on informal settlements from being hostile to 
finding positive ways of dealing with the problem and back to being hostile and 
ignoring informal settlements again. These changes mainly depend on the 
direction the government in office is taking towards provision of public services. 
 
According to Huchzermeyer et al. (2006) the different government attitudes 
towards informal settlements are determined by state-society relations. 
Huchzermeyer et al. (2006:21) provide three classifications of government‟s 
attitude. These are oppositional (hostile, repressive or exploitative), indifferent 
(neglecting, tolerating or ignoring), or cooperative (co-opting or integrating). 
Huchzermeyer et al. (2006:21) further indicate that most governments are 
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oppositional when they are „blinded by negative perceptions and interpretations of 
informal settlements among dominant classes‟ and when the government follows 
rigid approaches imposed by lending institutions. Huchzermeyer et al (2006:21) 
note that indifferent state-society relations with regard to informal settlements 
may result under several conditions. First, where the ruling party considers these 
settlements necessary for political support, second, where their existence does not 
pose a threat to the principle of private property, and third, where they are 
recognised as supporting the economic and social system.  
 
Based on Aina‟s (1997) classification of state-society relations, Huchzermeyer et 
al. (2006) developed a typology of six policy responses to informal settlements. 
The first one of these is called repressive and is characterised by removal of 
informal settlements at whatever cost to the communities living in the settlement. 
The Nigerian case, discussed above under section 3.3 is an example of this type of 
response to informal settlements. A deterministic response is usually characterised 
by formulated strategies in addressing informal settlements problems. These 
strategies do not involve communities‟ interests or how the strategy would affect 
the community. Tolerant/ambivalent responses are those that are used by 
government officials during election time to gain popularity and votes from the 
settlement. These responses provide temporary rights to residents to occupy a 
piece of land, as is the case with transit camps, and has been implemented in 
South Africa. However, this may not be a good solution as it creates uncertainty to 
the communities living in transit camps. Nevertheless, giving such „amnesty‟ 
lends people a right to occupy the land, whether temporarily or permanent and 
protects communities from being evicted. Finally, a transforming policy response 
involves the upgrading of the informal settlements with the provision of basic 
services.  
 
NGOs could work within any of these state-society relations when it comes to 
assisting communities in informal settlements. In the case of repressive policies, 
NGOs could assist the community fight for its rights, for example, by defending 
the urban poor from being evicted or educating them about their rights as citizens. 
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In the context of deterministic policies, NGOs could assist communities in 
engaging with government more effectively. With transitional, amnesty and 
transforming policy contexts, NGOs could assist the community in engaging 
government in influencing the development strategies of the area and project 
implementation. The objectives and the type of NGOs working in an informal 
settlement determine how and whether the NGOs can assist communities in these 
settlements. For example, in this thesis, the NGO Planact was working in a 
settlement established illegally on a private land. However, if the government 
acquires the land, the residents might eventually obtain permanent occupational 
rights. However, the policy context is primarily „deterministic‟, with little political 
will to move in a „transformative‟ direction that would involve in situ upgrading 
and serious involvement of the community in decision-making over its future. 
The arguments above indicate that the role of NGOs in community participation 
depends on the type of government policy being implemented. Huchzermeyer 
(2004a:55) categorises a number of existing interventions that recognise informal 
settlements and seek to improve conditions in informal settlements, into three 
categories. Firstly, she considers externally designed and comprehensive 
upgrading that transforms an illegal and substandard environment to acceptable 
standards through a capital intensive intervention. Secondly, she considers 
government initiated support-based intervention that explores alternative informal 
settlement intervention approaches (Huchzermeyer, 2004a:64). Finally she 
recommends an NGO initiated support-based interventions (ibid.). Huchzermeyer 
(2004a:64) indicates that the government initiated support-based interventions 
addresses some of the shortcomings of the conventional once-off physical 
interventions. Support-based interventions provide opportunities for communities 
to participate in the projects as some parts of such projects are managed within 
organised communities.  
 
NGO initiated support-based intervention are mostly important in situations where 
government policies towards informal settlements are oppositional or indifferent, 
as classified by Aina (1997). Huchzermeyer (2004a:70) further indicates that even 
when government policies are tolerant towards informal settlements, the 
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government can only reach a small percentage of informal settlements leaving the 
rest without services. Schlyter (1995) argues that governments are tolerant or 
cooperative when they have support in the form of funding from international 
NGOs and when the political motives suit the government in power. 
Huchzermeyer (2004a) agrees with this argument by Schlyter‟s. For example 
Huchzermeyer notes that, in the mid 1970s the Zambian government depended 
heavily on external funding and when this funding was delayed or cut, upgrading 
was discontinued. 
 
Huchzermeyer (2004a:70) states that when governments cannot intervene in 
improving the living standard of informal settlement communities, NGOs may 
attempt to assist communities with two objectives  
 
„Firstly, they attempt to challenge the poor to explore what they are capable 
of achieving without the assistance of governments and to empower them to 
successfully engage with government to win support for their self-defined 
local objective ... Secondly, they attempt to challenge funders to reform the 
regulations to which their finance is tied, which is to break with the product-
oriented funding mechanisms designed for the conventional contractual 
procedures of comprehensive upgrading‟.  
 
 Huchzermeyer (2004a) states that the attempt by an NGO to empower a 
community to engage more effectively with local government is a realistic one. As 
noted in the discussion above, informal settlements erupt because of government 
failure and the private sector to create conditions for the urban poor to access 
affordable housing. As discussed under the section on NGO theories, this is where 
development NGOs find their niche, claiming to represent the needs of 
marginalised communities in informal settlements.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
Marginalised communities in informal settlements are vulnerable to problems of 
unresolved tenure security. As such, communities in informal settlements are 
poorly represented in the local government decision making processes. 
Government policies that address the problem of informal settlements vary from 
tolerance to repressive measures to eliminate them depending on the attitude of 
the leaders in power. This is where NGOs claim their legitimacy in representing 
these marginalised communities. 
 
There are different types of NGOs with different roles working with different 
stakeholders. The representation and legitimacy of NGOs is questioned because 
NGOs face multiple and sometimes competing accountabilities from the different 
stakeholders. In most cases NGOs have to be accountable to the donors, 
communities they represent, partners and NGOs own mission. Although there are 
mechanisms to ensure accountability, often NGOs are accused of being more 
accountable to the donors than communities they claim to represent, because 
donors seems to have more power as they provide financial resources for the 
survival of the NGOs. As a result of their accountability to donors, the 
participation of communities is not implemented effectively as communities do 
not have the power to demand participation and accountability.  
 
Although NGOs face legitimacy questions in claiming representational role, 
NGOs are still seen to have an advantage in ensuring marginalised communities 
such as those in informal settlements participate in decision-making processes. In 
the next chapter I introduce South African development NGO Planact and 
Zandspruit informal settlements. The focus of the discussion is on the historical 
development of informal settlements and the role of NGOs in South Africa with a 
particular emphasis on Planact and Zandspruit. 
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4.0 CHAPTER FOUR 
AN INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT NGO PLANACT AND 
ZANDSPRUIT INFORMAL SETTLEMENT 
 
 
South Africa‟s economic inequalities are highlighted by the fact that the country 
has one of the highest rates of disparity between the very wealthy few and the vast 
majority of the poor in the world. Nothing characterises the disparities as clearly 
as the explosion of new upmarket town houses alongside vast informal 
settlements on the outskirts of most urban areas in South Africa. Fifteen years 
after the end of apartheid, little seems to have changed for the urban poor living in 
informal settlements. Although development NGOs are at the forefront of 
assisting communities in some informal settlements by engaging the government 
to provide housing and basic services, there are still many communities which are 
still marginalised.  
 
In South Africa, emergence of NGOs can be traced back as far as the arrival of 
missionaries and colonisation from Europe in the 1600s, although they were not 
called NGOs at the time (Editors Inc, 2000). Most development NGOs in South 
Africa have their roots in the country‟s anti-apartheid struggle in urban townships. 
After the advent of democracy, urban development NGOs have been mainly 
involved in policy advocacy by promoting people centred approaches in housing 
and local government policy formulation. Currently, urban development NGOs 
are mainly working in two areas, housing and local governance issues. Common 
programme areas for urban development NGOs include supporting community 
participation in low income housing delivery, conducting local governance and 
housing research and working in support of the institutional development of local 
authorities (Sangonet, 2010). 
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Much more recently, the relationship between NGOs and the South African 
government has changed from antagonistic and adversarial to collaborative. With 
the changes in these relationships, NGOs faced challenges and questions 
regarding their legitimacy. During apartheid, NGOs that took a stance against the 
government were seen as more legitimate by the community and donors than the 
government.  NGOs at this time were largely accountable to the communities they 
represented. With the transition to democracy, NGOs faced challenges such as 
adjusting their role and accessing foreign funding. This resulted in some NGOs 
working with government and competing for donor funding.  
 
These developments shifted NGOs‟ accountability from communities to donors 
and government. The benefits of a transition to democracy have not reached all 
marginalised communities in the informal settlements, especially regarding 
service delivery. The focus of this study is to look at the role of development 
NGOs in the apartheid to the post apartheid periods and how these changes 
affected or influenced NGOs‟ claim to legitimacy in representing marginalised 
communities.  
 
The other area of concern is how the democratic government in South Africa has 
attempted to address informal settlements challenges. The view in the informal 
settlements is that the efforts of the government, so far, have not yielded desired 
results from their perspective. Lastly, I provide a background on Zandspruit the 
informal settlement in my case study, and how Planact began its work in this 
settlement. 
 
4.1 The emergence of informal settlements  
 
Informal settlements have emerged in different guises throughout the last century 
and they continue to form and expand (Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006). A 
shortage of affordable housing in urban centres alongside stark economic 
disparities is blamed for the increasing number of informal settlements, and has 
been one of the challenges facing the successive governments for over five 
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decades (COHRE, 2005). Huchzermeyer and Karam (2006:4) argue that „the need 
for illegal occupation of land and informal dwelling arrangements stems from a 
deep marginalisation and exclusion from formal access to land and development‟. 
The marginalisation of the urban poor was deliberate during apartheid years and 
the effects are still seen today, with inadequate redress in terms of access to 
housing and basic services by urban poor.  
 
Ballard et al. (2006:10) point out that marginalisation is „often linked closely to a 
lack of material resources and poverty and associated with powerlessness and lack 
of representation and freedom‟. Marginalisation by race in South Africa began 
before apartheid policies were clearly defined. For example, in 1913, „at least 
three decades before the crystallisation of apartheid policy, the government passed 
the Natives Land Act, which made it illegal for blacks to purchase property from 
whites except in reserves. As a result, the entire black and native population of the 
country existed on less than eight per cent of South African land‟ (Adgate et al, 
2008:1). Adgate et al. (2008:1) further indicate that „ten years later [the Natives 
Land Act] was followed by The Native Urban Areas Act‟ 1923 that restricted the 
movement of black people into the cities.  
 
Informal settlements in South Africa mushroomed in the 1940s. At the same time 
communities were represented by community leaders whose mobilisation did not 
result in political conscientisation of the rest of the community. Legislated 
exclusion of blacks from the cities meant evictions and removals of black 
individuals to municipal emergency camps (Huchzermeyer, 2004a). Adgate et al. 
(2008:1) add that the 
 
„Group Areas Act of 1950 aimed at residential areas that separated people 
by race throughout the country. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s several 
vibrant communities, like the famous Sophiatown, were invaded by the 
state. These townships, once epicenters of interracial interaction were 
bulldozed to the ground. This was supported by the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act of 1951 that gave the Minister of Native Affairs the power to 
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remove blacks from public or privately owned land and to establish 
„resettlement camps‟ that were located in undesirable locations, far from job 
opportunities or viable community centers‟.  
 
By the mid-1960s, informal settlements within and around South Africa‟s towns 
and cities had largely been eradicated (although the state never managed to fully 
eradicate informal settlements in Cape Town) and replaced with sprawling 
townships. However, despite the declining rural economies and rapid 
urbanization, construction of houses by the government came to a virtual standstill 
in white urban areas due to the policy of territorial separateness (Huchzermeyer, 
2004a). This resulted in unprecedented proliferation of informal settlements and 
from 1979-1985 the extent of the housing crisis was apparent due to the 
urbanisation surge and the years of inactivity due to the then government‟s policy 
of separate development in housing (Harrison, 1992). 
 
In the 1970s, with the re-emergence of community and political mobilisation, new 
responses to informal settlements emerged. During 1970s, the African opposition 
to the apartheid government was mainly staged in the informal settlements 
through the civic movements. The civic movement was supported by the 
professional sector through the formation of development NGOs (Huchzermeyer, 
2004a). Social movements and some NGOs during apartheid were focused more 
on the construction of liberation and winning state power than addressing the 
problems of informal settlements (Buhlungu, 2006:69).  
 
Nevertheless, there were a few development NGOs that focused on working with 
the communities in the informal settlements. Mayekiso (2003) adds that the civic 
movement also developed a distinct development philosophy and sought to 
improve conditions in townships and informal settlements. 
 
With the increasing deterioration of conditions in the townships and in particular 
to the uprising in 1976, the Urban Foundation was created in 1976 as a Section 21 
(not for profit) think-tank on urban development. Its main task was to promote 
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freehold tenure for Africans in urban areas (Huchzermeyer, 2001a). The 
Foundation was sponsored mainly by the business community with the aim of 
raising the socio-economic circumstances of the black population in terms of 
housing, education, health, welfare and community development among others. 
But the agency faced challenges due to apartheid policies and soon focused on 
influencing changes in the policy environment (Smit, 1992). Huchzermeyer 
(2001b:73) notes that the central tenets that the Urban Foundation promoted were 
private sector delivery of a standardised product [serviced site], financed through 
a once-off household-based capital subsidy. This had a strong influence on policy-
making in the transition to democracy.  
 
Since most political organisations were banned during apartheid (Terreblanche, 
2002), marginalised communities in townships were represented by civic 
organisations which collectively formed the civic movement. This represented the 
virtual social movement across the country (Mabin and Smit, 1997). McKinley 
and Veriava (2002:72) point out that during apartheid these social movements 
gave a voice to the poor. Besides the civic organisations, there were church 
organisations and humanitarian NGOs, such as the Black Sash, which together 
engaged in non-political relief (Huchzermeyer, 2004a). According to Mabin and 
Smit (1997), the civic movement obtained technical support by interacting with 
students, academics and practitioners. This resulted in the formation of several 
development NGOs in the 1980s (Huchzermeyer, 2004a).  
 
Mamphiswana (2004) notes that during the mid 1980s, NGOs were formed within 
the context of the anti-apartheid struggle. Their services to organisations fighting 
apartheid are considered have been central to the final dismantling of the 
apartheid system (Mamphiswana, 2004:27). NGOs in the mid-1980s were 
concerned with challenging the South African state and furthering a democratic 
society (Habib and Taylor, 1999). It was during this period that development 
NGOs assisting communities in informal settlements emerged (Huchzermeyer, 
2004a:118). It must be noted that prior to the 1980s NGOs critical of apartheid 
were subjected to continuous harassment and banning. The political and legal 
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system was only supportive to NGOs that served the white community (Habib and 
Taylor, 1999:74). „This political environment was transformed with the 
liberalization of the South African polity and economy in the early 1980s. 
Although not supportive of anti-apartheid NGOs, the P.W. Botha regime allowed 
many to emerge, organise, and serve the disenfranchised and marginalised 
majority black population‟ (Habib and Taylor, 1999:74).  
 
Abbott (1996) notes that in the early 1980s two types of NGOs,   emerged in 
South Africa: development NGOs and NGOs in education and media advocacy. 
„The latter was perceived as a serious threat by the government and many of its 
members were banned and detained. The result was that development NGOs 
operated in a political space which allowed them a significant amount of freedom 
of action‟ (Abbott, 1996:200).  
 
Development NGOs had a good working relationship with grassroots 
communities and derived a good deal of their legitimacy representing these 
marginalised communities (Lee, 1991). International donors in turn gave support 
to these NGOs.  
 
The development NGO Planact was formally launched in Johannesburg in 1985 
by a group of development professionals working at the University of the 
Witwatersrand and in private practice (Abbott, 1996:200). The other development 
NGOs at the time were Built Environment Support Group (BESG) formed in 1982 
in Durban and Development Action Group (DAG) which was formed in 1986 in 
Cape Town (Huchzermeyer, 2004a). Later on in 1992 Afesis Corplan was formed 
in East London.  
 
Planact worked on requests from organised communities and trade unions on 
issues broadly related to housing and urban development. According to Planact‟s 
original constitution, Planact was described as a voluntary organisation of 
professionals who committed 
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„their skills to the homeless, the poorly housed and those that do not have 
access to sound professional services in relation to their living environment 
and the struggle for a free, united and non-racial and democratic South 
Africa, in which all may participate in all levels of society‟ (Development 
Works, 2006:15). 
 
With the increasing influence of development NGOs, „Urban Sector Network 
(USN) was formed in 1988, enabling co-operation and co-ordination between 
various localised development NGOs across South Africa. This strengthened an 
independent nation-wide development NGO movement‟ (Huchzermeyer, 
2004a:119).  
 
Abbott (1996:202) indicates that „Planact had been the prime mover in the 
establishment of an Urban Sector NGO Network in South Africa. [In 1992 
Planact] was dealing with almost 100 projects and was an integral part of the 
national consultations process. It was an adviser to the ANC, and World Bank 
missions could not have credibility unless they had spoken to Planact‟.  
 
The development provided in urban areas by the apartheid government was 
inadequate. Responding to pressure from the business constituency through the 
Urban Foundation, in the early 1980s the apartheid government offered to provide 
infrastructure and services to the urban poor while the private sector and 
individuals would be responsible for building houses. This was effective in 
securing tenure in some settlements and ensuring access to services, but did not 
lead to improved shelter (Huchzermeyer, 2004a). Moreover, as Harrison 
(1992:18) notes, „despite the government‟s commitment to accommodating 
urbanization in an orderly fashion, the housing backlog continued to escalate 
during the second half of the eighties, [and] informal settlements grew rapidly‟ in 
this period.  
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4.2 NGOs and informal settlements after 1994  
 
With the changing political conditions during the early 1990s there was a clear 
need for social and economic upliftment of the poor South Africans living in 
the informal settlements. This forced civic societies to move from the politics 
of resistance to tackle issues of urban development, despite the fact that 
apartheid institutions still remained relatively intact. As a strategy, civic and 
non-governmental organizations reacted by forming alliances to work together 
(Bremner, 1994:39). The political change post-1990 also impacted significantly 
on urban policy and planning. The creation of the White Paper on Land 
Reform, the scrapping of the Group Areas Act and the restrictive legislation, 
provision for non-racial local authorities are some of the factors that led to a 
more liberal South Africa‟s polity and economy (Harrison, 1992).  
 
Although the political change impacted on urban policy and planning, there was 
little change on the ground in terms of access to adequate housing by the urban 
poor. This resulted in the continued expansion of informal settlements in major 
cities such as Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg as the marginalised people 
trying to relocate closer to economic opportunities. Zandspruit, the informal 
settlement in my case study was formed during this time. 
 
Hence, civic organisations were increasingly in a better position to focus on 
development rather than resistance. Development NGOs instead pursued 
development programmes. Huchzermeyer (2004a:119) notes that, 
 
 „in the late 1980s, when the civic leadership [that was detained in early 
1980s as noted above] was released from detention and could rebuild the 
civic movement, civic organisations were increasingly in a position to focus 
on development rather than resistance. However, the development NGOs 
had by then developed a language and agenda of their own‟. 
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Development NGOs under the Urban Sector Network were now to a large extent 
involved in implementing the „Urban Foundation‟ approach to development in 
informal settlements and faced difficulties realising the envisaged results 
(people‟s direct participation in all aspects of the development of their own 
settlements) (Huchzermeyer, 2004a:121).  
 
The Urban Foundation promoted informal settlement intervention primarily as 
a form of housing delivery, dismissing a direct or central role for community 
organisations. Huchzermeyer (2004a:119) explains that the „Urban 
Foundation‟s thinking on informal settlement intervention had been semi-
institutionalised through the Independent Development Trust, thus increasingly 
dictating the shape of development‟. The IDT was set up through a government 
grant in 1990s as a development agency that offers programme management 
and development advisory services for the eradication of poverty to 
government departments and other development partners. The IDT supplied 
grants for poverty relief, infrastructure development, and services in the 
education, housing and welfare sectors. As it was originally funded by the 
South African government, it was accountable to the apartheid state. 
Huchzermeyer (2004a:2) indicates that the 
 
„IDT‟s funding mechanisms for low income development ... took the form 
of a uniform „capital subsidy‟. It was allocated to a developer on behalf of 
the individual household, and covered the cost of a peripherally located 
serviced site with freehold tenure‟. 
 
In the absence of other sources of development funding for informal settlements 
upgrading, the Urban Sector Network NGOs working in informal settlements 
placed „themselves in an uncomfortable position between civics and a rigid 
development framework from which they were no longer independent‟ 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004a:119). The role of Urban Sector Network NGOs in part 
became managing the Independent Development Trust projects and they had to 
abide by the dictates of the development framework, including its time constraints 
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and individualised site-and-service product (Huchzermeyer, 2004a:119).   This led 
Mayekiso (1996:271) who himself was a civil leader as well as a staff member of 
Planact to observe that 
  
„it was an entirely different experience building community organisations in 
the early 1990s, because not only could civic leaders negotiate with the 
regime directly, but the enemy now included a much more sophisticated 
crew of development technocrats even more intent on co-opting us and 
forcing us to accept their capitalist agenda‟.  
 
Mayekiso (1996) notes that development technocrats (partly in development 
NGOs) took over the implementation of a rigid form of development. NGOs were 
to play the role of ensuring smooth implementation of projects. This required 
NGOs to discourage civics from insisting on their views and ideas of 
development. This experience also contributed to demobilisation of civics. Thus, 
„while the IDT espoused community participation the IDT‟s entire development 
apparatus was geared against it. It sought to limit consultation to the state after 
installation of basic services and made little, if any funding available for 
participation‟ (Bremner, 1994:38).  
 
After the unbanning of political parties in 1990, a political transformation also 
occurred, which affected the way civil society organisations operated in 
relation to development: 
 
„the ANC moved swiftly to demobilise the popular organisations that had 
done vastly more to break apartheid ... these organisations were brought 
under control of top-down party structures and lost a significant degree of 
their autonomy ... The ANC aligned all organisations in informal 
settlements under a development committee that was  ANC aligned to the 
South African National Civic Organisation [SANCO] ... bottom up 
movement became top-down institution of social control under the ANC‟ 
(Pithouse, 2009:7). 
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A new social movement emerged in the early 1990s. People‟s Dialogue/Homeless 
People‟s Federation Alliance applied a different approach to representing the 
interests of the marginalised, mainly people living in informal settlements. It was 
strongly supported by the Indian Slum Dwellers Federation (SDF) and NGO Slum 
Dweller International (SDI) as well as by a coterie of international network that 
promotes active federation membership based on daily savings (Huchzermeyer, 
2004a). South Africa Homeless People‟s Federation (SAHPF) was formed in 
1992 with the participation of communities drawn from 40 settlements in both 
South Africa and Namibia. SAHPF also created links with other similar 
organisations in India and elsewhere. The NGO People‟s Dialogue was formed to 
support SAHPF to „assist individuals in squatter settlements, back-yard shacks 
and hostels to set up savings programmes and establish small-scale loans‟ 
(Jenkins, 1999:443).  
 
At this time „Planact focussed on the policies behind the state programme and the 
development of alternative policies … Communities needed practical alternatives 
for their negotiations with the state and Planact needed to develop these 
alternatives‟ (Abbott, 1996:201). Mayekiso (1996) also acknowledged that NGOs 
were focused on finding and promoting development alternatives. In this context,  
 
„Local struggles were being linked to national policy, implementation was 
moving rapidly and there was suddenly a massive influx of private sector 
organisations entering the market, all supposedly committed to community 
participation and all offering different services to the community 
organisation‟ (Abbott, 1996:201).  
 
This removed the monopoly previously enjoyed by Planact (Abbott, 1996:202). 
Abbott (1996:202) noted that in dealing with this challenge, Planact restructured 
the organisation by „dismantling the departments and replacing them with 
programmes, whose character was defined in terms of goals, outputs and client 
accountability‟.  
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Although there were changes in policy and legislation, most development 
alternatives and strategies addressing informal settlements faced challenges. As 
Bremner (1994:38) points out   
 
„development proposals were put forward at a time that was intensely 
politically loaded. Unbannings of the ANC, the SACP, and other liberation 
movements in February 1990 saw the beginning of the South African 
government, under De Klerk, openly negotiating with its former enemies‟.  
 
This resulted in deep tensions with communities which often erupted into conflict. 
For example, this was observed in Phola Park by Bremner (1994) and Adler 
(1994) and in Alexandra by Mayekiso (1996).  The significant changes in this 
period did not result in an immediate improvement in living conditions of most of 
the people residing in informal settlements. These communities had expectations 
that the new democratic government would form development strategies that 
would drastically improve their living conditions. This shaped the context of 
NGOs work in informal settlements in the post apartheid period. 
 
4.3 Post-apartheid informal settlements strategies  
 
Democracy in South Africa came with much excitement and expectations that the 
new government would provide the basic services which most of the population 
were denied before. There was a sense of euphoria and a large number of 
optimistic policy promises (Mackay, 1999). Apartheid laws were being repealed 
and new policies introduced. Although there was political change leading to 
policy and legislative changes, Mayekiso (2003:57) notes that political democracy 
alone was not enough to undo the generations of economic exclusion and 
exploitation that led to the extremely uneven development of South African cities.  
 
Informal settlements growth mirrored this uneven development. By 2005, the city 
of Johannesburg had 124 informal settlements with 147 248 shacks 
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accommodating 157 903 households, representing 12% of the city‟s population 
(Gauteng Department of Housing, 2005). These statistics underestimated the total 
number of households living in informal settlements. According to the City of 
Johannesburg Council (2004), there were an estimated 14% of households living 
in unserviced backyard shacks and a further 4% living in serviced sites in 2004s. 
This means an estimate of 18% of the city‟s households were living in informal 
settlements (City of Johannesburg Council, 2004). 
 
Although there has been an effort by NGOs and civic movements to assist 
informal settlement communities, 10 years after democracy, the majority of 
communities that live in informal settlements are still marginalised from 
development and do not access basic services like water. This situation is more 
pronounced in informal settlements on private land (such as Zandspruit Private 
Property), where local governments struggle to resolve the tenure situation before 
providing the necessary service and infrastructure needs of the community.  
 
4.3.1 Changing role for NGOs  
 
Robins (2008:3) notes that post-apartheid South Africa witnessed the emergence 
of a proliferation of NGOs and social movements in the, housing, labour and 
health sectors.    
 
The advent of democracy in South Africa brought about a number of challenges 
socially and politically for civil society organisations. These organisations had to 
redefine their identities and roles within a legitimate constitutional democracy 
(Motala and Husy, 2001:75).  With the changing roles of civil society 
organisations Ley (2009:151) argues that, although the state has redistributive 
responsibilities, both state and civil society have rights and responsibilities.  
 
After apartheid, the assumption by the broader civil society was that NGOs would 
assume responsibilities on the one hand, of being agents of change and 
development and on the other hand, being watchdogs where their main role would 
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be to advise and challenge the state. NGOs were to continue with their advocacy 
role, advocating for the welfare of the poor and marginalised communities while, 
at the same time, adopting a new developmental role. Developmental role here 
refers to active participation of people and putting people and their needs first 
(Development Works, 2006). However, this has not taken place, and development 
continues to be largely implemented in a top-down manner. 
 
NGOs underwent profound change under the ANC-led democratic government 
(Habib and Taylor, 1999). Habib (2003) noted that after 1994, the state was 
willing (though with limited capacity) to partner with NGOs in the policy 
development and service delivery arenas. This opened up a new avenue of 
operation for NGOs and transformed their relations with the state. NGOs were not 
functioning on non-government concerns, and worked on government policies and 
approaches even if this did not align with their pre-1994 orientations.  
 
Habib and Taylor (1999) note that some development NGOs had a good 
relationship with the new ruling party (ANC), and this provided them with a large 
degree of legitimacy. However, Habib and Taylor (1999) indicate that this 
changed when NGOs were facing funding crises and turned to commercialisation 
to address the crisis. This marked a dramatic change in the relationship between 
NGOs and government. This also marked the beginning of NGOs being 
challenged on their legitimacy.  
 
In a large part, the ensuing changes in NGO strategy was due to their large 
numbers and conflicts between them and civic movements (Meintjies, 1994). 
Voices within the RDP office of the new ANC government immediately 
questioned the relevance of some NGOs in the context of a legitimately elected 
government. Thus, the problem of NGO legitimacy became more apparent after 
the end of apartheid. As noted by Habib and Taylor (1999:80).  
 
In addition to the argument above, Habib and Taylor (1999:80) looking at 
development NGOs which include both urban sector NGOs and Planact indicate 
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that the „NGOs‟ relations with government [could] work to strain their 
commitment and lines of accountability to the poor‟. They argue that „NGOs‟ 
dependence on state funding and their newly formed „client‟ relationships with 
government must lead one to question their autonomy and whether they can avoid 
being mere appendages of state institutions‟ (ibid.). These questions arose because 
traditionally NGOs have been seen as institutions that serve the interests of the 
poor and marginalised (Korten, 1989). NGOs legitimacy in the post apartheid 
period was also challenged when „Nelson Mandela ... accused some [NGOs], at 
the ANC's national conference in December 1997, of following the agendas of 
foreign governments‟ (Habib and Taylor, 1999:80).  
 
According to the prescriptive/normative legitimacy approach to NGOs, NGOs 
have to be accountable to the represented and ensure participation of the 
represented to claim legitimacy through representation of marginalised 
communities. NGO‟s financial crisis and competition for donor funding, while 
working with government, meant NGO accountability was primarily to donors 
and government and to a lesser extent to the communities NGO represent. Hence, 
Habib and Taylor (1999:80) correctly noted that „the legitimacy of NGOs also can 
be undermined by the kind of client relationships that Mandela's own government 
has sought to establish‟. Habib and Taylor (1999:80) therefore warned that „The 
financial crisis and commercialisation of the new NGO sector in South Africa thus 
could evolve into a full-blown crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness‟. 
 
In explaining the financial crisis of NGOs, Kraak (2001) explains that donors did 
not reduce their funding to South African NGOs, but chose to channel the funding 
through government. Donors expected a strong partnership between NGOs and 
the state, but lack of capacity in government meant that government under-spent 
or under-allocated and the funds often did not reach the NGOs. Kraak (2001) 
argues that, NGOs accessed more funding from local sources such as the National 
Development Agency (NDA) than directly from international donors. Kraak 
(2001:132) mentions that other reasons for the lack of funding for NGOs at this 
time were the result of a shift in patterns of funding which benefited NGOs that 
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were able to read the changing environment and, therefore, changed their 
fundraising strategies. Hence, NGOs that were willing to compromise their stand 
on core values fared better in accessing funding.  
 
Facing these challenges, NGOs organised themselves under the umbrella of the 
South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) in August 1995. Habib and 
Taylor (1999:77) note that SANGOCO‟s primary role was advancing the interests 
of the poor and developing an enabling environment for the NGO sector by 
providing an arena for mutual monitoring. Kraak (2001:148) also indicates that 
SANGOCO, raised the NGO sector public profile. 
 
„[under] the leadership of Kumi Naidoo, blazed a trail through the sector 
between 1995 and 1997. It put the sector squarely on the map, raised its 
public profile and gave it political voice to speak out on poverty hearings in 
1997, which drew a defensive response from government. But this 
pioneering style of leadership could not be sustained, and a host of internal 
problems arose ... a period of organisation introspection followed, in which 
the sector was effectively left without a voice‟.  
 
Under SANGOCO, NGOs re-emerged more streamlined, in three different blocs. 
Formal NGOs which were bigger and more sophisticated and well resourced; 
informal community-based associations which emerged within marginalised 
communities to enable its residents to simply survive the ravages of poverty ; and 
more formal organisations and networks that started to engage more critically with 
neo-liberal policies and their effects on the lives of ordinary people (Kraak, 2001). 
Trade unions and churches have traditionally formed the core of this critical space 
(Habib and Kotze, 2002). Although SANGOCO was successful in organising 
NGOs, it also faced a number of difficulties. These were organisational, strategic 
and programmatic. The coalition has struggled to maintain its role as a prime 
force in uniting and co-ordinating voluntary sector organisations and initiatives. 
These problems were mainly due to a lack of effective leadership, lack of clear 
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decision-making procedures, as well as a weak programme and organisational 
focus (Kraak, 2001).  
 
NGOs explain that the challenges they faced during this time arose due to lack of 
organisational capacity (Royston, 2009). Habib and Taylor (1999:79) see the lack 
of organisational capacity resulting from „high turnover as skilled staff moved into 
government and state-run institutions‟. Some NGOs did not manage to adapt to 
the new political and funding environment and closed down while others made 
significant shifts in orientation and began to embrace new roles, including „being 
participants in the policy-making process, becoming partners in service delivery 
and monitors of the new government‟s performance‟ (Motala and Husy, 2001:74).  
 
4.3.2 NGOs and challenges in the new era 
 
With regards to civic movements, Mayekiso (1996:260) observed that „after the 
new democratic government came into power, the feeling was to enhance the 
capacity of social movements, CBOs [were] to adapt to partially changing roles‟. 
Civic movements had to also change their organisational structure and political 
ideology as most of their leaders had taken up positions in the new government 
(Mayekiso, 2003). For example, although Homeless People Federation became 
more prominent, it also faced significant challenges. As a result it adopted a new 
structure and picked a new name becoming FEDUP (Federation of Urban Poor) in 
2005/06.  People‟s Dialogue was also disbanded and its staff incorporated into 
uTshani Fund.  
 
As was the case with NGOs, civic movements had also to change due to the fact 
that the battle against apartheid had been won and there was no clarity on 
consensus on the post-apartheid role of social movements.  However, most CBOs 
and social movements faced challenges transforming their activities from a largely 
oppositional mode into a more developmental one (Mayekiso, 1996). 
Representative civic movement structures in townships and informal settlements 
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were ignored, and in their place or in addition, RDP forums and later community 
development committees (CDCs) arose.  
 
Mayekiso (2003:60) notes that to cope with the changing environment social 
movements also re-oriented themselves and instead of confronting government to 
address urban issues, they opted for  
 
„consultation and co-operation or collaboration as weapons to ensure service 
delivery and proper development of communities. Confrontation was a last 
resort. This accommodating approach has met with only limited success, 
and was unfortunately complicated by the internal failure to restructure civic 
organisations to meet the challenges of a democratic dispensation‟.  
 
Evolution of Planact in the post - apartheid period 
 
In South Africa, an NGO as a Section 21 company has to have a minimum of 
seven members and at least two directors. NGOs may also register with the 
Department of Social Development, which before the year 2000 was known as the 
Department of Welfare. However, this is voluntary. The requirements to register 
include a formal constitution explaining what the organisation does, how it will be 
structured, how it will run and includes the duties of each office bearer. The 
organisations may also register under the Non-Profit Organisation Act 71 of 1997 
if their operations are not for profit. One of the objectives of the Non-Profit 
Organisations Act 71 of 1997 is to encourage and support non-profit organisations 
in their „role towards meeting the diverse needs of South Africa‟s population, by 
inspiring them to maintain adequate standards of transparency and accountability‟ 
(Department of Social Development, 2001:16). 
 
Planact is a small organisation that manages a large budget. To meet legal 
requirements, Planact had to register under Section 21 of the Companies Act. If an 
organisation manages a large budget, deals with the buying and selling of goods 
and/or acquires expensive assets, the Companies Act will protect the members 
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from being individually responsible for the debts of the organisation.  This was 
one of the reasons  Planact changed from a voluntary association to a Section 21 
company (Department of Social Development, 2001).  
 
During the 1995/6 period Planact‟s work „concentrated on integrated local 
government and land and housing‟ (Royston, 2009:32).  Planact also „continued to 
provide support to CDFs and other CBOs (Royston, 2009:34)‟.  Planact had a 
„broad vision for integrated development planning [summarised as] integrated 
development planning; producing a development framework; organisational 
development; and identifying strategic intervention‟ (Royston,2009:33). 
 
In 2000, „Planact developed a new identity statement which it is still using to date. 
Planact positioned itself as a non-governmental developmental organisation, 
working mainly in the urban areas of Gauteng Province, with people who lack 
access to habitable environments‟ (Royston, 2009:44). By 2003/2004 Planact 
concentrated its work in two programmatic areas, namely community 
development and the empowerment of local government ward councillors through 
capacity building. It was also active in research and evaluation, and policy 
analysis and advocacy. „Planact‟s activities focussed mainly on facilitating CBO‟s 
participation in the local development agenda with a view to reinforcing the link 
between informal communities and their local municipalities‟ (Development 
Works, 2006:46). 
 
Like other NGOs in South Africa, Planact faced legitimacy challenges in the 
context of the post apartheid funding crisis. Abbott (1996:202) notes that Planact 
recognised in 1995 that it had serious problems, but attributed these primarily to 
structural problems with the organisation. Abbott (1996) argues that this was a 
mistake on Planact‟s part, as addressing structural problems is just dealing with 
symptoms and not the problem, namely the misunderstanding of its role as an 
NGO. Abbott (1996:203) argues that „NGOs working in development face 
tensions and contradictions between advocacy and practical implementation‟. 
Abbott (1996:203) further argues that in addressing this challenge, Planact made a 
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shift from advocacy to implementation. However, Abbott (1996) argues that in 
reality, this did not happen as the new mission to promote integrated community-
driven development meant that Planact had to play the role of professional 
supporters and independent project managers at the same time. Planact could not 
maintain both roles because „each of these roles would have required a different 
economic perspective and Planact was trying to be all of them at the same time‟ 
(Abbott, 1996:203). As a result, „Planact was unable to make the transition across 
to being an implementing agent because that would force it to abandon its ideal as 
a community support organisation‟ (Abbott, 1996:203). Other reasons for 
Planact‟s challenges were its inability to integrate its policy with projects and 
relationships between individuals and the organisation (Abbott, 1996:203). 
 
Planacts problems multiplied during 1994-95, as it was unable to raise salaries for 
its staff, which at some point, went without pay for several months. It embarked 
on massive staff cuts to remedy the situation. For example in 1993 its total staff 
stood at 47 and by 1995, it had reduced to 28 (Royston, 2009). The decline in the 
number of staff intensified in 1995 through 1996, as it faced a funding crisis, 
forcing it to retain only 14 employees (Development Works, 2006).  
 
Abbott (1996:202) also notes that Planact‟s funding base was dismantling rapidly 
due to the fact that it had not adapted quickly enough or, more importantly, in the 
correct way to the changing environment. Although Planact was already modelled 
on private sector organisations providing a service for a fee, Planact‟s holding on 
to a supposed NGO identity which it no longer fully lived up to also contributed 
to the crisis after 1994. Planact underwent organisational restructuring (reducing 
its staff further) to increase managerial efficiency and to deal with the increasingly 
demanding and competitive environment in accessing funding from international 
donors. The outcome of this management crisis for Planact was a new mission 
statement and „dismantling the voluntary constitution and creating a not-for-profit 
registered company‟ (Abbott, 1996:202).  
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Planact continued with its work of supporting community participation in 
municipal affairs which it had been doing well before 1994 (Royston, 2009:38). 
To ensure community participation was more effective, Planact focussed on 
training and capacity building by assisting CBOs to constitute their own 
community development forums (CDFs). Planact also played a role in 
capacitating community leaders to mobilise their communities and explain to 
them how government works (Planact Annual Report, 2001/2002). 
 
Planact realised that there was need to continue with its work in the informal 
settlements to ensure voices in these communities were heard. Planact‟s 
penetration and reach in the informal settlements in Gauteng has rather been 
shallow. Of the 189 informal settlements in Johannesburg, Planact has only 
managed to work with less than 10 between year 2000 and 2010. Some of the 
settlements in which Planact has had significant community development projects 
are Diepsloot, Vosloorus, Bekkersdal, Muldersdrif, Zevenfontein and Zandspruit. 
Zandspruit consists of two separate settlements. Planact worked with  Zandspruit 
Transit Camp first, and then shifted its work to Zandspruit Private Property, 
before exiting Zandspruit all together, as discussed in the section below. These 
initiatives were funded by foreign donors and the local government which 
commissioned Planact to train ward councillors. In most of its programmes, 
Planact seeks to promote participatory initiatives aimed at working „with‟ and not 
„for‟ communities (Planact, 2004). Planact‟s aim in working with poor 
communities in informal settlements is to help them play a meaningful role in the 
processes of local government.   
 
4.3.3 Key legislative, policy commitments and strategies  
 
While the social movements and NGOs were reorganising themselves, 
marginalised communities continued to experience neglect with minimal change 
in their situation.  „Patience was exercised, and although social conditions 
remained difficult for the poor, communities were not inclined to mobilise‟ 
(Ballard et al, 2006:17). 
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„Even if communities wanted to mobilise, the institutional environment that 
historically enabled this had all but disappeared. The organisational 
mechanisms that had been used to express opposition to government prior to 
the transition – the UDF, ANC, civics, NGOs were either now part of the 
government or operating in close collaboration with the government‟ (Ballard 
et al, 2006:16).   
 
In order to address informal settlement problems, the Mandela government 
embarked on an ambitious housing policy. However, as argued by Jones and Datta 
(2000:393), the new democratic government „inherited an unenviable housing 
record as a legacy of apartheid and its protracted demise‟. In the new housing 
policy of December 1994 (White Paper on Housing) the national housing vision 
was aimed at „establishment of viable, socially and economically integrated 
communities, situated in areas allowing convenient access to economic 
opportunities as well as health, educational and social amenities, within which all 
South African‟s people will have access in progressive basis” (South African 
Government Information, 1994:19)  
 
In the new democratic era, the government began dealing with informal 
settlements with the ANC election manifesto‟s Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP). RDP's housing agenda promised to provide 1 million 
government-subsidised units to accommodate the nearly five million (of an 
estimated 12.5 million) South Africans without proper housing (Adgate et al, 
2008:1). It must be noted, though, that RDP was an ANC election manifesto 
promise and was never properly translated into a coherent programme. Once in 
power, the ANC departed from several of the key tenets of the RDP. According to 
Adgate et al (2008:1),  
 
„[The] RDP was abandoned and replaced by growth, employment and 
redistribution (GEAR) a neoliberal strategy of growth-led development and 
national trends of marketisation and managerial insulation. GEAR 
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emphasised liberalising trade and privatising industry. The RDP ideal of 
„people driven‟ development, with its goals of training citizens, educating 
them, and engaging them in housing initiatives was completely abandoned. 
GEAR centres on „streamlining management systems, cutting costs, and 
emphasising administrative performance rather than mobilising 
participation‟. 
 
Although the new liberal policy created  
 
„improvements in the growth rate, lowering inflation, a reduction of the 
budget deficit, a narrowing of racial income inequality and some degree of 
black economic empowerment, on the negative side, GEAR created a 
growing problem of unemployment and a poor record of delivery in respect 
of some important areas of social and physical infrastructure‟ (Habib and 
Padayachee (2000:256).  
 
Habib and Kotze (2002) argue that there is some indication that GEAR has had a 
devastating effect on the lives of millions of poor and low-income families with 
increasing unemployment and economic inequalities trapping more people in 
poverty. 
 
Strategies addressing informal settlements 
Recent attempts to address informal settlement concerns according to COHRE 
(2005:30) include the „People‟s Housing Process (PHP) being implemented in the 
period 1995-1997 with the aim of assisting communities to supervise and drive 
the housing delivery process at community level‟. This was introduced as an 
alternative to the developer-driven and unparticipatory housing delivery situation, 
through a project-linked subsidy. South African Homeless People Federation and 
People‟s Dialogue were key contributors to the ideas and practices of the PHP 
programme (Carey, 2009). However, the PHP has never received full support, nor 
were its structures for participation or beneficiary decision making properly 
resolved.  
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A new subsidy guideline by the Minister of housing in 2002 required financial 
contribution from communities. Those who could not raise the cash were 
exempted. As a result of affordability constraints the normal developer driven 
housing projects were now being defined as PHP projects (Carey, 2009:15).  The 
main challenge with this strategy was limited institutional capacity (COHRE, 
2005:30). Other housing subsidies include the Institutional Housing Subsidy 
(IHS) that catered for organisations that could be private, government or 
nongovernmental, for the provision of accommodation to qualifying beneficiaries 
in a form other than ownership (COHRE, 2005:31).  
 
In 2004, reluctantly recognising the short comings of its predominantly one-size-
fits all subsidised housing delivery programmes, the government aimed at housing 
interventions that were more flexible and responsive to demand. That year, the 
Department of Housing released the „Breaking New Ground (BNG)‟ housing plan 
(Ministry of Housing, 2004), in which municipalities were given a central role in 
implementation. BNG introduced, for the first time, a subsidy programme 
specifically for informal settlements upgrading (Huchzermeyer, 2006a). The BNG 
policy aimed to „shift from conflict and neglect to the integration and cooperation 
with informal settlements‟ and it focussed on inclusion of informal settlements 
„into the broader urban fabric to overcome spatial social, and economic exclusion‟ 
via a phased in situ upgrading approach‟ (Ministry of Housing, 2004:12). BNG 
also introduced the Emergency Housing Subsidy (EHS) in 2004 that provides for 
temporary but secure access to land and basic municipal services to people who 
have been left without a home (COHRE, 2005:31).  
 
According to Pithouse (2009:1), the BNG housing policy has failed to deliver due 
to contradictions between policy and implementation problems in terms of 
„financial provision for participatory and collectives in situ upgrades‟. Pithouse 
(2009:11) further indicates that BNG has a basic contradiction in that  
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„its focus on a holistic and consultative process based on the development of 
housing as a form of support for communities, and slum eradication 
measures ... BNG takes inadequate housing as a fundamental problem and 
seeks to take action to develop more adequate housing. Slum eradication 
takes shack settlement as a fundamental problem and seeks to get rid of 
them‟. 
 
4.3.4 New challenges facing informal settlements  
 
Smit (2006) notes that informal settlements are complex, and in order to improve 
the lives of communities living in these settlements there is need to ensure that the 
upgrading process entails integrated programmes, participation of communities 
and flexibility of programmes. Smit (2006:121) further notes that „participation is 
important in informal settlements with existing communities whose lives might be 
affected by the upgrading process‟. To ensure effective participation, Smit 
(2006:121) recommends that „in these communities there should be a committee 
elected by beneficiaries and committee members must be accountable to the 
beneficiaries‟. Planact attempted to adopt such strategies in Zandspruit Private 
Property when it helped the community form a Joint Committee. The importance 
of participation and flexibility of programmes is all incorporated in the Informal 
Settlement Upgrading Programme under the BNG. BNG emphasises 
empowerment, not just participation and sets aside a budget for this purpose 
(Ministry of Housing, 2004). Unfortunately, most of the time, this provision is 
ignored by the municipal structures of the local governments in Gauteng Province.  
 
Legally, communities in informal settlements have the right to participation in the 
decision-making processes within their local municipalities. This is demonstrated 
by the Local Government/Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, which aims to 
enhance participatory democracy in local government. This act is implemented by 
ward committees in metropolitan municipalities (Huchzermeyer et al., 2004). 
Huchzermeyer (2004b) notes that although ward councillors have the 
responsibility of representing communities from both formal and informal areas, 
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this often does not happen. Ward councillors are often from formal areas and tend 
to be biased towards the interests of the people living in formal areas, to the 
neglect of - and often in conflict with - the interests of those in informal 
settlements. Even when the councillors are not from the formal part of the ward 
they often tend to adhere to „the formal, technically driven system of resource 
allocation and service delivery‟ rather than looking for effective ways to address 
the social realities in informal settlements (Huchzermeyer, 2004b).  
 
To address these constraints, the Local Government/ Municipal Systems Act 32 of 
2000 was introduced. This Act provides a flexible opportunity for community 
involvement in local government by acknowledging that the ward committee 
system may not be sufficient for effective community participation (Roux, 
2004:24). The Systems Act allows for community participation in municipal 
planning through civic organisations, NGOs, private sector and labour 
organisations in local affairs, within the municipality. The municipality should 
consult with these organisations representing a significant portion of the residents 
of an informal settlement (Huchzermeyer et al., 2004). However, some aspects of 
the act, such as the informal settlements upgrading programme, are largely 
ignored, and the City of Johannesburg only began to engage with social 
movements directly in 2009. 
 
The City of Johannesburg has a number of mechanisms for public participation. 
The first is the ward committee which is elected by the ward. The ward committee 
facilitates community participation and representation of these interests within the 
government system (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2005:5). 
The second mechanism is the IDP process where the public participates in the 
identification of development priorities (through ward public meetings, regional 
stakeholder fora and city wide fora); the development of intervention strategies 
(regional stakeholder fora and city wide sectoral fora); and the adoption of the 
IDP document (Johannesburg stakeholder fora) (City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality, 2005). NGOs are involved in the two of the three 
phases - the identification of development priorities and development of 
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intervention strategies and „participation of informal settlements depends on the 
level of representation of these communities in the active stakeholders such as 
NGOs and ward committees in each region‟ (Mohamed, 2009:165). The third 
mechanism is ward public meetings, which are open mass meetings organised at 
ward level. Ward public meetings function as a platform for informing the 
residents of the ward matters concerning the ward and public consultation on the 
city‟s annual review of the IDP and budget (City of Johannesburg, 2002). The 
fourth mechanism is the mayoral road show that creates a space for leaders to 
interact with communities to listen and respond to their needs. The road show 
begins with one day at the regional administration office and the second day, a 
visit to selected communities and priority projects (City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality, 2005). Lastly, there is a petition management system 
that allows the community to petition its grievances (City of Johannesburg 
Council, 2001). This is more about implementation issues rather than policy 
issues (Mohamed, 2009).  
 
However, Huchzermeyer (2004a) argues that, although there have been 
strategies on community participation since 1994, the intervention process has 
mainly been top-down with almost no chance for communities to influence or 
shape the process. The lack of community involvement in the policy decision-
making processes is further demonstrated with the BNG policy. Huchzermeyer 
(2006b:40) points out that,  
 
„[time] frames for the formulation of the new housing plan and its Informal 
Settlement Upgrading Programme were too tight to allow for comments 
from the public, in particular civil society, and some aspects of the 
Upgrading Programme remain unresolved‟.  
 
Mohamed (2006:44) explains that although a legislative framework exists in 
South Africa, there are  
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„limiting factors that inhibit the active participation of informal settlements 
communities in policy formulation at the city level, [and these are] 
attributed to the configuration of the municipal system in South Africa, the 
attitude of the local governments towards informal settlements, the 
prevailing urban management approach, the approach to public participation 
and the lack of strong organisations that represent informal settlements 
communities‟.  
 
Participation through public meetings has its own challenges as it only allows for 
the flow of information with no control by the masses or grassroots communities 
over the final outcome in the policy-making processes. The ability of informal 
settlement communities to attend the meetings is also influenced by the 
accessibility of venues, timing and relevance of the agenda (Mohamed, 2009). 
 
In most cases, community involvement only takes place when community 
members are asked to ratify a housing delivery plan, and only once the budget and 
objectives of the plan have already been set. There is still a need for communities 
and their representatives to be involved in the design and implementation of 
municipalities‟ integrated development planning and the preparations of budgets 
(Roux, 2004:28). Limited participation of communities in development projects, 
such as service delivery, security, tenure and housing issues, reinforces   
marginalisation of informal settlements residents. This creates a niche for social 
movements and NGOs to enter these communities and attempt to help them 
engage the government (Roux, 2004:28). They may suggest partnering 
communities with government, negotiating and often accepting compromises and 
delays with patience.  
 
Responding to dissatisfaction with the new democratic government, informal 
settlements have re-emerged on the civil society agenda. For example, the 
Landless People Movement (LPM) emerged in 2001 „in the context of the 
negative effects of years of belt-tightening fiscal policies on the poor and 
marginalised majority of the country following the adoption of GEAR‟ 
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(Greenberg, 2006:135). However, membership of the social movements has not 
spread to all informal settlements. For example, there are no active social 
movements at Zandspruit informal settlement. The period 1999-2000 saw 
formation of many social movements to challenge water and electricity cut offs, 
evictions and lack of land redistribution and social dislocation. The economic 
devastation was increasingly seen by the poor as betrayal by the ANC 
government. Social movements challenging the new democratic government 
resulted in these movements being seen as enemies of the ANC, and of the ANC-
led government, although the latter would still like to be identified with the strong 
liberation movement tag (McKinley and Veriava, 2002:65). These social 
movements are now referred to as „new‟ issue-based social movements 
representing a massive diversity of concerns. (Ballard et al., 2006:17; 
Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006).  
 
In the apartheid era, development NGOs worked on representing marginalised 
communities. Although there is a new democratic government, there are still large 
sections of communities that remain marginalised. With the democratic 
government in power, NGOs have compromised their accountability to the 
community in favour of foreign donors and government. Planact‟s brief 
involvement with Zandspruit Private Property and its exit from the settlement 
provides deeper insight into this legitimacy. Analysts such as Habib (2003) blame 
both the government and NGOs for the wavering commitment, the latter not being 
pro-active in redefining the role and agenda of the sector. Although there are 
questions around the normative approach to legitimacy, NGOs such as Planact 
still succeed in constructing their legitimacy to donors, to the state and, indeed, to 
the communities they do and do not directly work with.  
 
4.4 Zandspruit 
 
The Zandspruit informal settlement emerged because of the wave of evictions 
from smallholdings in the sub-region in the period preceding the first democratic 
elections (Development Works, 2005). Zandspruit consists of two sites as seen in 
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Figure 2: „Transit Camp‟ and „Private Property‟. In the section below I begin the 
discussion by describing the characteristics of the settlement explaining the two 
separate areas Planact has worked with in Zandspruit, namely „Transit Camp‟ and 
„Private Property‟. Then the focus shifts to Zandspruit Private Property which is 
the settlement used for the case study. I provide background on Zandspruit Transit 
Camp and Private Property in terms of their population and the limited basic 
services in the settlements. I conclude the discussion by explaining how Planact 
started working in Zandspruit Private Property.  
 
Zandspruit Private Property 
Zandspruit Private Property is the larger and more densely populated of the two 
settlements and densely populated, as seen in Figure 2 and 3. The two names are 
applied mainly by the communities and officials are aware of the two names but 
describe Zandspruit in general using the plot numbers. The difference between the 
two plots is that the municipality bought the land from its owner on behalf of 
Zandspruit Transit Camp residents and has already subdivided into 122 small 
stands, whereas Zandspruit Private Property is on eight large parcels of private 
land owned as seen in Figure 2, which the state had not yet purchased as the time 
of my fieldwork in 2007.  
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Figure 2: Zandspruit Private Property and Transit Camp 
Map compiled by Corporate Geo-Informatics, City of Johannesburg, 16 
November 2009. 
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Figure 3: A section of Zandspruit Private Property illustrating spatial layout and 
shack density 
Map compiled by Corporate Geo-Informatics, City of Johannesburg, 16th 
November 2009. 
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Transit Camp (no longer a transit camp but the name remains) residents, unlike 
Private Property residents, access better services and hold title deeds to their 
properties. As seen in Figure 4, Transit Camp has services such as roads water and 
drainage. Moreover, construction of subsidised housing began in 2008 and (see 
Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 4: Zandspruit Transit Camp tarred roads. Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
 
 
 Figure 5: Zandspruit Transit Camp Housing. Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
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Zandspruit Private Property informal settlement has unresolved tenure, with 
limited accessibility to basic services. Zandspruit Private Property presented itself 
as a relevant case study for my research because of the following characteristics: 
Firstly, the continued illegal status of occupation of this community creates 
particular challenges for the role of NGOs and raises questions of legitimacy and 
accountability of NGOs working in communities whose occupation is not easily 
regularised or legalised. Secondly, Planact only worked for short period in the 
settlement, and is not able to show significant development results. This raises 
accountability questions about the relevance of Planact‟s work in Zandspruit and 
the subsequent perception of Planact‟s legitimacy in relation to Zandspruit Private 
Property. The Zandspruit Private Property case allowed me to explore legitimacy 
challenges development NGOs face when working with citizens who have right to 
basic services, but whose occupation is informal and do not conform to the rules 
and regulations of planning in terms of the materials used in the structures and the 
arrangement of these structures.  
 
4.4.1 Historical background of Zandspruit  
 
From the study by Development Works in 2005, residents‟ accounts on the origin 
of Zandspruit Transit Camp differ to a large degree. Some residents indicate that 
Zandspruit settlement originated from initial „shack farming‟ where plots were 
allocated by a third party for R200. Others maintain that the evictees from the 
initial Randburg Council site   and the surrounding farms declared it a temporary 
transit camp in 1994. In order to halt the expansion of the settlement into the 
public site, the then Randburg Council conducted the first registration of 
households in 1997 (Development Works, 2005).  
 
The residents were provided with identity documents and subsidy forms. The area 
was then fenced off and security guards posted to prevent more people from 
moving in. These plans were meant to upgrade the area and formalise it. 
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Accordingly, in 1997 the settlement was declared permanent (no longer a transit 
camp). This provided prospects for upgrading by the government and more people 
moved into the settlement with the hope of eventually obtaining formal housing. 
As a result, the population of Transit Camp grew from 50 people just before 1994 
to 1600 people by 1998. Even the move of fencing off the settlement and placing 
security guards was not effective in stopping new people from coming into the 
settlement (Development Works, 2005).  
 
 The sudden and significant increase in the number of inhabitants of Transit Camp 
erupted into violence   and forced people to move out and settle elsewhere.  
Hence, people moved from Transit Camp to the surrounding empty privately 
owned land, hence the origins of Private Property, the area bordering the 
Zandspruit Transit Camp as indicated in Figure 2.  
 
Households who invaded the land first build their own shacks and later continued 
to build smaller shacks surrounding their homes for rental for new arrivals. 
Several people may have merely moved into the Zandspruit Private Property area 
with the intention of having a place to stay, but later became entrepreneurial and  
began shack renting. This increased demand for land in Zandspruit Private 
Property as shack renting became a vital source of income. As a result, invasion 
spiralled and the settlement mushroomed out of the municipality‟s control. It is 
not clear how many people are currently renting in this area and how many are 
shack owners.  
 
Private Property is divided into four sections named after the land owners: Mbele 
section, Woolf, Vuku Zenzele and Breaker Brothers. Some residents claim to own 
the plots which they say they bought for about R35-R650. On top of these initial 
fees they had to later pay monthly rents to land owners. Others are renting and in 
2005 rents ranged from R40 to R1500 per month (Development Works, 2005).  
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4.4.2 Population and services 
 
During my visits to Zandspruit Private Property from January to August 2007, I 
interviewed the Zandspruit area manager of the Region 5 municipal office and 
collected documents from the Region 5 Department of Housing. The City of 
Johannesburg (2007) records indicate that by 2006, the population of Zandspruit 
Private Property was 19 318 people living in 5 529 shacks.  
 
In terms of development status, Zandspruit Private Property only has limited 
services – that comprise mainly water access through public standpipes as seen in 
Figure 6 and Figure 7. Other services are high-mast lights and VIP toilets as seen 
in Figure 8 and 9. The Department of Local Government and Planning of the City 
of Johannesburg together with the agency Johannesburg Water, had installed 30 
stand water pipes and 1800 VIP toilets (roughly one for every 2-3 shacks) in all 
sections of Private Property during the 2005/2006 financial year. Households are 
being issued with two plastic bags per week which are collected once a week by 
Pikitup, the City‟s waste management company (Pikitup, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 6: Zandspruit Private Property public taps. Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
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Figure 7: Zandspruit Private Property public taps. Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
 
The main source of transport for Zandspruit Private Property residents is public 
taxis, public buses and private motor vehicles as some households own cars. 
Zandspruit Private Property depends on Transit Camp for social services, such as 
the one primary school (with no adequate sports facilities as the area is too small), 
and one clinic as seen in Figure 10. The community is serviced by Honeydew 
Police Station. Other services include one makeshift soccer field as seen in Figure 
11, churches and halls.  
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Figure 8: Zandspruit Private Property VIP toilets. Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
 
The City of Johannesburg identifies the current community problems as limited 
access to basic services (illustrated in Figure 12 and Figure 13), shack farming, 
crime, narrow roads, overcrowding, and illegal electricity connections (City of 
Johannesburg, 2007). From the government‟s observation, it is evident that 
currently there is not enough land earmarked for the purpose of upgrading if 
conventional residential densities are applied (City of Johannesburg, 2007). 
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Figure 9: Zandspruit Private Property VIP toilets. Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Zandspruit Clinic in Transit Camp. Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
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Figure 11: Zandspruit Private Property Soccer Field. Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
 
Figure 12: Lack of services in Zandspruit Private Property (no drainage).  
Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
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Figure 13: Lack of services in Zandspruit Private Property (no drainage). 
Source: (Ole Saibul, 2008) 
 
The local government‟s attitude (at regional level) towards this settlement is 
claimed to be transformative. In Region C, according to one government official, 
Area Manager - Zandspruit (personal communication, 2007), the government‟s 
plan regarding informal settlements is to formalise these areas and have 
communities „involved‟ in the process. He added that some of the challenges the 
government faces include the illegal building and selling of new shacks, which 
results in a growing number of shacks. Although the local government official 
indicates that it would like to get the community involved, the community 
involvement that is being implemented according to the government official is 
informing the community about the development projects. Communities are not 
effectively involved in the decision-making process from the inception of the 
projects. 
 
The biggest challenge in the informal settlements is how to provide basic services 
and housing to communities occupying privately owned land. This makes 
development of the area very difficult unless the government buys the land from 
the private owners or if the owners accept such development on their land. Once 
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the government owns the land then the process of service provision may begin (as 
happened in Zandspruit Transit Camp). New policy was introduced in 2004 after 
Planact exited Zandspruit. Chapter 13 of the Housing Code provides for the 
purchase of the occupied land. However, it has not yet been implemented by the 
City of Johannesburg. 
  
4.4.3 Planact involvement with Zandspruit 
 
As Planact mainly focussed on informal settlements with the aim of organising the 
communities and empowering them to engage with local government more 
effectively, the Zandspruit Transit Camp community had requested Planact‟s 
assistance. Planact started working in Zandspruit Transit Camp in 2000, with the 
aim of establishing representative community-based structures capable of 
engaging government agencies and other service providers around the delivery of 
services and housing (Planact Annual Report, 2000/2001). According to Planact‟s 
Annual Report (2001/2002), it played its part by helping the community form a 
democratic, accountable and representative community development forum 
(CDF). Partly through this structure, the community managed to acquire sites and 
service stands, water and sewage lines from the then Northern Metropolitan Local 
Council in 2001.  
 
However, by the end of that year, community violence against foreign nationals in 
Zandspruit Transit Camp erupted and made Planact‟s continued involvement in 
the area difficult. The CDF leader with whom Planact was working was also 
implicated in the xenophobic attacks. The CDF leadership itself appeared divided 
and attendance of meetings was low.  Planact‟s 2001 Annual Report (Planact, 
2001) explains that the xenophobic violence was mainly blamed by community 
members on the perception that foreign nationals (Zimbabweans) were the main 
source of crime in the area. Violence erupted when a South African citizen was 
allegedly killed by a Zimbabwean. Planact withdrew its project officer from 
Zandspruit Transit Camp on safety grounds. In September 2002 Planact ended its 
support of the CDF and Zandspruit Transit Camp residents indefinitely and began 
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assisting informal communities on private land around Transit Camp that is 
Zandspruit Private Property. 
 
Planact has no one uniform approach to its entry into communities. Planact‟s 
overall strategy for working in informal settlements, according to Planact‟s 2006-
2009 Director (who was Planact‟s Project Manager from 2002), is as follows: 
 
 „[we] are here to work with the most marginalised people on issues of 
human settlement and governance. We work with informal settlements to try 
to get them into the government system, to try secure housing, land and 
basic services. We try to build leadership that represents most of the 
interests groups in the community‟. (Planact Director, personal 
communication, 2007) 
 
At the time when Planact was working in Transit Camp and before the violence 
broke out in that area, already Planact was approached by people from Private 
Property. With the violence in Transit Camp, Planact then considered moving its 
activities to Private Property. Planact began to interact with the four sections 
commonly referred to as Private Property. These settlements had no services at 
all. From September 2002, Planact withdrew its support from the CDF in Transit 
Camp indefinitely and concentrated on assisting the informal communities settled 
on the Private Property. This latter action was a way to maintain some 
involvement with Zandspruit (Planact, 2001). Zandspruit Private Property 
residents comprise both foreign nationals; and South African citizens (forming the 
majority group) (Development Works, 2005).  
 
According to the then Director of Planact, the organisation‟s strategy in 
Zandspruit Private Property was to support and expand some fledging 
organisations which were trying to represent residents in terms of accessing land, 
housing and basic services. The Planact Director further indicated that when 
Planact asked the City of Johannesburg for help they were met with resistance 
from the city officials who indicated that they could not do anything to help as the 
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community was based on privately owned land (Planact Director, personal 
communication: 2007).  
 
When Planact started working in Zandspruit Private Property, the initial aim was 
to intervene by helping the community form structures for engagement on 
development issues affecting them. The main challenges Private Property faced 
were lack of access to services, inadequate amounts of water from boreholes on 
the property and threat of eviction. Since Zandspruit Private Property has no 
security of tenure, the community tends to be very vulnerable and are still 
deprived of adequate services as seen in Figure 12 and Figure 13. For example, 
despite its existence since 1997, by the year 2002/2003, the community was still 
coping with temporary services such as shared water tanks and family bucket 
toilets. Up to the latter part of 2002, the municipality still refused to provide 
services to this private land as a matter of policy, but, eventually in 2004, the local 
government did provide temporary basic services such as communal water points, 
high mast lights and shared toilets (pit latrines). 
 
In 2006, at the time of the fieldwork for this thesis, there was a slight 
improvement as the community had shared public water taps and VIP toilets 
provided by the municipality. During the period when Planact worked with 
Zandspruit Private Property (2002-2004), strategies for residents‟ permanent 
settlement continued to be delayed due to difficulties the government was facing 
in trying to buy the land from its owners - the municipality claimed the owners 
kept raising prices. Another reason for the delay was that the Johannesburg Metro 
Council was left to develop its own strategies without any policy guidance or 
dedicated funding prior to BNG in 2004. Generally, a very negative perception of 
informal settlements on the part of all tiers of government existed. This led to a 
somewhat adversarial relationship with communities and it made developing the 
area difficult during this period (Planact, 2003). 
 
By the end of 2002 to early 2003, Planact focussed on the formation of a Joint 
Committee at Zandspruit Private Property. The Joint Committee consisted of 
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representatives from the four sections. Each section has its leadership structure 
which represents its section at the Joint Committee meeting, where issues to be 
taken to local government are discussed. Planact noted that by the end of 2003, its 
new focus on Private Property was making a positive impact (Planact Annual 
Report 2003/2004). The Joint Committee recognised the role of Planact‟s 
assistance in bringing together the leadership structures and building a stronger 
voice on issues common to sections of Zandspruit Private Property than had 
previously existed (Planact, 2004). The community became more focussed on 
strategic concerns and its engagement with government (Planact Annual Report, 
2002/2003). 
 
For over a year, Planact seemed to be doing well in Private Property and making 
progress in assisting the community with leadership training and capacity 
building. After just over two years of concentrating on Zandspruit Private 
Property, Planact stopped its activities in this informal settlement. Planact 
explained that this was due to the problems of staff shortages in the NGO and the 
fact that it was not making real progress in assisting the community due to the 
municipality‟s failure to acquire the land. This exit by Planact from Zandspruit 
Private Property raises several questions about Planact‟s accountability, its 
commitment to particular forms of representation and participation and, 
ultimately, the construction of its legitimacy.  
 
The Zandspruit community requested Planact‟s assistance; there was no mandate 
for Planact when it began its work. There was just mutual understanding and 
acceptance that Planact would accomplish its promises to the community. This is 
in line with mutual NGO accountability to communities based on shared 
understanding, trust and respect. This type of accountability is difficult to 
maintain due to the many stakeholders involved. In addition, the Zandspruit 
community was in no position to question Planact‟s accountability as discussed in 
my findings. Unpacking this case allowed me to explore Planact‟s multiple 
sources of legitimacy and in particular, legitimacy working with the Zandspruit 
community. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
In South Africa, during apartheid, the existence of NGOs could be explained 
using what Tvedt (1998) referred to as public goods theory and contract failure 
theory where NGOs represented marginalised communities. At this time, NGOs 
received donor funding to assist black majority communities that the apartheid 
government and private sector did not cater for. Although the political 
environment was not conducive as the apartheid government continued harassing 
NGO leaders, the existence of NGOs could also be explained by using the 
functionalist theory, due to the financial resources that were available for NGOs 
from international donors.  
 
With the transition to democracy, NGOs had to transform their roles and 
objectives to fit the new democratic dispensation. During this period NGOs faced 
legitimacy challenges in terms of their role in a democratic society and most of 
the funding from donors was channelled to the new democratic government. The 
relationship between development NGOs and government and donors changed 
and raised questions on how NGOs can claim representation of marginalised 
communities in the informal settlements such as Zandspruit while they face 
multiple accountabilities.  
 
Participation of informal settlement communities in decision making processes is 
seen as important by government. Participation mechanisms are there through 
ward committees. Although there is a legislative framework for participation, 
there are factors limiting participation of informal settlement communities. 
Development NGOs work with communities to improve their participation in 
decision making processes by mobilising communities, act as intermediaries 
between communities, government and donors and assist communities articulate 
their needs to government and other agencies. In the case of Planact and its work 
in Zandspruit informal settlement, Planact attempted to create representation 
structures to improve the engagement between Zandspruit and local government. 
Zandspruit community face challenges in terms of security of tenure and has 
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limited services. Due to tenure insecurity in Zandspruit, Planact left the 
community before they could access housing and secure tenure. Planact indicated 
that it was taking too long to resolve tenure security and the organisation could no 
longer continue working with the settlement. Planact‟s exit from Zandspruit 
community created questions on the legitimacy of NGOs in representing 
communities with tenure insecurity. With reference to the prescriptive approach to 
legitimacy, in the next chapter I present the conceptual framework, which I used 
to explore Planact‟s legitimacy working with Zandspruit informal settlements. I 
also expand on the research questions and methodology.  
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5.0 CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN RELATION TO 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CASE STUDY 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Prescriptive legitimacy as discussed in the theoretical framework and literature 
review provides a number of ways organisations can construct or claim 
legitimacy. In this thesis I explore legitimacy in relation to representation because 
developmental NGOs claim legitimacy in representing marginalised communities. 
For development NGOs to claim legitimacy in the representational role, they have 
to ensure communities participate in the decision-making processes and ensure 
accountability to the communities. This thesis explores how Planact constructs its 
legitimacy in representing a marginalised community, namely Zandspruit an 
informal settlement for which development is delayed indefinitely due to 
unresolved land tenure.  
 
5.1 Conceptual framework 
 
NGOs often claim to represent marginalised communities‟ needs and interests. In 
order to be an effective representative of communities‟ needs and interests, there 
has to be participation by the communities in decisions on which issues will be 
put forward as their interests and needs. Therefore, without community 
participation, the representative role NGOs perform will not be credible to 
construct legitimacy. For NGOs to claim to perform a representative role, they 
have to be accountable to the communities they claim to represent. Therefore, the 
variables that are used in this thesis to assess NGO legitimacy are participation, 
representation and accountability.  
 
Based on this conceptual framework, the legitimacy of the NGO working in 
informal settlements will be determined by its representational role which is, in 
turn, determined by the effectiveness of the participation of the communities and 
the NGO‟s accountability to the communities. As already indicated, NGO 
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legitimacy in this thesis is explored in the context of an informal settlement in 
which participation was unable to achieve development results and the NGO 
accountability to the community was limited. The question then is: can NGOs be 
considered legitimate if the representational role is not accompanied by effective 
participation of communities, and NGOs are not accountable to the communities 
they represent?  
 
5.1.1 NGO Legitimacy 
 
There are two main approaches to legitimacy as seen in Figure 14. In this section, 
I explain the conceptual framework created using a prescriptive or normative 
approach to legitimacy. This framework as seen in Figure 14 is used to explore 
how NGOs construct legitimacy. Different arguments by social scientists explain 
that NGOs do not have to be elected to be legitimate. NGOs claim prescriptive 
legitimacy by representing marginalised communities (Hudson, 2000). Lister 
(2003:177) also agrees that the legitimacy of development NGOs especially in 
advocacy work is often considered to rest on issues of representativeness.  NGOs 
can derive their legitimacy legally or morally through accountability (Edwards 
and Hulme, 1995 Edwards, 2000); and participation (Marschall, 2002).  
 
Prescriptive legitimacy of NGOs is based on their legal and moral status. The 
latter comprises representativeness, participation and accountability, while the 
former refers to whether an NGO complies with the provisions or legislations for 
non-profit organisation of the host country.  
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Figure 14: A conceptual framework to assess the legitimacy of NGOs 
Source: Based on the information in chapters Two and Three. 
 
Moral claims are specifically based on whether organisations promote public 
interests and are receptive to communities‟ needs; whether communities are 
interested and participate in the organisation‟s activities, as well as whether 
communities accept and consider the NGO legitimate. 
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5.1.2 NGOs’ representation 
 
Questions on an NGO‟s representational role arise because NGOs, unlike 
governments, are not elected. In this sense, it may not be legitimate for them to 
claim a representational role. In addition, NGOs have to be accountable to donors, 
and to some extent governments, and not to the community alone. For NGOs to 
claim a legitimate representational role, they should demonstrate the whole share 
of accountability to the community alone. However, the representational role of 
NGOs does not have to be the same as that of governments as NGOs can claim  
legitimacy through a number of ways, such as through community participation 
(Marschall, 2002), representation (Atack, 1999; Edwards, 2003; and Niggli and 
Rothenbuhler, 2003) and accountability (Edwards, 2003).  
 
Pitkin‟s (1967) form of substantive representation, which sees representatives as 
actors or agents of the community, can be used to assess the representational role 
of NGOs through the existing structures and processes. In the case of Zandspruit 
informal settlement, the representational processes considered were participation 
and accountability.  Participation and accountability are mutually inclusive, as 
each influences the other.   
 
The structures used in the representation processes in a democratic dispensation 
are official government structures. But the argument for the existence of NGOs 
according to the public goods theory and contract failure theory is that, 
government structures in most cases do not effectively represent the interests and 
needs of the marginalised communities. Therefore, there are attempts by NGOs to 
show that there is a need for them to step into the gap and represent the interests 
and needs of these communities. This is how NGOs claim legitimacy. Therefore, 
when assessing NGO legitimacy using representation I use structures and 
processes to assess representation as seen in Figure 15. In terms of structures, I 
look at the two structures of community representation, namely those of local 
government and those of the NGO. And processes include participation and 
accountability. 
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Figure 15: Framework used for NGO representation 
 
5.1.3 Participation processes 
 
For NGOs to claim legitimacy through representation, communities that are being 
represented have to participate in the decision-making processes to ensure 
accurate representation of their needs and interests. Participation plays an 
important role in NGOs‟ claim to legitimacy through representation as seen in 
Figure 16. In this research, mechanisms for assessing participation of 
communities in decision-making processes with NGOs include variables from 
Abbott (1993), Wilcox (1994) and Choguill (1996), Arnstein (1969) and Imparato 
and Ruster (2003), and will be discussed below. 
 
Effective participation depends on government support, the community‟s 
willingness or ability to participate and the access to a participation process as 
illustrated in Figure 16. The Zandspruit community willingness to participate in 
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decision making processes was measured by the nature of decisions made, and 
willingness to contribute their private resources (time, labour and money) as well 
as the homogeneity of the Zandspruit community. Homogeneity was assessed 
using the community‟s political orientation, ability to resolve disputes and the 
willingness of the four different sections of Zandspruit Private Property to work 
together.  
 
The development of effective participation in any country depends on government 
support (Choguill, 1996). Participation depends on outside help and government 
support in terms of resources and willingness to carry out mutual help projects. It 
also depends on the openness of government to the inclusion of the community in 
the decision-making processes. I explored government‟s support by looking at the 
structures it had put in place for participation. NGOs alone cannot assist 
communities in accessing development in informal settlements without 
government support in providing basic services, such as water, electricity and 
housing. The Zandspruit community‟s access to the participation process was 
established through the instruments used for participation. These could be through 
the use of community development workers or NGOs (Wilcox, 1994; Abbott, 
1993). The instruments observed included communities‟ attendance at meetings, 
the technical involvement used in the participation process and the role and 
relationship between Zandspruit and Planact. 
 
Other factors in assessing participation included how organised the community 
was. According to Wilcox (1994), Oakley and Marsden (1984) and Durand-
Lasserve (2006), communities that are organised into small organisations are more 
assured of participation compared to communities that are organised into a large 
organisation (where the minority will not be heard). Organised communities have 
more voice in their demands compared to an individual. I explored the level of 
organisation by looking at the CBOs within the community to establish their 
relationship with NGOs and the community. The above factors would influence 
whether there would be any participation at all and the level of participation. Once 
it has been established that there is some sort of participation taking place, 
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Arnstein (1969) and Choguill‟s (1996) levels of participation can be used to 
establish the level of participation.  
Participation
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Figure 16: Conceptual framework used to assess participation
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5.1.4 Mechanisms for NGO Accountability 
 
Representatives have to be accountable to those who give them 
authority/responsibility to ensure effective participation and legitimate 
representation. Available literature indicates that NGOs have multiple and 
sometimes conflicting accountabilities (Ebrahim, 2003). For NGOs, multiple 
accountabilities relate to multiple actors, such as patrons, clients and NGOs 
themselves. This creates upward and downward accountability as well as internal 
accountability within the NGO itself as indicated in Figure 17. 
 
Planact‟s accountability is assessed through its functions (functional). The interest 
in this thesis is not on strategic accountability because strategic accountability is 
focused on accounting for the impacts that an NGO‟s activities have on the 
actions of other organisations and their wider environment (Ebrahim, 2003). The 
interest in this thesis is rather to establish how Planact‟s multiple accountabilities 
create and affect its representational role in Zandspruit. Planact has multiple 
accountabilities, as shown in Figure 17, and these include up-ward accountability, 
downward accountability and internal accountability. Upward accountability is 
measured on how Planact accounted to the individuals and organisations that 
provided financial aid (patrons/donors). Statements and reports are widely used 
tools of accountability as they provide information to donors and anyone who 
wants to know about the activities of the NGO (Ebrahim, 2003). Downward 
accountability is evaluated through the impact of Planact‟s programmes in 
Zandspruit. This was assessed using reports and documents and Planact‟s 
performance.  
 
Internal accountability is assessed on how Planact reported to internal and external 
stakeholders. The internal accountability is influenced by how members control 
the actions of the organisation, how senior staff members are appointed, 
compliance mechanisms regarding the power of organisation in enforcing its 
decisions, and processes on how the organisation is evaluated and reported on to 
the public. External accountability is influenced by how organisations involve 
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external influence in decision-making processes. Examples are complaints 
mechanisms regarding how organisations enable the registration of complaints 
and what follow-up mechanisms are in place; how organisations incorporate 
social responsibility; how an organisation manages, evaluates and reports on its 
social and environmental impact; and access to information (Kovack et al. (2003). 
External accountability then influences an NGO‟s accountability to the 
community and donors. It may also determine how downward and upward 
accountabilities influence each other. 
  
The way Planact engaged with its different stakeholders illustrates some of the 
challenges Planact faced trying to meet these multiple accountability measures - 
upward, downward and internal (within Planact itself). For instance, which 
stakeholders had the greatest say in, and largely influenced, Planact‟s 
programmes? Planact‟s accountability was also determined by how it accounted 
for and used the resources at its disposal and the immediate impacts of the 
programmes.  
 
Measures for accountability include first establishing what the accountability is, 
then establishing to whom accountability is due and finally identifying the 
indicators of establishing accountability. These indicators include disclosure of 
reports and statements, performance assessment and evaluation, self-regulation 
and social auditing (Ebrahim, 2003). An NGO can also determine its 
accountability using social auditing, which refers to a process through which an 
organisation assesses reports and improves upon its social performance and 
ethical behaviour through stakeholder dialogue (Ebrahim, 2003). I used these 
mechanisms as variables in assessing NGO accountability in this case study. 
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Figure 17: Conceptual framework used to assess Planact‟s accountability 
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This study explored whether Planact provided statements and reports to 
communities and donors. I enquired from Planact whether they availed the 
statements or reports to communities and governmental officials, whether 
governmental officials and communities received reports and statements from the 
Planact, and whether these mechanisms were good enough to warrant 
accountability.  
 
Given that Planact implemented social auditing, I was able to enquire whether the 
community felt involved in the social auditing processes. In addition to social 
auditing, NGO accountability can be measured or gauged using NGOs‟ 
performance (Ebrahim, 2003). In this thesis, I did not assess Planact‟s 
performance per se because Planact did not have a specific mandate working with 
Zandspruit community. Instead, I explored the views of communities, government 
and Planact itself on Planact‟s performance in Zandspruit Private Property. 
 
5.2 Contextual analysis of the case study 
 
In order to establish how NGOs construct legitimacy when working in informal 
settlements, there is need for a clear understanding on what makes a settlement 
„informal‟. There are certain characteristics that determine whether the settlement 
is legal or illegal. For example, the legality of a structure depends on whether the 
inhabitant has legal ownership of the land, has an agreement with the owner and 
follows the planning and building laws and regulations of the city or country 
(Durand-Lasserve and Tribillon, 2001) and (Payne, 2002). Therefore, my 
assessment of the legality of structures and settlements was done using the 
following variables. 
 
Legality issues and how these influenced Planact‟s legitimacy were analysed at 
two levels. First, based on Planact‟s compliance with the relevant legislation of 
South Africa, and second, how Zandspruit informal status influenced Planact‟s 
representational role. The informality of Zandspruit as discussed in Chapter Four 
was determined in terms of compliance to planning and building laws and 
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regulations, ownership of the land, agreements with land owners and rights to 
subdivide plots and how these affected Planact‟s representational role and 
legitimacy. I explored also how this affected Planact‟s representation of the 
Zandspruit community to local government.    
 
5.3 Research question 
 
The main research question, as stated in Chapter One, is: How do NGOs construct 
their legitimacy using representation, participation and accountability working in 
an informally occupied informal settlement? This question was further split into 
sub-questions to focus on different aspects of the research. This section expands 
on these sub-questions as a guide to this case study. These are sub-questions on 
legitimacy, representation, participation, accountability and the settlement 
informality. 
 
Legitimacy 
What is the basis for legitimacy of NGOs using representation, participation and 
accountability?  
 How does Planact construct its legitimacy working in informal 
settlements?  
 In particular, what are the Zandspruit community‟s and relevant 
government officials‟ views on the legitimacy of the NGO Planact? 
 What criteria do the Zandspruit community and government officials use 
to assess Planact‟s legitimacy in its role in Zandspruit? 
 
Representation 
To which extent did Planact represent the actual interest, needs and aspirations of 
Zandspruit residents? 
 What entails Planact‟s representation of the Zandspruit community? 
 In particular, does Planact face challenges representing communities that 
are considered illegal? 
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 How did Planact ensure different needs and interests of the Zandspruit 
residents were represented? 
 How did Planact gain community trust and did people in Zandspruit trust 
Planact to represent their needs and interests? 
 Did people in Zandspruit feel their needs and interests were being 
represented to government and donors efficiently by Planact, and did 
Zandspruit residents‟ views on representation affect Planact‟s construction 
of legitimacy?  
 
Participation 
How did Planact facilitate participation of Zandspruit residents in the decision 
making process? 
 Did Zandspruit residents have access to the participation process? 
 How did Planact deal with different power relations within the Zandspruit 
community to ensure effective participation? 
 Did the organisation of the Zandspruit community by Planact improve the 
participation and representation of their needs and interests to 
government? 
 Was there government support towards the participation of the Zandspruit 
community in the decision-making process? 
 Were Zandspruit residents willing to give their time, labour and money to 
the participation process? 
 Did the nature of decisions to be made affect the participation process? 
 Did the homogeneity of the Zandspruit community affect the participation 
process? 
 What level of participation is implemented in Zandspruit? 
 What challenges did Planact face working with local government? 
 How effective was Planact as an instrument of participation between the 
Zandspruit community and government or donors, and did this affect their 
legitimacy? 
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Accountability 
What accountability challenges did Planact face while working with Zandspruit 
community? 
 How did Planact deal with multiple and sometimes competing 
accountabilities in a context of informal settlement work? 
 Did Planact provide statements and reports to both its donors and 
Zandspruit community? 
 Did Planact implement self assessment, evaluation and regulation? 
 What are internal and external stakeholder influences on Planact‟s 
accountability? 
 Did the Zandspruit community think Planact was accountable to them, and 
did that affect their views on Planact‟s legitimacy? 
 
Illegality/informality 
What challenges did Planact face working with informally occupied sections of 
Zandspruit? 
 Does the illegal occupation by informal settlement residents create 
additional challenges for the role and legitimacy of NGOs in community 
participation processes? 
 In particular, what challenges did Planact face in representing the 
Zandspruit community that is occupying the land without authorization 
from the owner?  
 Where does Planact position itself in representing informal settlement 
residents with a possible threat of eviction or relocation? 
 Does Planact avoid areas with uncertain status of occupation to ensure 
success? 
 What accountability dilemmas does Planact have in representing 
communities that have no financial resources or power to challenge 
NGOs?  
 
162 
 
5.4 Methodology 
 
I have already introduced my choice of a case study approach in Chapter One, 
including a brief discussion on the strengths and limitations of this approach. 
Here, I provide details on the approach I took to the case study of Planact and 
Zandspruit Private Property.  
 
5.4.1 Case study 
 
The thesis case study is about Planact‟s brief involvement in Zandspruit Private 
Property from the end of 2002 to 2004, when it made a decision to abandon its 
work in this community. The case study fieldwork was conducted from 2007 to 
2008, therefore reconstructing a chain of events. In order to respond to my overall 
research question, it was important to explore the contextual framework in terms 
of the status of Zandspruit and the views on Planact‟s representation, participation 
and accountability as these factors determine the legitimacy of an NGO. The 
framework in Figure 14 was used to assess the Planact‟s legitimacy. Planact‟s 
legitimacy was explored based on its legal and moral status. The legal status was 
established by checking Planact‟s compliance with non-profit organisation 
legislation of the country. Moral legitimacy was assessed through Planact‟s 
representation, participation and accountability.  
 
5.4.2 Selection of the NGO and the community  
 
For survey results to be generalisable, a representative sample must be used and 
for a sample to be representative it must be drawn up using probability methods 
(Gobo 2004). However, this rarely happens in qualitative research. Instead, 
qualitative research is based non- probability sampling that is not considered 
representative and therefore not generalisable (Gobo, 2004).  Although there are 
arguments for the different types of generalisability, there are still challenges 
when it comes to generalising findings from a qualitative case study. The 
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arguments above for generalisability are useful in explaining the sampling process 
in the qualitative research.  
 
In this thesis, because it is a qualitative research approach, non-probability 
sampling was used to select Planact and Zandspruit. In qualitative research there 
are two strategies for selecting samples or cases. These are random selection and 
information oriented selection. Flyvbjerg (2004:426) indicates that in random 
selection it is possible „to avoid systematic biases in the sample. The sample size 
is decisive for generalisation‟. There are two options when it comes to random 
selection, one can either use [a] random sample „to achieve a representative 
sample that allows for generalisation for the entire population [or use a] stratified 
sample to generalise for specifically selected sub-groups within a population‟ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2004:426).  
 
With information oriented selection the research is able „to maximize the utility of 
information from small samples and single cases. Cases are selected on the basis 
of expectations about their information content‟ (Flyvbjerg, 2004:426). Flyvbjerg 
(2004) noted that there are four options,  
 
„extreme/deviant cases – to obtain information on unusual cases, which can 
be especially problematic or especially good in a more closely defined 
dense; maximum variation cases – to obtain information about the 
significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome, e.g. 
three to four cases that are very different on one dimension: size, form of 
organisation, location, budget etc; critical cases – to archive information that 
permits logical deductions of the type, if this is (not) valid for this case, then 
it applies to all (no) cases; paradigmatic cases – to develop a metaphor or 
establish a school for the domain that the case concern‟.  
 
In this thesis the selection of Planact and Zandspruit was done using information 
orientated selection, based on the extreme/deviant strategy which allowed for the 
use of a small sample in this single case study research.  
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Planact‟s objectives include training and building the capacity of civil society to 
engage with government and become partners in development, targeting the most 
marginalised and disadvantaged communities in the urban areas of Gauteng, 
advocacy at policy level, and support of communities to participate in decision 
making. Planact‟s entry point is at a community level and from a community 
perspective (Planact Annual Report, 2000/2001). Planact seeks to promote 
participatory methodologies aimed at working with and not for communities to 
develop their own voices (Planact, 2004).  
 
According to Brown and Jagadananda (2007), NGOs with capacity building and 
policy advocacy roles participate in multi sectoral governance processes and this 
creates legitimacy questions. These characteristics about Planact influenced the 
selection of Planact for the case study using Flyvbjerg‟s (2004) information 
selection strategy. It must be noted that there are other development NGOs with 
similar objectives working with informal settlement communities such as Afesis 
Corplan in East London, BESG in Pietermaritzburg and DAG in Cape Town. 
These latter were not selected because they were located in towns significantly far 
away from the base of my research. Moreover, in spite of Planact being nearer, it 
also has a connection with the University of the Witwatersrand through my 
supervisor Prof Marie Huchzermeyer and then head of school Prof Alan Mabin. 
Therefore, Planact was selected for this study. 
 
Planact works with poor communities in informal settlements to help them play a 
meaningful role in the processes of local government. The focus here is on 
meaningful participation in government policies. These objectives are aligned 
with exploring how NGOs construct legitimacy using representation, by ensuring 
participation and accountability while working with communities that are 
occupying land illegally in informal settlements.  In addition, Planact‟s exit from 
Zandspruit without meeting its objectives make Planact a useful NGO to use in 
exploring the legitimacy challenges NGOs face. 
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The informal settlement for the case study was also selected using Flyvbjerg‟s 
(2004) information strategy as noted above. Before I decided which settlement to 
use for this case study, I read the documents on different informal settlements 
Planact had worked with (and is currently working with) and visited each one 
with Planact‟s Project Officer. Zandspruit was selected for the case study due to 
the challenges Planact faced working with this community. Planact decided to 
stop working in this community because it was not making progress in meeting its 
objectives, due to the unresolved tenure security. This raised relevant questions on 
the accountability and representation of NGOs. I expected the Zandspruit case to 
provide insights on issues of legitimacy as it is an informal settlement that at the 
time of Planact‟s work, and still at the time of my fieldwork, was occupying the 
land without authorisation from the owner, with no change in sight, or no 
certainty regarding when or whether the land occupation would be regularised. 
Also, I expected relevant insights on NGO legitimacy as Planact had worked with 
the community but abandoned the work without meeting its objectives.  
 
5.4.3 Data sources and collection 
 
The information for this research was drawn from both primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources of data used included community meetings, the physical 
environment in the community, and interviews with Planact staff, government 
officials, community members and community leaders. In selecting individuals to 
interview in a qualitative research, non probability sampling methods were used 
because I was interested in people who were there when Planact was working in 
the community and also people who were informed of what was happening in the 
community. Probability sampling methods could not be used in this case because 
of a chance of getting people who knew nothing about Planact. Non probability 
sampling methods for qualitative research included purposive sampling, quota 
sampling, and snowball sampling (Gobo, 2004).  Purposive sampling „consists of 
detecting cases within extreme situations (as) for certain characteristics or cases 
within a wide range of situations to maximize variation, that is to have all possible 
situations‟ (Gobo, 2004:448). Quota sampling „is employed for objects that 
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contain a wide range of statuses. The population is divided into as many sub-sets 
as the characteristics we want to observe and the proportion of each sample is the 
same as in the population‟ – snowball sampling „means picking some subjects 
who feature the necessary characteristics, and through their recommendations, 
finding other subjects with the same characteristics‟ (Gobo: 2004: 449).  
 
In this thesis the methods used for community interviews are snowball sampling 
and convenience sampling. All those who were available during the survey and 
willing to take part were included in the study.  The same method was used when 
selecting government officials to be interviewed. Local government officials that 
were working with Zandspruit were selected for the research. Two Planact staff 
that were available for the interviews were interviewed, one Project Officer and 
Planact‟s Director. Sixteen community members were interviewed, four from 
each section. Interviews with community members were mainly ad-hoc as 
recruitment depended on contact given by other interviewees, who recommended 
knowledgeable informants. Using this format and choosing different interviewees 
to test emerging themes, I was able to get a range of views.  I have only 
interviewed 16 community members because after interviewing two three people 
in each section I was not getting anything new, so I decided to leave it to four 
considering these were long interviews of about two hours. Four community 
leaders, (three men and one woman) one from each of the four sections were 
interviewed. Seven of the community members and two community leaders were 
not employed. The rest had what they referred to as „piece jobs‟ they may have 
worked on one day but not on the next.  
 
To protect their identity, interviewees were given names in this thesis that are not 
their real names. The names of the community leaders are simply referred to as 
„community leader‟ from Section One to Four. Two government officials were 
interviewed and they are described using their position. These are the Zandspruit 
Area Manager and City of Johannesburg (region 5) Project Manager. Two 
political representatives were also interviewed; these are the ward councilor and a 
development worker. The secondary sources of data included documentation 
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(administrative and formal studies), archival records such as organisational 
records, survey data and service records. 
 
The information collected included the following: data about the physical 
environment, historical development, economic and social factors to understand 
the background and context. Other data was about the role of Planact, its 
relationship with CBOs, the community participation process, information on the 
power structures in the community, attitudes and perceptions of individuals 
towards Planact as agent of community participation. Data was also collected on 
mechanisms and processes of legitimacy using accountability and representation, 
mechanisms of community participation, representation, accountability and 
legitimacy. Other information sought was on land ownership, Planact‟s self 
regulation techniques and accountability to the community as well as government 
support, levels of participation and the nature of decisions to be made. 
 
Data collection techniques and instruments included the following. A desktop 
investigation was used to collect historical data and background on the role of 
NGOs as agents of community participation and their relationship with financial 
institutions and communities. This informed the theoretical and literature review 
chapters. Questionnaires and structured interviews were used when conducting 
interviews with Planact officials, government officials and community members 
and leaders in Zandspruit. These instruments are attached in Appendix One. 
 
Direct observation in Zandspruit and other informal settlements was conducted 
during meetings in the settlement to observe the interaction between community 
members. These meetings were organized by the community leaders. This 
provided information on community power relations and whether they were 
influenced by gender, age or other factors. The direct observation also provided 
information on the mechanisms and processes of community participation. 
Unfortunately I did not get the opportunity to see how Planact interacted with the 
Zandspruit community as Planact was no longer active in the community. The 
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information on how Planact interacted with the community was obtained during 
interviews with community members, leaders and Planact staff. 
 
5.4.4 How the fieldwork was conducted and its limitations 
 
At the start of the fieldwork I had some anxiety that there might be problems with 
the community considering the fact that I am not South African, and the 
community had a history of xenophobic attacks. I was pleasantly surprised that 
they did not mind that I was a foreigner from another African country. All the 
people I came into contact with, both community members and leaders were very 
welcoming and willing to be interviewed. In some cases I had to politely explain 
that I had no resources and due to time limitations, I could not interview as many 
people as came forward.  
 
I had expected to conduct most of my interviews over weekends but I could not 
do so because after visiting the community one Saturday morning I realised some 
community members were intoxicated from the previous night and were in no 
state to give objective interviews. I then decided to conduct the interviews during 
the week and during day time. I did not have problems getting people to interview 
because most of them are self employed or not employed at all. 
 
I was granted access to the Zandspruit community by Planact‟s project officer 
who provided me with the cell phone number of the chairperson of the Zandspruit 
Joint Committee whom I made an arrangement to meet at Zandspruit Private 
Property. From there I was introduced to other community leaders from the four 
sections. Due to the fact that I received contact details of the chairperson from 
Planact, it became very difficult to remove the perception that I had a link to 
Planact. There was an immediate expectation that I could help the community to 
convince Planact to return and assist in Zandspruit. In Planact‟s staff own 
admission to me, Planact had left Zandspruit without explaining its reasons with 
no indication whether there was possibility of the NGO‟s return. This justified the 
community‟s high hopes of Planact returning. I explained to the community that I 
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was just a student and the study was for research purposes only, unless someone 
decided to make use of the academic document, which rarely happens. The 
residents and leadership accepted this, although some expectations did seem to 
linger. 
 
I began by interviewing a project officer from Planact, gathering information on 
what the objectives were for Planact‟s work with Zandspruit, how far the 
organisation had gone in meeting the objectives and what challenges Planact 
faced. After interviewing the Planact officer, I proceeded to interview community 
members and leaders from the four sections in Zandspruit. The third phase of 
interviews was with government officials. I interviewed a regional manager of one 
of the Zandspruit‟s regions, a community and Project Manager from 
Johannesburg‟s Region Five. I also interviewed development worker and ward 
councilor. Lastly, I interviewed Planact‟s then Director using the interview 
guideline that incorporated issues raised by the community and government 
officials on the role of NGOs and, specifically, Planact and questions about its 
legitimacy. Due to my limitations in language, I used one research assistant who 
could communicate with the local community using the language they were 
comfortable with. The research assistant was used for roughly eight hours per 
week for eight weeks. Funding from National Research Foundation (NRF) of 
South Africa covered the field work costs. 
 
During my fieldwork, I attended relevant community meetings organised by 
community leaders and workshops organised by Planact. These workshops were 
organised by Planact and included community leaders from different informal 
settlements. The workshops were not connected to Planact work in Zandspruit as 
Planact had already stopped working with Zandspruit. The meetings attended 
were organised by community leaders where they discussed challenges each 
section faced. The Zandspruit Private Property community was meeting and 
discussing their challenges to be presented to local government because there was 
development going on at Zandspruit Transit Camp and the community was 
pressing for development in their area too. Workshops were organised by Planact 
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and these sessions were done in town (near the CBD) away from the settlements. 
Leaders from different informal settlements participated in the workshops 
including Zandspruit Private Property leaders. The main focus of these workshops 
was on leadership skills and how informal settlement community leaders engaged 
the local government. Community meetings involving community members in 
each section were conducted mainly on Thursday nights which I could not attend 
due to security reasons. I only managed to attend community leaders meetings 
which took place during the day, comprising the four sections that form 
Zandspruit Private Property. I did not get a chance to observe an interaction 
between community members and Planact as Planact was not actively working in 
the community. However, I managed to observe an interaction between 
community leaders/representatives from different informal settlements at a 
workshop organised by Planact.  
 
5.4.5 Data analysis and presentation 
 
Data analysis is done using theoretical propositions and rival explanations by 
(Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) explains that theoretical propositions and rival 
explanations are preferred strategies when analysing case study findings. In this 
case, the objectives and design of the study are based on theoretical propositions. 
Therefore, the theoretical proposition helps organise the entire case study and 
define alternatives to be examined. Yin (2003:109) also indicates that the 
„theoretical proposition answers how and why questions [which] can be extremely 
useful in guiding case study analysis‟. The theoretical proposition in this case 
study has rival explanations from the community, government and Planacts‟ 
views on what makes Planact legitimate. 
 
Using the conceptual framework as a guideline, I explored representation, 
participation and accountability looking at the different views from the 
community, Planact and government officials. Using an analysis process by Green 
et al. (2007) the analysis began by the researcher counterchecking the interview 
transcripts and contextual data. I then examined and organised the information in 
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the transcripts in each interview and the whole data. I made judgements and 
organised the transcripts into themes in terms of views on legitimacy, 
representation, participation and accountability in the different transcripts.  I then 
explained the inter-relationships and made interpretations of the findings. 
 
5.5 Ethical Considerations 
 
Donors were not interviewed in this thesis because it a very sensitive issue and 
would have created a number of challenges. For example (a) it would have 
undermined the openness with which Planact‟s Director and Project Officer had 
during the interviews. I relied on their trust to get information on Planact work in 
different informal settlements. (b) I could not control the way donors might have 
reacted to my insights about Planact‟s work in and exit from Zandspruit. There is 
a probability this may have led to donor withdrawal, even with my best intentions 
not to undermine Planact. I therefore decided not to enquire about and interview 
Planact‟s donors as my findings could have be perceived as undermining the way 
donors fund NGOs. 
  
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides a link between international the literature review and this 
case study. The literature review on legitimacy, representation, participation and 
accountability provided the basis for the conceptual framework for the case study.  
Background on the South Africa case study helped inform the research questions 
and methodology used in this thesis. The conceptual framework used a 
prescriptive legitimacy exploring how Planact constructed its legitimacy using 
representation, participation and accountability. 
 
The next chapter presents my findings on the prescriptive legitimacy, discussing 
processes and views from community, Planact and government officials on 
Planact‟s representation, participation and accountability. 
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6.0 CHAPTER SIX 
PRESCRIPTIVE LEGITIMACY: REPRESENTATION, 
PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF PLANACT’S LEGITIMACY IN 
RELATION TO ITS WORK IN ZANDSPRUIT  
 
The nature of Planact‟s work in Zandspruit demonstrates an NGO grappling with 
a context of community marginalisation where there are minimal governance 
structures to facilitate consultation, if not participation of the community in the 
municipal service delivery system. However, Planact‟s work in Zandspruit does 
not lend itself to straightforward conclusions about its prescriptive legitimacy.  
Instead, it points to interaction between representation, participation and 
accountability, and also to the Planact‟s own concerted efforts to maintain the 
legitimacy required for the continued relevance and existence of the organisation.  
 
The conceptual framework for this thesis indicates the NGO legitimacy is 
constructed using prescriptive/normative and descriptive legitimacy. The 
prescriptive/normative legitimacy can be constructed legally or morally. How 
NGOs construct legitimacy legally is straight forward. In the case of Planact 
legally derived legitimacy was relatively straight forward as Planact is fully 
compliant with the legislation I reviewed in Chapter Four. Planact‟s Director 
indicated that Planact is registered as a Section 21 company; and the Act required 
it to have a constitution, article of association, a board of directors, membership, a 
mission statement, regular auditing and to hold an AGM. By Planact complying 
with these requirements, it derived legal legitimacy. Planact sees itself as 
legitimate by being registered under Section 21 of the company Act. Planact also 
makes public its financial statements through its AGM and annual reports with 
financial statements indicate financial accountability as required by law. Also 
Planact enters the formal legal contracts with donors as well as the government 
agents by which it is commissioned to carry out work or provide services. In the 
section below I discuss how Planact constructed moral legitimacy according to 
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government officials, Planact itself and the Zandspruit Private Property 
community. 
 
Morally derived legitimacy in this case is explored through representation, 
participation and accountability. The first section of this chapter I describe the 
structures used in representing Zandspruit. Then I discuss processes of 
representation, participation and accountability in ensuring Planact‟s legitimacy. 
 
6.1 Zandspruit community representation structures 
 
A key component of NGOs claim to legitimacy in their work with marginalised 
communities is the extent to which they succeed in representing the communities‟ 
needs and interests to governments and different donor organisations.  The 
discourse on NGOs is relatively new in representation debates. Political 
representation is no longer only in the hands of elected representatives.  
Representatives of marginalised groups are no longer located in the formal 
political arena only.  
 
Legitimate NGOs are considered to fulfil a representational role on the basis of 
the advantage they have over government in reaching marginalised communities. 
As NGOs often focus on single issues, they are believed to have an advantage of 
depth which is relevant in representing marginalised communities such as 
informal settlements. Informal settlements have different characteristics and 
require different strategies in addressing developmental problems. Although 
NGOs are accommodated in the formal procedures as relatively new 
representatives, there are still questions regarding the legitimacy of NGOs as 
representatives of marginalised communities. 
 
Planact‟s representational role in Zandspruit was primarily that of setting up 
representative structures rather than directly representing the communities to local 
government. Also Planact assisted communities through training and 
empowerment. Although this was the stated approach, when Planact attempted to 
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assist the Zandspruit community, some findings of this study indicate that in some 
cases Planact did represent Zandspruit‟s residents directly to local government, 
applying substantive representation. These situations are explained later in this 
chapter. Based on Planact‟s previous work in Zandspruit Transit Camp and other 
informal settlements, the Zandspruit Private Property community trusted that 
Planact would be able to assist the community in accessing some basic services. 
 
The discussion on Planact‟s representation in this chapter begins with an 
explanation of the official representation structures set up by local government, 
indicating how representation was implemented and the challenges faced in 
implementing representation. I discuss how Planact worked with Zandspruit 
Private Property to ensure representation. During the discussion of Planact‟s 
structure of representation I also present the different views on Planact‟s 
representativeness from Planact itself, local government and the Zandspruit 
community. 
 
Official local government representation according to city of Johannesburg 
legislation and policy formulation is done by the political branch, whereas the 
management and implementation of bylaws and policies, and co-ordination of 
council activities, are done by city‟s administrative branch. The administrative 
branch has 11 regional administrations which facilitate the participation of 
communities. Zandspruit is located in Region C under Ward 100. Within Region 
C, the Zandspruit community is formally represented by the elected ward 
councillor with the assistance of a ward committee. As set out by the City of 
Johannesburg, ward committees are responsible for assisting ward councillors 
keep abreast of concerns in the communities, and for supporting them in the 
conduct of ward responsibilities. Each ward committee is chaired by a ward 
councillor, and each ward committee is made up of 10 elected representatives 
from the communities. Each representative is responsible for representing the 
needs and interests of a specific sector. Most ward committees have a member 
responsible for representing issues, for example, on women, youth, religious 
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groups, culture, education, health sports and community. (City of Johannesburg, 
2006) 
 
In Zandspruit, representation by the ward committee has been problematic. One of 
the reasons is the fact that ward committee members have limited time to work 
with the community as they are not full-time political office bearers. However, the 
City of Johannesburg (2006) claims it has done much to ensure that it has 
workable ward committees. This has resulted in some achievements but these are 
not without challenges (City of Johannesburg, 2006) as noted in Chapter Four.  
Zandspruit community is represented to the ward councillor by a „Joint 
Committee‟ as discussed further in the section below. Other small committees 
assist the Joint Committee. During the time of the interviews and Planact‟s work 
in Zandspruit there were no representatives from Zandspruit community in the 10 
member ward committee. Nevertheless, the City of Johannesburg (Region C) 
Project Manager indicated that he recognised the Joint Committee as a 
representative structure.  
 
„[the] leaders will communicate with us and they are spokespersons for the 
community. As local government, we need the leaders‟ „buy-in‟ (City of 
Johannesburg project manager, personal communication: 2007).  
 
However, the Project Manager also seem to indicate that the preferred 
representative was the ward councillor,  
 
„[the] local government would approach community leaders to represent the 
community in decision making on projects. If there is no leadership, the area 
manager will then approach the community and call a meeting. This was 
mainly done when there was no ward councillor. Now it is easier as the 
region is represented by the ward councillor‟.  
 
In rating the effectiveness of the ward councillors, the Planact project officer, 
using an example from another ward, indicated that,  
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„[their] performance differs from one area to the next, some ward 
committees are functioning, e.g. in Ward 64, the ward councillor would use 
loud speakers and call people to meetings, and would also give reports back 
to communities‟. 
 
The project officer further indicated that,  
 
„[the] challenges of working with [the] ward committee are because the 
ward committees are not functioning because they do not receive the 
administrative support from government. [For example], they do not have 
all the necessary documents to support their work. Also, when the ward 
councillor is an ANC member, the councillor will get his/her own comrades 
to be in a ward committee which is a problem because it is not a political 
structure, it is supposed to serve civil society ... a ward committee is 
supposed to have 10 members but at the end of the term there will only be 
three active committee members, as they do not attend meetings, alleging 
that ward councillors are bullying them. There is still a lot of work that 
needs to be done in this area in ward committee representation‟. 
 
Another challenge in working with ward committees as representatives of 
communities was noted by the Planact Director, who indicated that,  
 
„[ward] committees have disadvantages due to the fact that they do not 
represent the small communities, they represent a ward which is big and 
some communities might not be represented in the ward committee‟. 
 
To improve the effectiveness of the ward committee, Planact project officer 
suggested that:  
 
„[the] municipality needs to provide administrative support to the ward 
committee, [for example] provide name tags, office space, pens and paper, 
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build their capacity. Also revise how ward committees are elected - there is 
a need to look at the election process. Some people join the ward committee 
with the hope of moving up the ladder. This has an effect on whether a 
community knows who their ward committee is. The process has to be 
transparent‟. 
 
From these interviews it was apparent that the official representation by local 
government has challenges. The ward councillors represent large communities 
with different interests and needs. During the public meetings between ward 
councillors and the community, it is very difficult for community members to 
express their needs and interests in these large gatherings. The Ward councillor 
also reports to the local government officials who do not have powers to make any 
decisions. This means the ward councillor is not able to represent the community 
at the local government fora effectively.  
 
Benit-Gbaffou‟s (2008) research showed that ward councillors have limited power 
in Council, and do not have incentives to ensure accountability to the 
communities that voted for them. This whole process becomes very frustrating for 
the community and local government. Lack of representation of poor communities 
is a problem beyond South Africa. Bracking and Hickey (2005:851) argue that 
„people who live in poverty over extended periods of time are the least likely to 
gain political representation and have few immediate or natural allies in either 
civil or political society‟. The question then, is what difference can an NGO make 
to improve representation of communities to local government? In the next 
section I discuss Planact‟s facilitation of representation through the Joint 
Committee. 
 
6.2 Planact’s work on representation  
 
The discussion of this chapter focuses mainly on the Joint committee as a 
representative structure. Before Planact started working with Zandspruit Private 
Property, communities were represented by individual leaders from the four 
178 
 
different sections, and no committee existed to bring these leaders together. Apart 
from the four community leaders who under Planact‟s guidance eventually formed 
the Joint Committee, there have been, and still are, a few community groupings 
within each section. Initially when Planact was still working in Zandspruit there 
were objections to the Joint Committee. Some community members felt the 
process of selection of the coordinating committee members was not done with 
enough community involvement (Planact, 2002). There was a coordination 
committee that organised the election of the Joint Committee. Therefore, Planact 
facilitating the process of elections, the community formed a Joint Committee. 
The Joint Committee comprised seven leaders from each of the four sections as 
indicated in Figure 18. The seven leaders are elected by community members in 
their section. The role of the Joint Committee structure is to represent each section 
to local government and any other organisation attempting to work with the 
community. In order to establish the needs of the community, one Joint 
Committee member speaking at the Joint Committee level representing 
Zandspruit Private Property indicated that, 
 
„[leaders] from each section walk around and consult with members of their 
community in each section where community members would indicate their 
needs, interests and challenges. Community members would also approach 
their leaders to inform them of their problems. We would meet from each 
section as the Joint Committee and discuss the different needs and 
challenges from each section and decide on priority issues to be taken to 
government or any other organisation. After deciding the priority issues, the 
Joint Committee would write letters [jointly] to responsible people in 
government [Region C]‟.  
 
Planact did not work directly with the community members but with the leaders 
from the four sections who were expected to report important decisions and 
developments back to the community members and get feedback from them. A 
community leader from Section One who explained that „Planact did not interact 
with the community directly; Planact was working with the Joint Committee‟ 
179 
 
(personal communication: 2007).   In addition, public meetings were held between 
the Joint Committee leaders and community members (Planact Director, personal 
communication: 2007). A community member pointed out that „the Joint 
Committee organised meetings with the community, using loud speakers ... The 
Joint Committee gives people reports on the progress and asks people to give 
input on community issues‟ (Masondo, personal communication: 2007). 
 
The Joint Committee has a chairperson who is elected by the Joint Committee 
members. From the four sections of the Zandspruit Private Property community, 
there is a community leader from each of the four sections that form part of the 
leadership of the Joint Committee. The leadership was representative in terms of 
gender and geographical spread. Planact provided leadership training for the 
community leaders, such as how to chair meetings and the different leadership 
responsibilities (Planact Project Officer, 09/07/07). Although Planact attempted to 
ensure that the Joint Committee was representative of the community, there were 
many problems and the Joint Committee collapsed a number of times during the 
period of support from Planact due to power struggles between leaders from 
different sections of the Zandspruit Private Property settlement. Even though the 
Joint Committee had problems, it was important for Planact to ensure such a 
structure existed, as in Planact‟s view it was necessary for representation and 
participation (Planact Project Officer, 2007).  
 
 
180 
 
Joint Committee
(28 members)
Zandspruit Private 
Property Section 
Four Committee 
Members (7)
Zandspruit Private 
Property Section 
Three  Committee 
Members (7)
Zandspruit Private 
Property Section 
Two Committee 
Members (7)
Zandspruit Private 
Property Section 
One Committee  
members (7)
Community 
Members
Community 
Members
Community 
Members
Community 
Members
 
 
Figure 18: Planact's representation structure in Zandspruit Private Property 
 
While most community members indicated that they were happy with the Joint 
Committee representation, some felt the Joint Committee at the time of interviews 
in 2007, was not doing much to represent the community. This was due to the 
power struggle in the leadership between the representatives from the four 
sections. Out of the 16 community members interviewed, four felt that the Joint 
Committee was not effective in its role, especially after Planact left Zandspruit. 
Two interviewed community members were not even aware that the Joint 
Committee existed or of its role in the community. One community member 
indicated that,   
 
„[the] Joint Committee is doing nothing at the moment, each section has its 
own committee and this is what is assisting the community now‟ (Dlamini, 
personal communication: 2007).  
 
Another community member, 33-year-old Moloko, who is the head of his 
household, indicated that,  
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„[the] Joint Committee is not doing much for the community as they only 
meet with the ward councillor; the process is too slow with the Joint 
Committee‟ (Moloko, personal communication: 2007). 
 
From my interviews with community leaders, I observed another challenge with 
the Joint Committee. The position of leader is a voluntary one, making it difficult 
for the Joint Committee to function properly as there are costs that leaders have to 
incur as individuals. Also, the Joint Committee has challenges dealing with the 
many different needs from the four different sections when it comes to 
prioritisation. Committee members expressed views that the Joint Committee 
comprised too many members; each section has seven committee members, 
resulting in a total of 28 members on the Joint Committee. My observation is that 
the negative perceptions about the Joint Committee may be due to the fact that the 
community has high expectations of the leaders and they become impatient when 
leaders are not seen to be securing delivery or solving their problems. 
 
As indicated above, Planact did not only work with the Joint Committee to ensure 
representation. Planact explained that in order to make any progress in ensuring 
marginalised communities were represented in government policies, Planact 
would attempt to make contact with the local government by approaching the 
ward councillor of the area and other local government officials. It considered this 
extremely important. This direct approach is what Pitkin (1967) refers to as 
substantive representation, as discussed in Chapter Three. But ensuring an 
effective relationship with local government is very challenging as the Planact 
Director indicated:  
 
„It is a very challenging environment; in many cases you do not have access 
to people who can make the decisions e.g. the ward councillor cannot make 
decisions to provide land. Although the ward councillors are the ones close 
to the people they have no power to make the decisions. The ward 
councillor will also meet the Region officials but these officials also have no 
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decision-making power, they only implement policies‟ (Planact Director, 
personal communication, 2007). 
 
In explaining the relationship between local government and NGOs, the Planact 
project officer noted that,  
 
„[sometimes] NGOs are not trusted so there is need to work hard at 
developing [a] relationship with the ward councillors before moving on to 
other levels of government. As an NGO working in a community you need 
to prove yourself to the ward councillor first. In most areas we have had 
good relationships with ward councillors. Some ward councillors perceive 
NGOs as poisoning people against government; this could be because we 
have opened people‟s minds and eyes about their rights‟. 
 
Planact‟s role in representing the community to local government was mainly one 
of facilitating interaction between the community and the Region C local 
administration. This was done by assisting the community organise itself to speak 
with one voice. Planact also helped community leaders write letters using 
Planact‟s facilities, and to make calls and arrange dates and times for meetings 
with government. The Planact project officer explained that,  
 
„[Planact] would assist the community as a „mediary‟ [mediator] in 
community and local government meetings so that the discussions would 
not escalate into a shouting match‟.  
 
What has been discussed so far are structures of representation by local 
government and Planact. The official local government structures of 
representation have implementation challenges in terms of ensuring that the 
interests of the community reach the decision makers in government. Planact 
attempted to ensure that Zandspruit community‟s interests and needs were 
represented to local government using the Joint Committee, in addition to its own 
direct representation of issues to the ward councillor and local government. The 
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Joint Committee also faced challenges in ensuring effective representation. 
Although both methods of representation have their limitations, the fact that the 
Zandspruit community allowed Planact to work in the community indicates that 
the community trusted that Planact understood the background of the community 
and would be able to assist them.  
 
Although the Joint Committee has faced problems, as the structure of 
representation, is still seen as representative of the community by community 
members and government officials. It could be argued that the Zandspruit 
community still sees the Joint Committee as representative due to their shared 
history. As Williams (1998) indicates, there has to be trust between 
representatives and those represented in understanding communities‟ challenges, 
and this is more effective when communities „are represented by their own 
members to government with an understanding of their past‟ (Williams, 
1998b:14). The Joint Committee structure for representation is also important for 
representation because the leaders of the Joint Committee have memory of the 
community‟s past. As argued by Williams (1998b), memory is important in 
assessing representation because representatives must be aware of the 
community‟s past experiences in order to implement institutional mechanisms to 
their needs and interests in the future.  
 
The findings above indicate that Planact‟s representation of the Zandspruit 
community has mainly been that of encouraging the Joint Committee to engage 
directly with government. This is something that has been observed in other 
developing countries. Bracking and Hickey (2005) show how in India, social 
movements are seen as a promising form of representation of the poorest groups 
compared to professional development NGOs. (Although I need to distinguish 
here between the community organisation in Zandspruit and a social movement 
referred to, in this case. What interests me is the role of the professional NGO in 
relation to either of these formations). According to research done in India by 
Kilby (2006), this could be because NGOs do not want to get directly involved in 
advocacy work in the political field, these „NGOs did not directly involve 
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themselves in advocacy but rather allowed/facilitated the representative groups of 
women to take on  issues with government directly‟ (Kilby, 2006:958).  
 
Another example of limited representation by advocacy NGOs is described by 
Lavalle et al. (2005) in their study entitled Lessons of Civil Society and 
participation from Sao Paulo, Brazil. From this study, Bracking and Hickey 
(2005:851) observed that „advocacy NGOs were not very successful in gaining 
the effective representation in Brazil. The most successful were National Network 
NGOs, particularly those that had historical links to political parties through a 
shared commitment to social justice‟.  
 
Dicklitch (1998:18) points out that in Africa, „many NGOs hesitate to become 
politically active‟. Dicklitch (1998:18) cites Manuh (1993:125), argues  
 
„[they] eschew any relations with political parties, in particular opposition 
groups. They operate in non-controversial areas building schools, providing 
water and health care, and extending services, credit and information to the 
poor and needy. In these activities, they are often backed by the state which 
sees them as supplementing their effort and often takes the credit for those 
services. In such ways, NGOs can prop up weak and discredited 
governments and actually act to disempower people‟. 
 
During apartheid Planact‟s mission was to promote community driven 
development and the achievement of this mission lay „within the arena of 
confrontation‟ (Abbott, 1996:202). In the post apartheid era, Mayekiso (1996), 
Abbott (1996) and Habib and Taylor (1999) all observed that some development 
NGOs among other NGOs in South Africa began working in partnership with 
government. Planact is one of the NGOs that have sought a partnership with 
government as observed in Chapter Four by Abbott (1996). This process coupled 
with the particular role, government funded development projects geared to 
community participation (i.e. merely to ensure smooth implementation) was seen 
by some as demobilising civil society (Mayekiso, 1996). 
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In the case of Planact working with the Zandspruit community, Planact did not 
seek to directly represent the community‟s interests.  Planact‟s work in Zandspruit 
focused on capacity building and training for the community leadership to 
effectively engage with government. This is consistent with approaches by 
Planact adopted in the transition to democracy period, which created a shift in the 
relationship between development NGOs and the community.  
 
For representation to be considered legitimate, there must be processes through 
which people can participate and voice the interests and needs that are to be 
presented at higher levels. Because the Joint Committee is the tool Planact used to 
ensure representation of the Zandspruit community, in the next section I explore 
how participation has been implemented using the Joint Committee. This is where 
I will also discuss the interaction between Planact and the Joint committee.  
 
6.3 Implementing participation to ensure representation 
 
It is important to explore how participation has been implemented because, as 
Lavalle et al. (2005:961) argue, civil society plays a substantial role  
 
„[in] representing people living in poverty in the policy process. The 
dynamics of this representation cannot be understood on the same terms as 
that of individual citizen participation. Sectors of the poor obtain very 
different levels and forms of representation from civil organisations because 
these vary tremendously, including their capacity to participate and in the 
type of relations they have with their beneficiaries‟.  
 
Participation, as indicated by Marschall (2002), is assessed in the way people 
voice their interests and needs, and the influence communities have on the 
decision-making process. This influence determines the level of people‟s 
participation in the decision-making process. Participation, in this case, is 
assessed by observing the level of participation being applied by the local 
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government and Planact (via the Joint Committee), the openness and support of 
local government to the inclusion of communities, communities‟ willingness and 
ability to contribute their labour, time and money, and the role and relationship 
between Zandspruit Private Property, Planact and government. I then explain the 
different factors that have influenced participation in Zandspruit Private Property. 
In the next section I discuss Zandspruit Private Property participation as 
implemented by government. 
 
6.4 Participation process as facilitated by local government 
 
In South Africa, opportunity is created for the public to influence the policy 
decisions of government through the Ward Committee reporting to ward 
councillors. Communities are in turn expected to participate in these decision-
making processes of local government. The ward councillor works with different 
organisations in the community such as ward development forums, community 
development forums, CBOs and other stakeholders. However, recent government 
intervention in informal settlements in South Africa has been top-down with 
almost no chance for communities to influence or largely shape the process 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004a). Also, the government has abandoned the bottom-up 
dialogue (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). Other attempts by municipalities to facilitate 
participation include outreach programmes such as road shows and Integrated 
Development Planning (IDP)/budget outreach, as noted in Chapter Five (City of 
Johannesburg, 2006). These programmes are also not very effective.  Mohamed 
(2006) indicates that, although there have been significant improvements in the 
level of community involvement in general, there are still challenges as the extent 
of community involvement in the decision-making processes in the IDP is not 
clear. 
 
As already mentioned, the official participation process of the local government 
for the Zandspruit community is through the ward committee, which works with 
the ward councillor who is expected to report community challenges to the Region 
C administration. The views of the community leaders from the four sections 
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regarding access to the participation processes differ.  First, it must be noted that 
there has been a change of the ward councillor. The ward councillor when Planact 
worked in Zandspruit was replaced in the 2006 local general elections, after which 
my interviews were conducted for this thesis. Community members and leaders 
compared the two councillors during the interviews.  The majority of the 
community leaders and their community members were unhappy with the 
previous ward councillor, arguing that he was not interested in their community as 
it was located on privately owned land. Some community members also believed 
that the councillor had no interest because he represented a different political 
party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), while the majority of the community 
members in the area are supporters of the African National Congress (ANC).  This 
argument is supported by Piper and Deacon (2008), who show the extent to which 
the work of ward committees and councillors in South Africa is dominated by 
local political leaders. In Zandspruit, leaders from the three sections supported the 
new ANC ward councillor, who started working with the ward in 2006. One 
pointed out that the „previous ward councillor could not assist the community as 
he said the community was on private property and there was nothing to be done‟ 
(Community Leader Section Four: 2007).  
 
The community leader from Section Two indicated that,  
 
„[the] previous ward councillor was not very supportive. Now we have a 
new ward councillor who is in touch with the community and community 
needs. The former ward councillor did not do his duties‟ (Community 
Leader Section Two: 2007).  
 
This is the opposite of what the community leader from Section One believed. 
This leader argued that,   
 
„[our] chances of participating in government policies is limited because 
they undermine us. Previously there were some IDP processes under the DA 
ward councillor. The new ward councillor has not invited us [to participate 
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in] the IDP processes. The ward councillor does not want us to raise the 
issues that concern us in the IDP meetings‟ (Community Leader Section 
One: 2007).  
 
There was a perception that the Ward Councillor treated the four sections of 
Zandspruit differently. A community member from Section One was of the view 
that,  
 
„[the] ward councillor is busy with other sections and does not care about 
section one. We do not know who our government is; we voted for the ward 
councillor but now they keep on calling us Private Property‟ (Zungu, 
personal communication, 2007).  
 
These views suggest that government support to Zandspruit Private Property 
community through the ward councillor was inconsistent and limited under the 
previous ward councillor. The lack of government support affects the level of 
participation, as the community is mostly merely informed of the initiatives 
and has no opportunity to influence project or policy decisions. In addition, a 
poor relationship between Zandspruit residents and the ward councillor 
influences the level of participation negatively. 
 
One of the community members indicated that to address the participation 
challenges they face, they need NGOs, such as Planact because they are more 
effective in assisting the community engage government. The community member 
felt that „Government needs us when it comes to voting only and not when it 
comes to addressing our problems‟ (Langa, personal communication, 2007). The 
community leaders believed NGOs would be beneficial to the community in 
engaging with government and obtaining better services.  
 
As noted, the ability of Zandspruit community to participate in the decision-
making process was limited due to lack of access to the participation process. In 
some cases, the community‟s ability to participate in decision making was 
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hampered due to the fact that people did not have the financial means (for 
transport) to attend meetings organised by local government. When Planact 
worked in Zandspruit, it was able to assist community leaders with money to 
attend meetings. Planact also availed its office facilities to community leaders 
who could make phone calls and write letters to arrange for community meetings.  
 
In some cases, community members had the opportunity to contribute to a very 
limited form of community participation in terms of their labour, time and 
resources. For example, a community member (Magagula, personal 
communication, 2007) indicated that the community members were required by 
local government to contribute their labour by digging the hole for pit latrines that 
were built for individual households. Although they agreed to this, this does not 
comply with the idea of participation in decision making. 
 
Residents in all the four sections indicated that they engaged with local 
government mainly through community leaders and the ward councillor. 
Community members would hear about ward public meetings through loud 
speakers and from their section leaders. During the meetings, the community 
would participate by raising their hands and expressing their views, while some 
would just sit and listen because they would not get the opportunity to speak. In 
most cases, in these mass meetings the government officials would inform the 
community on what was happening rather than involve them in decision making. 
Ten of the 16 interviewed community members felt that the local government did 
not involve them much in the decision-making processes.  A community leader 
from Section One pointed out that, 
 
„[there] is no link with local government. The Joint Committee felt sidelined 
by the municipality. Region C has not organised even a general meeting for 
the community, they have only organised branch meetings for the ANC. The 
only way we get through to local government is through illegal mass action‟ 
(Community Leader Section One, personal communication: 2007). 
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A community member, Mr Zungu, lamented that, those „people with higher 
positions from ANC offices do not listen when you give your suggestions‟ 
(Zungu, personal communication, 2007).  
 
Participation in Zandspruit Private Property is also affected by lack of government 
support. Zandspruit residents expect the government to assist the community 
access adequate housing. The government has not been able to provide housing 
because residents do not own the land they occupy. The Zandspruit community 
sees this as lack of support from government. As indicated by a community leader 
from Section One, „being on private property limits our participation as the local 
government is mainly focussed on the Transit Camp and not us‟ (Zungu, personal 
communication: 2007).  
 
Such problems with community participation at local government level are not 
faced by the City of Johannesburg Municipality alone. Ley (2009) observed 
similar challenges in Cape Town. According to Ley (2009:154) DAG indicated 
that  
 
„channels for influencing IDP and city-wide planning are very narrow... the 
new City Housing plan lack commitment for community participation and 
that in many projects communities are not consulted about developments‟. 
 
A number of reasons are provided by DAG for participation challenges. Ley 
(2009:153) explains that for DAG the  
 
„lack of accountability of government‟s commitment to participation in 
housing processes [is due to] housing is a highly politicised matter ... 
political leaders are not trusted as they are perceived to be gate keeping and 
corrupt ... politicians interested in being re-elected want short-term delivery 
of houses and not a participative process‟. 
 
191 
 
Although the Zandspruit community is willing to contribute its labour, time and 
money for the development of the area, its ability to engage local government is 
limited. The discussion above on participation by local government indicates that 
the Zandspruit Private Property community feels marginalised by the government. 
The level of participation afforded by local government considered mainly 
informative, which is seen as non-participation by Arnstein (1969) and Choguill 
(1996). Arnstein (1969) does not consider this to be participation as the 
communities affected by the project do not have the power to add their 
contribution to any government initiatives. Communities are just informed of a 
forth coming project and are not given the chance to influence the project. With 
these challenges facing Zandspruit, what participation measures could Planact 
implement to improve the participation process between the community and local 
government? In the next section I discuss the participation measures implemented 
by Planact with the aim of empowering the community to engage the local 
government more effectively.  
 
6.4.1 The participation process (in Zandspruit)  
 
The Planact project officer indicated that „Planact is a pro-poor organisation 
trying to build the capacity of leaders to engage with government and 
participate in their own development‟. The project officer further indicated that 
the focus of Planact on informal settlements was important because „it is part 
of Planact‟s mission and vision to assist the poor people in these communities‟ 
(Project Officer, personal communication: 2007). With the advantages NGOs 
have in reaching the poor, as noted in the literature review, the question then, is 
what role did Planact play towards ensuring participation of the Zandspruit 
community and what did Planact‟s role in participation mean for the legitimacy 
of its activities? 
 
To implement participation more effectively, Planact began by creating 
representation structures as noted in Section 6.2. The Joint Committee was formed 
to improve the chances of the community‟s voice being heard in local government 
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decision-making processes. The participation process between the Joint 
Committee and the community was facilitated through community meetings 
organised by community leaders, and the agenda consisted mainly of discussions 
about community problems. The Joint Committee as a representative structure and 
a tool for community participation is useful for the Zandspruit community, despite 
the limitations alluded to above.  
 
The Joint Committee ideally enables the community to speak with one voice, 
which is more effective than each section of the community engaging government 
individually. Communities that are organised into small organisations are more 
assured of participation compared to communities that are not organised (Oakley 
and Marsden, 1984; Wilcox, 1994; Durand-Lasserve, 2006) due to the fact that 
they will have more authority in their demands compared to unorganised 
individuals. 
 
The Joint Committee and community members‟ interaction involved informing 
communities about relevant developments. For example, in the case of basic 
services installations, Joint committee members would call a meeting and brief the 
community only about the need to volunteer their labour in initiatives. The 
participation of the community was through the community members raising their 
problems and providing labour in the different initiatives in the settlement. This 
type of participation falls under the rung of consultation and information. The 
main purpose of the Joint Committee appeared to be that of facilitating 
communication. As one community member indicated, 
 
„I attend meetings organised by the Joint Committee and as a community we 
ask questions and indicate our needs to the community leader. The 
community leaders also inform us about the different projects initiated by 
the local government‟ (Moyo, personal communication: 2007). 
 
To ensure participation of the Zandspruit community Planact, it worked with the 
Joint Committee, but not directly with the community. Planact‟s Director 
193 
 
indicated that Planact had a good relationship with local government and had 
better access to local government than the community. The Planact Director 
further indicated that local government tended to pay attention to intermediary 
organisations. The Director warned though that although Planact has a good 
relationship with local government, it does not mean the government always 
responds. This is mainly because the relationship is with the ward councillors and 
the regions, which are not in a decision making position regarding access to land 
or implementation. In Johannesburg the decision making is centrally located with 
the Mayoral committee (Mohamed, 2009). In an attempt to ensure participation of 
Zandspruit community, Planact would meet with community leaders or the Joint 
Committee and discuss the challenges the community faced. After the discussion 
Planact would use its position and relationship with government to make contact 
with local government officials and arrange meetings between Zandspruit 
community leaders and government officials.  The Joint Committee would then 
discuss the challenges facing the Zandspruit community. 
 
Although the Joint Committee was important in organising the community‟s 
engagement with government, it had its own challenges. For example, the Joint 
Committee participation process was limited by poor communication between the 
Joint Committee members and the Zandspruit community it represented. There 
was also reported poor attendance of meetings by the community members. This 
resulted in the community not being informed of what was happening in the 
community. The poor communication between the Joint Committee and the 
community it represents had been a problem since its inception. As noted by a 
community leader from Section Two, even when Planact still supported the Joint 
Committee, the Joint Committee would meet Planact but fail to report back to 
community members on the progress of a certain project. This was mainly due to 
personal problems experienced by Joint Committee members. Planact Project 
Officer noted that another challenge facing the Joint Committee was the lack of 
financial resources and motivation as some leaders accepted certain positions with 
the hope of „climbing the ladder‟ and not necessarily to assist the community.  
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At the time of these interviews, some community members were not aware of 
Joint Committee meetings and did not participate in community meetings or 
projects. This was mainly due to the fact that they were working on weekends and 
were not present when meetings were conducted; the meetings were mostly 
conducted on weekends. For example, a community member (Lunga, personal 
communication: 2007) indicated that she heard about the community meetings 
organised by the Joint Committee from the children, and that she had not been 
able to attend the meetings because she worked on weekends. The community 
members interviewed were mostly aware of the community leaders in their 
individual sections and not of the entire leadership of the four sections as a whole.  
 
From the interviews, it was evident that the Joint Committee worked more 
effectively with the community when Planact was still lending its support. The 
Joint Committee still existed at the time of my interviews in 2007 but was no 
longer functioning effectively due to power struggles between the leaders from 
different sections. These power struggles began from when the Joint Committee 
was formed and when Planact was actively working with the community.  Power 
struggles jeopardised communication within the community. Power differences 
within a community can affect community participation processes (Wilcox, 1994). 
A Mr Zungu, a community member, said: 
 
 „[we] have no Joint Committee because there is a power struggle within the 
leadership. Leaders are not working together anymore… and there has been 
no improvement in the community since the power struggle began‟ (Zungu, 
personal communication: 2007).  
 
A community leader from section four also noted that „due to differences in 
community leaders - some people fight for power and not development - , leaders 
worked only for their different sections‟. Another community leader from Section 
Two suggested that Planact could have moderated this problem: „The Joint 
Committee is not functioning properly as Planact is not here anymore; there is no 
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direction in Joint Committee‟ (Community Leader Section Two, personal 
communication :2007).  
 
Apart from training provided by Planact, there were no other projects being 
implemented by the NGO, so assessing participation of communities through the 
vehicle of a Planact project was not possible. Participation of the Zandspruit 
community in influencing local government policies was very limited. Joint 
Committee participation processes yielded limited results, as committee members 
did not feel they were really influencing the decision-making processes of the 
local government. Although Planact assisted the community in creating 
representation structures to improve the participation process, the ability of the 
Zandspruit community to influence the decision-making processes by the 
government was limited. The various factors contributing to this are set out in 
Figure 19. Planact did not see it as its role to assert pressure on the municipality to 
address Zandspruit development problems. In the context of a staff shortage 
Planact opted to exit the settlement. This raises questions around Planact‟s 
advocacy work, its accountability and its legitimacy which I turn to in the next 
section.  
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Figure 19: Limited participation by Zandspruit community 
 
6.5 Planact’s multiple accountabilities  
 
The focus of this discussion is on Planact‟s accountability to the Zandspruit 
Private Property community which is important in claiming representation. 
Planact‟s accountability to government, to donors and internally to Planact itself is 
briefly discussed to highlight the accountability dilemma Planact faced. 
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Representatives can only be considered legitimate if they are accountable to the 
community that give them authority or responsibility to represent them (Edwards, 
2003). Planact‟s exit from Zandspruit Private Property makes this an interesting 
case study to explore accountability challenges facing NGOs working in informal 
settlements. In my interviews, Planact expressed that it failed the community due 
to the circumstances of its exit from the community.  
 
One would expect that Planact had a mandate when it began working with the 
Zandspruit community, but this was not the case. As noted in the review of Brown 
and Jagadananda (2007) in Chapter Two, mutual accountability is the form of 
accountability NGOs apply to their relationship with the communities. In the 
Zandspruit case, there was mutual accountability in the understanding that Planact 
would assist the community engage with government more effectively to access 
services such as land, housing and other basic services. This may considered 
mutual accountability because it was an informal agreement between Planact and 
Zandspruit with no legal/binding contracts. But Planact left Zandspruit before the 
land was secured and services accessed. Due to mutual accountability 
characteristics, there was no contract or formal agreement stating what Planact 
had to deliver or achieve in Zandspruit (Planact Project Officer, personal 
communication: 2007). Planact could only have a mutual accountability with the 
Zandspruit community because it also had to be mindful to its relationship with 
donors and with the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. Explaining 
Planact‟s exit from Zandspruit Private Property, Planact‟s Director indicated that 
the main reason was that „Planact had to be strategic with its resources. It was 
taking too long for government to process access to land and housing‟. Planact‟s 
Project Officer also indicated that  
 
„Planact left because it was short staffed, there was no visible headway in 
providing land and housing, and it was going to take over 10 years to make 
any difference. The Zandspruit community is on private land. Planact has 
been trying to get government to buy the land but due to shack farming and 
[because] land owners keep on increasing the prices, there was no progress 
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on accessing the land‟ (Planact Project Officer, personal communication: 
2007). 
 
The discussion above shows that Planact could not continue working in 
Zandspruit without a clear vision or positive results. Planact‟s Director agreed 
that there was always pressure to show positive results. She indicated that the 
organisation had not managed to go back to Zandspruit to resume its support 
because there were „many other challenges around the time the organisation 
stopped its work in Zandspruit‟. Basically, Planact‟s involvement with 
Zandspruit ended when the employment of the project officer working with the 
community had to be terminated (for reasons not directly related to Planact‟s 
work in Zandspruit). According to Planact‟s Director, Planact is a small 
organisation with few staff members, and there was no one to replace the 
project officer immediately. The decision was also made not to allocate a new 
project officer to Zandspruit due to the lack of progress. As noted by the 
Planact Director, „Planact was at a dead end at this point in terms of making 
progresses. The Director further indicated that,  
 
„[this] was also the beginning of Planact‟s enormous work [for local 
government] of training ward committees, so Planact was short staffed and 
there was no one to pick up right away on Zandspruit. Planact was 
experiencing huge staff turnover at that time. This resulted in an exit that 
was not planned, as the project officer was terminated from the 
organisation‟ (Planact Director, personal communication: 2007).   
 
Responding to the question of the effect of Planact‟s exit from Zandspruit on 
Planact‟s commitment to facilitating representation and participation in 
Zandspruit, Planact‟s Director indicated that although Planact had stopped its 
support in Zandspruit Private Property, they had not cut all ties with Zandspruit. 
The Director noted that, „We do not want the community to feel abandoned. If the 
city is taking years to make any decisions, it becomes difficult to work with the 
community‟. The Planact Director also indicated the lack of communication 
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between Planact and the community at the time of the exit in explaining Planacts‟ 
decision to abandon its work in Zandspruit. The Director noted that, „Although the 
exit situation was explained to the community, this was poorly done‟.  
 
Planact still keeps ties with Zandspruit by inviting the leaders to Planact network 
meetings, its annual general meetings and workshops. For example, the Director 
indicated that,  
 
„[we] have invited the Zandspruit community for workshops of Voices of 
the Poor, IDPs, Urban Sector Network, and [urban] Landmark, which 
provide the community with an opportunity to learn from other communities 
... even if Planact is not active in their community any longer‟(Planact 
Director, personal communication: 2007). 
 
Planact assisted the community in creating representation and participation 
structures in an attempt to ensure that the Zandspruit community engages with 
local government more effectively, ultimately in order to secure legal access to 
land and housing. But Planact‟s exit from Zandspruit before Zandspruit 
community was able to access land and housing raises questions on Planact‟s 
ability to ensure representation through participation of marginalised community 
as an NGO advantage.  Planact‟s inability to assist the community also raises 
questions about Planact‟s accountability to the community. In the section below, I 
discuss different views from the community, government and Planact on Planact‟s 
accountability. Mechanisms to explore how Planact ensures accountability to 
different stakeholders were adopted from Ebrahim‟s (2003) paper entitled 
Accountability in Practise: Mechanisms for NGOs. The mechanisms are used in 
the case of upward, internal and downward accountability and they include 
disclosure of reports and statements, performance assessment, accounting for 
resource use, social auditing, and self regulation. The main question is whether 
the different stakeholders see Planact as being accountable to them and whether 
this accountability or lack thereof matters. 
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6.5.1 Limited accountability to the community 
 
Accountability between Planact and Zandspruit Private Property is what Brown 
and Jagadananda (2007) refer to as mutual accountability discussed earlier. NGO 
accountability to a community is important because it is necessary for the 
meaningful involvement or participation in and, ownership of, its projects by the 
community. NGO accountability to a community is also important in terms of 
prescriptive legitimacy. For NGOs to claim legitimate representation of 
marginalised community, NGOs must be accountable to the community they 
claim to represent. Therefore, the main focus here is on the extent to which 
Planact ensured accountability to the Zandspruit community. NGOs, compared to 
government, face unique accountability challenges as they are required to be 
accountable to multiple actors, clients and to themselves (Najam, 1996). Kilby 
(2006) indicates that there is less work available on the type of downward 
accountability to communities that NGOs may adopt.  
 
For NGOs in India, Kilby (2006) notes that accountability mechanisms that are in 
place range from formal to very informal. Planact‟s accountability mechanisms in 
relation to Zandspruit are considered formal. Planact ensured accountability to the 
community through annual reports, including financial statements that were made 
available to the public. Although Planact had these formal mechanisms for 
accountability, Planact was not able to ensure effective accountability to 
community. One of the foremost problems with Planact‟s accountability to 
Zandspruit Private Property was the fact that Planact did not have a clear mandate 
from this community. The work began after a general agreement on an 
understanding of the assistance Planact was going to provide for Zandspruit. 
 
According to Marschall (2002), NGOs can ensure accountability depending on the 
organisation‟s performance. In Zandspruit, both community members and leaders 
agreed that although Planact did not manage to assist the community in accessing 
land and housing, the organisation made a difference in the community. Hence, 
Planact‟s accountability to Zandspruit community members was mainly based on 
Planact‟s performance and services Planact offered to the community. This was 
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evident in its providing leadership training, capacity building and the formation of 
the Joint Committee. Planact also assisted the community in engaging with 
government more effectively, as a leader from Section Two acknowledged, at the 
same time expressing hope for Planact‟s return:  
 
„[Before], we would demonstrate and block roads, but now we use the 
sensible way to reach the government. Unfortunately, since Planact left the 
Joint Committee has no direction anymore. We need Planact support‟ 
(Section Two Community Leader, personal communication: 2007). 
 
The Section Two leader further indicated that Planact provided guidance on how 
to engage with government. „People needed to be informed that toyi toyi [protest 
action] is not a sensible way to reach the government‟. Most community members 
in Zandspruit recognised Planact as having brought valuable skills to the 
community and were happy with Planact‟s performance at the time of its 
departure. Most articulated expectations of Planact‟s return to the community. For 
example, Section Three Community Leader indicated that,  
 
„[Planact] provided training in leadership which assisted the community in 
getting together to organise our needs and ways of engaging the 
government. Although they did not provide housing and land as anticipated 
by the community, the community was still happy with what Planact did and 
would be happy if they were to come back and continue with work in the 
community‟ (Section Three Community Leader, personal communication: 
2007). 
 
These statements must be understood in the context of the relative 
disempowerment and desperation by the community, certainly a factor that led to 
relatively low expectations from the community in terms of accountability from 
Planact. This also contributes to the continued legitimacy Planact enjoys in the 
Zandspruit Private Property community.  
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A formal mechanism for Planact‟s accountability to the Zandspruit community 
was by provision of project reports (annual reports and financial statements). This 
formal form of accountability was confirmed by the community leaders from 
section four who stated that, „Planact would provide reports to us on progress on 
accessing land from Cosmo City‟ (at this stage, it was envisaged that some 
households might relocate to this housing project). The Planact Director also 
indicated that Zandspruit community members were invited to Planact‟s Annual 
General Meetings (AGMs). Financial reports were available to the public and 
distributed at the AGMs. This encapsulates the general problem with NGOs‟ 
downward accountability to communities; there are no requirements for NGO 
accountability.  
 
Although Planact‟s mechanism for accountability to Zandspruit was formal, the 
community was in no position to question Planact‟s reports or financial 
statements. Inviting the community does not mean the community would attend 
these meetings with a critical mind to assess whether Planact was accountable or 
not. The context of Planact‟s work in Zandspruit was one where the community 
perceived itself as being marginalised by the government. At the time, Planact 
was the only NGO that offered any assistance to the community. Spatially located 
on the urban fringe, Zandspruit is not a settlement which university students have 
conducted action research, or where outreach programmes have ventured. 
Zandspruit informal settlement is significantly different from, for instance, 
Kennedy Road in Durban, where the shack dwellers‟ movement, Abahlali 
baseMjondolo, received support from the academic community in 2005 (Gibson, 
2008). For example, in Durban with its housing policy to eliminate slums, social 
movements such as Abahlali baseMjondolo are very articulated and critical of 
government and NGOs. Gibson (2008:8) noted that Abahlali baseMjondolo „have 
created tensions not only with government departments but also with NGOs, 
including the left NGOs, and other groups that lobby the government on behalf of 
the shack dwellers for service delivery‟. The communities that are represented by 
this social movement are so mobilised by their own leaders that they do not want 
to be represented by NGOs. In this instance, NGO ability to represent these 
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communities seems in question, as their legitimacy is questioned by the 
communities. 
 
Considering the real desire of the Zandspruit community for assistance, it was 
unlikely that its members would question an organisation which they understood 
was volunteering to assist them, considering the fact that there are many other 
settlements competing for the same help. Therefore, the Joint Committee might 
not necessarily perceive attending AGMs as an opportunity to critically assess 
Planact‟s accountability. Primarily, the AGMs are a form of celebration.  
 
Apart from reporting to the Joint Committee, Planact also used the Joint 
Committee mass meetings to report directly to the community until it exited. A 
community leader from Section One indicated that, „In some instances, Planact 
reported back to the community through public meetings where the community 
also raised issues they were not happy with, such as high crime levels and poor 
housing conditions‟.  
 
However, in these public meetings with Planact, residents raised issues that 
Planact could not deal with (Planact Director, personal communication: 2007). 
What did that mean for Planact‟s accountability? Did this contribute to Planact‟s 
dilemma of not being able to help this community, and to its decision to exit from 
Zandspruit? The Planact Director indicated that when the community raised issues 
that were beyond Planact‟s means, Planact tried to explain to the community that 
Planact was a small organisation and that „if the City is struggling, then an 
organisation like Planact will not be able to cope with many problems the 
community is facing‟. The Director further explained to the researcher that 
„Planact needs to focus on areas where it will be able to get results, considering 
our limited financial resources‟. The Planact Director indicated that Planact has a 
responsibility to be strategic as it cannot be a delivery agent per se. „We have to 
document their [informal settlements‟] processes and challenges. [But] Planact 
has not been so great about communicating these processes with the communities 
we interact with so that they know what to expect from us‟.  
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In terms of views on NGO accountability to communities, the City of 
Johannesburg project manager (personal communication: 2007) from Region C 
stressed the same point, namely that Planact was not in Zandspruit to deliver on 
any particular project, as such:  
 
„[when] community members are working together with an NGO in the 
community to improve the living conditions of the community it is easier 
for the NGO to be accountable to the people in the area. Making community 
members part of the project is more important in ensuring accountability to 
the community, therefore in this case, accountability will depend on the 
level [at which] an NGO decides to involve the community in the project. In 
this case, this is not important in assessing Planact accountability as Planact 
did not do a „project‟ as such in Zandspruit‟ (Project Manager City of 
Johannesburg, personal communication: 2007).  
 
Although Planact provided statements and reports to the Zandspruit community 
and the community members and leaders were satisfied with Planact‟s 
performance, Planact‟s accountability to the community must be seen as being 
limited. Zandspruit community leaders were not in a position to question Planact‟s 
accountability as the community needed assistance in improving their living 
conditions. This was mirrored, though with possible generalisation, by a local 
government community development worker in Zandspruit (personal 
communication: 2007) who indicated that, „NGOs just come as they please in the 
community with big promises and no accountability. They are more accountable 
to the donors. In most cases communities are disorganised with no proper 
structures. Therefore cannot demand accountability from NGOs‟.  
 
Although there were measures through which Planact attempted to account to the 
Zandspruit community, these measures were limited accountability. This was 
attributed to the nature of NGOs work as well as limited funding and dependency 
on donors. In most informal settlements, communities are marginalised and 
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desperate for help, and it becomes difficult to demand accountability from the one 
organisation trying to assist them, particularly because there are another 124 
informal settlements in the city, and Planact cannot manage to support more than 
six of these at any one time. Although NGO accountability to the communities 
they represent is important in their effectiveness as representatives, there are „few 
incentives for them to be accountable this way‟ (Kilby, 2006:951). For Planact, 
accountability to the Zandspruit community was the most important aspect of 
accountability to its claim for legitimate representation. Although Planact‟s 
accountability to the community was important, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
NGOs face multiple and sometimes competing accountabilities. In the following 
sections I discuss Planact‟s accountability to government, donors and itself.  
 
6.5.2 Ambiguous accountability to government 
 
Planact‟s accountability to government in this case is considered to be upward 
accountability. Planact did not have to provide statements and reports to 
government to ensure its accountability as is the case with donors. With the 
government Planact had to register the organisation as discussed in Chapter Four. 
Planact‟s accountability to government was assessed through its performance in 
implementing or facilitating government projects. This type of accountability 
between Planact and government occurs when Planact is commissioned to work 
for the government. This was similar to the IDT or other agencies delivering site 
and service or upgrading projects in the early 1990s. Planact did not have a direct 
accountability to the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality at the time of its 
work in Zandspruit. However, it still had to maintain a positive relationship with 
the government. As noted in Chapter Four, Planact has been doing, commissioned 
work for local governments, particularly in terms of assisting with training ward 
councillors. Therefore, in assisting the community to engage local government, 
Planact‟s aim was to ensure a positive relationship with government. This was 
confirmed by the Planact Project Officer who explained that when assisting a 
community engage with local government, the approach is to create a positive 
relationship with the local government first. This begins with the ward councillor 
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and then moves on to government officials at regional level (Planact Project 
Officer, personal communication, 2007).  
 
Post-apartheid development NGOs pursued the role of being advocates and 
implementers in dealing with the government in the early 1990s (Development 
Works, 2006). At the time of its involvement with Zandspruit, Planact‟s general 
mission was focussed on integrated local government, land and housing. Planact 
worked with relatively newly established local governments and to some extent, 
with provincial and national structures. At the same time, it continued its work 
with community-based organisations (Planact, 2001).  
 
While working with communities at Zandspruit, Planact also worked on other 
government contracts in other localities, such as the training of the ward 
councillors in the Greater Tubatse and Potchefstroom Municipality (Planact, 
2002). Literature indicates that NGO accountability to communities is somewhat 
undermined once NGOs start to work for government (Habib and Taylor, 1999). 
However, the training of ward councillors in local municipalities outside of 
Johannesburg by Planact cannot be seen as having compromised accountability to 
the Zandspruit community. There is no evidence that this work for government 
impacted significantly on Planact‟s role and accountability to the Zandspruit 
community.  
 
Although Planact did not face direct accountability challenges between Zandspruit 
community and the local government, Dicklitch (1998) shows that in African 
countries, NGO accountability to government is very important to ensure their 
legitimacy. As already discussed in the literature review, NGOs‟ ability to work 
with communities and their legitimacy depends on their relationship with 
government.  
 
This is because in these African states, the legitimacy of the state depends on its 
ability to deliver services; therefore governments do not want to see NGOs 
delivering more services than them (Dicklitch, 1998). This means that „states with 
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little legitimacy will be highly suspicious of NGO activities, especially those that 
may be construed as political (Dicklitch, 1998:24). In South Africa, where the 
post-apartheid state enjoys legitimacy, particularly from foreign aid agencies, the 
situation is somewhat the reverse - NGOs depend on government sanction for 
their own legitimacy. Donors may not fund an NGO that takes an adversarial 
position towards what is perceived to be a legitimate state. The fact that NGOs‟ 
main funding source for work in empowering marginalised communities is from 
foreign donors‟ raises important questions in relation to the role of Planact‟s 
accountability to its donors in the Zandspruit case. 
 
6.5.3 Simultaneous accountability to donors 
 
NGOs‟ accountability to donors is what Brown and Jagadananda (2007) describe 
as „principal-agent accountability‟ based on contracts and formal agreements. 
Planact ensured accountability to its donors by providing annual reports 
accounting for its performance and the impact it is making in communities, and 
financial statements accounting for resource use. Accountability to donors is 
complex. It can affect NGOs‟ accountability to communities they claim to 
represent as well as to other stakeholders. In most cases donors demand financial 
accountability and accountability to the objectives of the programme (Kilby, 
2006). At the time of Planact‟s work in Zandspruit, donor funding was (and still 
is) limited.   
 
In order to secure funding for any initiative, an NGO submits proposals to those 
donors that support that specific objective. This means most NGOs work with 
different donors at the same time, depending on the different initiatives the NGO 
is pursuing. Regarding the suggestion that NGO accountability is primarily to its 
donors, the Planact Director indicated that this was not necessarily true for 
Planact. The Planact Director explained that, 
 
„[An] NGO has its mission and tries to get donors who will also support the 
mission. So NGOs are not controlled by the donors, they try to get donors 
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who will support their mission‟ (Planact Director, personal communication: 
2007).  
 
However, the Planact Director continued by admitting that,  
 
„[there] are challenges, though, when an NGO cannot find a donor with the 
same mission. This means an NGO has to adjust its mission. It is only in the 
perfect world where an organisation does not have to adjust its mission. But 
it‟s not a perfect world so some NGOs have to adjust their missions. If this 
happens, and the NGO does not adjust, it means closing‟ (Planact Director, 
personal communication: 2007).  
 
For example, as discussed in Chapter Four, Planact underwent changes in its 
objectives to cope with the changing political and financial environment around 
1990 and, soon after, in 1994. During the transition to democracy in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, Planact‟s funding base was dismantling rapidly due to the fact 
that it had not adapted quickly enough or, more importantly, in the necessary way, 
to the changing environment. Royston, (2009:32) explains that after 1994, 
 
„[Planact] saw a way forward by responding to the main challenges of 
identifying new spaces for constructive engagement between municipalities 
and communities; retaining a solid core of activities capable of contributing 
towards the linked objectives of local government transformation and 
meeting the development needs of the poor communities; and sustaining a 
healthy funding base by attracting new donor partners while simultaneously 
developing the capacity to secure fee based income‟.  
 
In terms of the influence of donors on NGO objectives, the Planact project officer 
explained that Planact was focussed on working with communities where there 
were good chances of achieving positive results. In relation to Planact‟s exit from 
Zandspruit, the statement above raises questions on whether, due to pressure from 
donors, NGOs only work in communities that guarantee results.  
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When Planact‟s Director was asked whether funding and requirements from the 
donors influenced the decision to exit Zandspruit, she responded that, „When 
Planact writes proposals for funding, we try to make the proposals as general as 
possible to allow for flexibility. [However], if we face problems with the 
community, we will withdraw and inform the donors‟. Indeed, when Planact faced 
problems that were difficult to deal with Planact exited Zandspruit community. 
This shows that donor accountability in terms of following the original proposal 
or agreement with the donor is taken into account the project from its inception. 
Therefore, indirectly, accountability to donors was one of the reasons for 
Planact‟s exit from Zandspruit. 
 
Although Planact or NGOs in general may attempt to work with marginalised 
communities which display potential for positive results, complications may 
arise. Planact‟s Director remarked that,   
 
„[Planact] would try analysing a community first to determine if there is a 
possibility for success, due to pressure to show results. This does not mean 
we only work with communities where there is potential for success. It is 
important to have successful projects but even if we have failures we 
document them and learn from them [but also exit them]‟ (Planact Director, 
personal communication: 2007).  
 
As NGOs, and in this case Planact, tend to work with communities with the 
potential for positive results, and abandon communities that have challenges, it 
must be asked: who should support communities such as Zandspruit, which are 
marginalised, have internal challenges and have few prospects of securing 
improvements such as land regularisation in the near future? Donors seem to have 
control over the objectives of NGOs because of NGOs‟ dependence on donors for 
funding. This is not unique to Planact as many NGOs ensure accountability to 
donors for survival. For example Dicklitch (1998:28) explains,  
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„[many] NGOs would not be functional if foreign donors did not provided 
funding for the various programmes and services offered by NGOs ... many 
NGOs have become heavily dependent on these donors, to the point that 
they would collapse without the funding. This dependence often serves to 
undermine an NGO‟s legitimacy to its constituency since they tend to be 
more accountable to foreign donors than to their targeted population ... if the 
NGO has little accountability to its constituency, its claim of representing 
the needs and desires of the poor is significantly undermined‟.  
 
Therefore, Planact failed to prove financial accountability to donors and it had to 
exit Zandspruit. It could not justify its work there due to lack of progress (as 
indicated by both Planact Director and Planact Project Officer). What does this 
mean for Planact‟s accountability to its own mission? In the next section I discuss 
Planact‟s internal accountability. 
 
6.5.4 Internal accountability within the NGO 
 
Planact‟s mission is to „support and mobilise community processes that enhance 
good governance at the local level to improve people‟s habitable environment in 
ways that alleviate poverty‟ (Planact, 2004: i). This includes „a right to the city‟ 
and „facilitating civic empowerment‟ (Planact, 2004). Planact would develop 
annual plans as well as indicate its targeted communities and the objectives or 
goal of working with those communities in order to source funding (Planact 
Director, personal communication: 2007). 
 
An NGO‟s internal accountability is assessed by looking at how members control 
the actions of the organisation, compliance mechanisms regarding the power of 
the organisation in enforcing its decisions, and evaluation processes on how the 
organisation is evaluated and reported on to the public. Social auditing refers to a 
process through which an organisation assesses reports and improves upon its 
social performance and ethical behaviour through stakeholder dialogue (Ebrahim, 
2003). Planact carried out performance assessment and evaluation of its activities 
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to assess the organisation‟s internal accountability through its board of directors. 
Planact‟s Director indicated during an interview that: 
 
„[the] Board has quarterly meetings and scrutinises the financial reports and 
management reports, as well as strategic decisions. There is also a human 
resource committee and a finance committee appointed by the Board. The 
financial committee would interrogate the budget‟ (Planact Director, 
personal communication: 2007).  
 
Although Planact faced challenges in adhering to its objective to be accountable to 
donors financially and by its performance, its project indicated that it was willing 
to work with informal or illegal settlements as this was part of its mission. The 
officer said, „This is our mission - to formalise the areas by using the Constitution 
which says everybody has a right to adequate housing‟.  
 
Although Planact tries to work with communities and meet the stated objectives, 
in some cases, communities are not satisfied with its work. Planact‟s Director 
admitted that, 
 
„[sometimes] there are grievances, as we cannot get to assist all settlements 
due to a lack of resources and staff. We need to communicate this more 
effectively to the communities. For example, we need to start budgeting per 
programme and then budget per community, and try to communicate our 
plans to the community regarding our financial and staff capacity so that 
there are no high expectations from the community‟ (Planact Director, 
personal communication: 2007). 
 
This situation is not unique to Planact and its work in Zandspruit. Kilby (2006), in 
his monitoring of accountability and empowerment in India, concluded that 
although Indian NGOs were aware of the importance of community participation 
and accountability mechanisms, they did not consider these as important in their 
day-to-day activities.  
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6.5.5 Defining Planact’s accountability 
 
The above section discussed Planact‟s multiple accountability to the community, 
government, donors as well as to Planact itself. Amidst these multiple 
accountabilities, the focus of this thesis is on Planact‟s accountability to the 
community. The other accountabilities were discussed to demonstrate the 
accountability dilemma NGOs face and how these influence their role and 
representation of communities‟ interests and needs. Concerning accountability to 
local government, Planact did not face a direct accountability dilemma because at 
the time of Planact‟s engagement at Zandspruit, no government-commissioned 
projects were underway in the Zandspruit. 
 
In terms of Planact‟s internal accountability, Planact indicated that it followed the 
procedures of social auditing, self regulation and performance assessment. But 
Planact‟s ability to implement its mission depended more on donor funding. This 
made it difficult for Planact to adhere to its mission without considering donors‟ 
interests too. Planact staff indicated that in some cases Planact had to adjust its 
mission to suit donors‟ objectives. Accountability to donors was mainly ensured 
by providing financial statements and annual reports.  
 
Assessing Planact‟s accountability to the Zandspruit community using Planact‟s 
performance and disclosure of reports and statements indicate that Planact‟s 
accountability to Zandspruit was limited as indicated in Figure 20. There was no 
significant impact observed in terms of Planact‟s performance. Planact did not 
meet its objectives of working with Zandspruit Private Property. However, the 
residents were still content with the limited impact of Planact‟s performance. This 
was because communities in the marginalised informal settlements, in this case 
Zandspruit, have little power to demand accountability from such an organisation. 
Communities that are not empowered through strong social movements are 
grateful for assistance rendered and are unable to demand accountability. This was 
demonstrated not only by the community satisfaction that was expressed in my 
interviews with regard to the support the community had received from Planact, 
but also by the fact (as explained in my research limitations in Chapter Five), that 
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the interviewees initially hoped to use me to persuade Planact to return. In 
summary then, although Planact disclosed statements and reports, the Zandspruit 
community had no ability to critically look at the reports and question Planact‟s 
performance. 
 
 
Planact’s Limited 
Accountability 
Functional 
Accountability 
Upward 
Accountability 
Patrons/Donors
Disclosure of 
reports & 
statements
Accounting 
for 
resources 
Resource 
use
Performance 
assessment 
Immediate 
impact 
No significant 
performance 
impact 
Limited 
Participation 
Disclosure of 
statements 
reports
Self 
regulation 
Social 
auditing 
Performance 
assessment 
Limited Internal 
Accountability 
Limited 
Download 
accountability 
Internal/External 
stakeholder 
accountability 
 
Communities 
 
Figure 20: Limited accountability to Zandspruit Private Property 
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
To be a legitimate representative according to prescriptive legitimacy as discussed 
in Chapter Two and Three, a representative must ensure participation of the 
represented and accountability to the represented. The discussion shows that, in 
the case of Zandspruit, representation by the local government had challenges. 
With limited representation and participation from government structures, NGOs 
claim the representation of the marginalised communities such as Zandspruit. This 
is where Planact came in to assist Zandspruit community and ensure the 
representation and participation of Zandspruit community in the decision making 
processes. Planact attempted to ensure Zandspruit‟s representation and 
participation in the decision making processes by assisting the community form 
the Joint Committee. As the community could not engage the local government as 
a whole, the Joint Committee role was to represent the Zandspruit community 
engage with government and Planact. The Joint Committee worked side by side 
with the official representative local government structure, namely the ward 
councillor and ward committee. In some situations, Planact also represented the 
community directly to local government and to donors. 
 
The representation processes include participation and accountability. In the case 
of Zandspruit, the community participated in the decision making processes 
through the Joint Committee. The level of participation was mainly informing and 
consulting, which Choguill (1996) and Arnstein (1969) do not consider as real 
participation. In addition to the level of participation, representation and 
participation of the Zandspruit community in decision making processes, its 
influence in decision making at local government and to donors was limited. This 
was mainly due to limited government commitment or will, limited access to 
participation process, power struggles within the Joint Committee and limited 
financial capacity as noted in Figure 19.  
 
Although NGOs claim to represent the interests of the poor, Kilby (2006:952) 
notes that „there is no clearly defined path by which they can be held to account 
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by that constituent (who has little power in the relationship) in how they represent 
those interests‟. Brown and Moore (2001) note that accountability is affected by 
differences in power and some NGOs will tend to be accountable to stakeholders 
with more power. In the case of NGOs, Igoe (2003:868) observes that „NGO 
leaders often derive their power from local people and powerful outsiders. As a 
result, they are torn between the often-unrealistic expectations of their local 
constituents and often-unrealistic demands of their western donors‟.  As a result, 
due to different power pressures from government and donors, although NGO 
accountability to community is important, accountability may be limited, as 
demonstrated in the case of Planact and Zandspruit.  
 
Planact‟s accountability to the community was assessed using its performance and 
the provision of statements and reports. Although Planact attempted to ensure 
accountability to the community by providing reports and statements, this 
accountability to the community was still limited. This is mainly because the 
Zandspruit community lacked the capacity to scrutinise the reports and statements 
of Planact. Planact performance was also limited in terms of assisting the 
community engage local government effectively to access land and housing.  
 
Although Planact‟s performance was limited, the Zandspruit community was 
satisfied with Planact‟s limited performance. Some informal settlement 
communities are desperate for assistance, and accountability from NGOs may not 
be one of their priorities. What do limited representation, participation and 
accountability to the community mean to Planact‟s legitimacy working in 
Zandspruit? As far as the prescriptive approach to legitimacy is concerned, 
Planact cannot readily claim legitimate representation of the Zandspruit 
community. Nevertheless, the community and local government considered 
Planact legitimate in their activities in Zandspruit. Therefore, in Chapter Seven, I 
use a descriptive approach to explore Planact‟s legitimacy. I explore how Planact 
is perceived as being legitimate by the community, government and by Planact 
itself.                                                                                                                                           
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7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN 
BEYOND REPRESENTATION, PARTICIPATION 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY: DESCRIPTIVE 
LEGITIMACY OF PLANACT IN RELATION TO ITS 
WORK IN ZANDSPRUIT 
 
 
This thesis explores how NGO derive legitimacy using representation, 
participation and accountability within the context of informal settlements with 
unresolved tenure insecurity and against a backdrop of multiple accountabilities. 
Chapter Six explored legitimacy via representation, participation and 
accountability and found limited grounds for claims to legitimacy. The question 
then is, when there is no tangible representation, participation and accountability, 
what makes an NGO legitimate? In this chapter, using the descriptive legitimacy I 
present views from Planact, government officials and the Zandspruit community 
on Planact‟s legitimacy as perceived by the Zandspruit community. I first discuss 
why the prescriptive legitimacy provided limited grounds for claim to legitimacy 
as far as Planact‟s work in Zandspruit is concerned. This chapter therefore returns 
to the conceptual framework, explaining why representation, participation and 
accountability were relatively insignificant in the actual construction of Planact‟s 
legitimacy. 
  
7.1 The challenging context of unresolved tenure and 
marginalisation 
 
It has been shown that Planact claimed its initial legitimacy from its offer to assist 
the community through its representation structures to more effectively engage 
with local government in the pursuit of improved living conditions. However, this 
study demonstrates that, unresolved tenure and marginalisation in informal 
settlements blunted Planact‟s claim to prescriptive/normative legitimacy through 
representation, participation and accountability. The illegal occupation of the land 
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in particular, limited the applicability of this conceptual framework in 
demonstrating Planact‟s legitimacy. 
 
From a normative or prescriptive approach to legitimacy, Planact could be judged 
to have limits to its legitimacy because there was limited accountability to the 
Zandspruit community and limited representation of, and participation by, the 
Zandspruit community in decision-making processes (Figure 21). Whereas a 
simplistic, normative analysis would conclude that Planact was not legitimate, the 
organisation did enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant stakeholders as 
discussed in relation to Planact‟s morally derived legitimacy below. While my 
findings indicate that Planact is legitimate in the eyes of the Zandspruit Private 
Property community, this is not to suggest that the respondents from Zandspruit 
Private Property were simplistic in their thinking. Several community members 
were aware that the illegality of the occupation or the problem of occupying 
private land was the main obstacle to permanent development or upgrading of 
Zandspruit Private Property. 
 
Planact‟s legitimacy using representation, participation and accountability has 
been explored in the challenging context of unresolved tenure and 
marginalisation. This context presented limits to the applicability of 
representation, participation and accountability as variables in justifying Planact‟s 
legitimacy.  For example, Zandspruit community saw itself as being marginalised 
by local government due to lack of support from the government because the 
community occupies the land illegally. This unauthorised occupation has created 
challenges that limited Planact‟s legitimacy according to the prescriptive 
approach.  
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Figure 21: Planact not legitimate according to prescriptive/normative approach to 
legitimacy 
 
One of Planact‟s reasons for exiting Zandspruit Private Property was that it was 
taking too long to resolve or legalise the settlement. Indeed Planact‟s director 
explained that the municipality was taking too long to acquire the land from 
private owners so that development could take place. The fact that Zandspruit 
Private Property residents were occupying the land illegally made it difficult to 
undertake development in the settlement. Zandspruit‟s informal occupation could 
not be regularised in a reasonable period of time, and power struggles within the 
Zandspruit Private Property leadership created challenges for Planact‟s. Planact 
felt that there was no meaningful progress with the government efforts of 
acquiring land for the community. Therefore, Planact felt its resources were being 
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spent with no real progress to justify and account to donors and to itself as an 
organisation. The Planact Project Officer specifically stated that donors do not 
want to fund projects that are not showing positive results.  
 
Committee members and residents explained that due to the illegal occupation of 
the land in Zandspruit Private Property, the government had marginalised them 
and this was why development was taking too long. For example, Moyo (personal 
communication, 2007) stated that,  
 
„as a community, we cannot move forward in terms of development, 
because we do not know where we stand with land. We need to get clarity 
on where we stand and how far the process is. We have written letters to 
Region C with no answers. Now the next move is going to the municipality, 
premier, and then the president‟s office. [Before Planact assisted us] We 
have even tried to toyi toyi on Beyers Naude road to show government we 
are here and we have problems‟. 
 
Some community members and Planact saw the unresolved tenure as a reason for 
the limited participation of the Zandspruit community in decision making 
processes. The unresolved tenure issue was also given as a reason for the lack of 
government support in developing the area. A community member indicated that 
the local government „… keep on saying we are on private property and there is 
nothing they can do for us now‟ (Dlamini, personal communication: 2007). A 
former Joint Committee member (who is now an adviser to the Joint Committee) 
also saw the community‟s challenges in the participation processes as resulting 
from the fact that they are located on privately owned land. She explained that, 
 
„[most] development projects in Zandspruit are in the Transit Camp area, 
which is on government-owned land. The community on the private land 
gets to hear about the projects in the Transit Camp through ANC general 
meetings in the area; we were advised to seek employment from the 
different projects.  The only projects on the private land have been the 
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provision of public water taps, VIP toilets and high mast lights‟ (Moyo, 
personal communication: 2007).  
 
Whereas the community feels being on private property limits its ability to 
participate, the local government does not think so. When asked whether the 
unauthorised occupation of Zandspruit limits its chances to participate, a Project 
Manager, City of Johannesburg (personal communication: 2007), said,  
 
„[their] illegality does not affect their participation in government policies. 
We want them to participate because if they do not, they will do as they 
please. Working hand in hand with the community is important‟. 
 
However, Project Manager, City of Johannesburg insisted that there was no 
marginalisation (personal communication: 2007). Although government officials 
do not acknowledge the unresolved tenure issue as a big problem, there is 
continued marginalisation of communities that occupy land informally by the 
government.  
 
This stand by the government is in sharp contrast to the views of Planact which 
sees the illegality of the settlement as a hindrance to the community‟s 
participation. Planact‟s project officer (personal communication, 2007) explained 
that: 
 
„[in] Finetown [another informal settlement] we wanted to invite them [the 
residents] for the IDP review process but they could not participate because 
they were not included in the IDP processes. They did not participate in IDP 
processes at all‟.  
 
The Planact project officer (personal communication, 2007) also noted that,  
 
„[Zandspruit] does not participate in any IDP processes. Their representation 
is also limited. That is why development of these areas is very slow. As 
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Planact, we wish a time would come when informal settlement communities 
would be involved in the mainstream decision making‟. 
 
The community feels that being on privately owned land limits its ability to 
participate and engage the government to improve housing and access to basic 
services. Masondo (personal communication, 2007) indicated that, „what delays 
development is the problem of land and the government is taking too long to 
address the problem of access to land‟. Dlamini (personal communication, 2007), 
stated that „illegality affects development a lot because the shacks are mixed up 
with no roads and the government cannot develop the area as they have to buy the 
land first. And the municipality is supposed to help us, but for now they are not 
helping us, as they keep on saying we are on private property and there is nothing 
they can do for us‟. This argument was supported by another community member 
Malope (personal communication, 2007) who shared his insight that, „Private 
Property has different owners and this makes development in the area difficult. 
The illegality of this area causes problems in terms of developing the area as it is 
difficult to put infrastructure on the illegal land. As the result, government has 
problems putting water tanks in the settlements while the land owners do not 
agree with government‟. 
 
Although some community members felt occupying the land illegally is the 
reason for lack of development, some community members do not believe their 
illegal occupation should stop the government from developing the area. They felt 
the government was just marginalising. They maintained that if the government 
was serious about assisting them, it was possible to develop the area despite its 
illegality. For example, Zamani (personal communication, 2007) noted that, 
„being on private property is not a problem for developing the area. We need 
houses, the place is really dirty and people get sick. We need government 
assistance‟.  This is supported by Lunga (personal communication, 2007), who 
stated that, „although we are on private property and we have no title deed to the 
land we occupy. We believe the government should assist with the development 
of the area. It makes it difficult for us to get the services. Government could assist 
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by providing houses; it will address many problems like fires which burn a lot of 
houses‟. 
 
I discussed with local government officials the fact that the Zandspruit community 
is feeling marginalised by the government and that they saw this as a reason for 
the limited development in the area. Local government officials indicated to me 
that they do not regard the Zandspruit community as marginalised in any 
particular way because it is on private land. The Zandspruit Area Manager 
(personal communication, 2007) did not agree that being on private land limits 
participation of communities. However, the government official expressed the 
local government‟s real concern in relation to Zandspruit, namely that the 
government wants to work with the community in order to stop Zandspruit Private 
Property from growing in terms of construction of new shacks. The Zandspruit 
Area Manager (personal communication, 2007) explained that  
 
„we would like the Zandspruit community to be involved and formalise the 
area. Being on private property does not compromise their ability to 
participate. We are not happy when people in informal settlement bring 
more and more people in the settlement. We want the community to assist in 
developing the area‟.  
 
Yet, change, densification and expansion are inherent characteristics of informal 
settlements. Government officials appeared unwilling to acknowledge this and 
could be seen as wishing away the reality of informality. Nevertheless the 
government officials agreed that the illegality of the settlement was an obstacle to 
development (Area Manager, City of Johannesburg, personal communication, 
2007).  
 
In addition to the unresolved tenure security of Zandspruit Private Property and 
the lack of government support as a reason for delayed development and limiting 
Planact performance in Zandspruit, some community members in Zandspruit 
believed that  the delay in development  was mainly due to lack of local 
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government support and lack of political interest.  A Section One Community 
Leader noted that,  
 
„[it] has taken long to develop the area, because the previous ward 
councillor [from the opposition party, the Democratic Alliance] was not 
interested in the area. We had no one representing us to the government. 
This is why there was delay in development. But with the new ward 
councillor [ANC] things are moving and we can see light at the end of the 
tunnel‟ (Section One Community Leader, personal communication: 2007). 
 
A Section Three community Leader added, „[when] the ANC came into the area 
last year [2006], that‟s when a little development began. So far we are happy with 
the progress the ANC is making in terms of development of the area‟. 
 
The development the community member is referred to in the area was the 
provision of VIP toilets and public water taps. In 2009, the government finally 
had a programme of purchasing the illegally occupied land for further 
development. It is not clear, though, whether Planact‟s work in the area in 2002-
2003 assisted in getting the wheels in motion for this achievement, or whether it 
was going to happen even if Planact had not worked with the community. It was 
difficult to establish this causality. The community believed the program was due 
to the change in the ward councillor. This gave hope to the community although 
the process is still taking a long time. The new ward councillor indicated that,  
 
„[the] delay in development in Zandspruit is mainly due to the slow process 
of acquiring land. Also, the Johannesburg Property Agency is trying to get 
land from farmers but farmers are asking for very high prices and the plots 
are too pricey for the government‟ (Maureen, personal communication: 
2007). 
 
Although there was a promise to assist the Zandspruit community through 
purchase of the land, provision of title deeds, services and housing, Zandspruit 
224 
 
Private Property had been ignored by local government for many years in terms of 
access to housing. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Zandspruit Private 
Property was provided with communal stand pipes and VIP toilets which many 
other informal settlements in Johannesburg did not have. 
 
Even though interim development had been forthcoming after Planact‟s exit from 
Zandspruit, representation of Zandspruit Private Property community in decision 
making processes remains limited due to the implementation of the ward system. 
By 2007, the community still felt marginalised. This marginalisation and lack of 
support from local government seemed to create desperation for assistance from 
NGOs. Whether the representation that Planact had facilitated in 2002-2003 had 
been effective in securing development, the community continued to look for 
more assistance.  This explains the expectations from the community that my 
research would help motivate Planact to return and assist the Joint Committee. 
However, the Zandspruit Private Property community was in no position to 
question whether Planact achieved effective representation, participation and 
accountability. This leads to a more detailed presentation how Planact‟s 
legitimacy is perceived by its stakeholders and itself. 
 
Planact‟s legitimacy at Zandspruit in Chapter Three, was discussed that under the 
prescriptive/normative approach to legitimacy an organisation can claim 
legitimacy morally using representation, participation and accountability. 
Information from the fieldwork in this thesis indicates that organisations can 
construct legitimacy morally without directly using representation, participation 
and accountability as indicated in Figure 22. Using a descriptive approach to 
legitimacy, I discuss how Planact‟s legitimacy is perceived by the community, 
government and Planact itself. There would have been one more dimension to 
explore in relation to Planact‟s descriptive legitimacy, namely how donors 
perceive Planact‟s legitimacy. However, due to the precarious funding context and 
the potential of my research findings in Zandspruit to be interpreted in an 
undermining way by donors, I did not find it appropriate to include interviews 
with Planact‟s donors in my research. 
225 
 
 
7.2 Planact’s views on its own legitimacy 
 
Planact perceived itself as a morally legitimate organisation through the 
combination of its work across different settlements, its expertise, its historical 
legitimacy, the media attention it attracted as well as its success in facilitating 
representation of marginalised communities in the decision making processes at 
local government level as set out in Figure 22.  
 
Planact had been in existence for the past 20 years as a development NGO 
working on different urban challenges including community participation and 
development in informal settlements. This provided Planact with a form of 
historical legitimacy as there was credibility created by people who acted in the 
name of the organisation. Planact was also seen as legitimate through its 
publication of its activities in annual report, Planact‟s website as well as its book 
Making Towns and Cities Work for People: Planact in South Africa: 1985-2005, 
which reflects on Planact‟s history as a development NGO in South Africa, made 
the organisation visible. In this book, Planact took stock of its experience in order 
to highlight its real achievements and reinforce key principles and values of the 
organisation In addition, „[Planact] staff would attend workshops and seminars to 
raise the organisation‟s profile‟ (Planact Project Officer, personal communication, 
2007). Although there is limited literature on how NGOs use the media to 
improve or construct their legitimacy, there is no denying that the internet, 
publications and reports enable an organisation construct its legitimacy. In 
addition, Planact maintains that the work it had been doing in different informal 
settlement communities attributed to its being legitimate. Planact Project Officer 
indicated that what makes Planact legitimate,  
 
„[is] the work we have done for different communities. For example, in 
Diepsloot there were many organisations each claiming to represent the 
community. Within a year we managed to unite them and work together as a 
CDF. In these cases, they saw us as the Messiah. This makes communities 
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see Planact as effective in their work/role within communities and therefore 
legitimate as an organisation‟. 
 
Planact also indicated that its legitimacy could be shown through its expertise. 
Planact skills included project management abilities of its staff. Such expertise 
could be employed to assist communities, such as in leadership training. „Planact 
is able to open doors to community as we are better positioned to do research‟ 
(Planact Project Officer, personal communication: 2007). Such research can lead 
to better approaches or strategies the government could implement to improve the 
lives of marginalised communities in informal settlements (Planact Director, 
personal communication, 2007). Planact‟s Director further indicated that 
 
„[the] expertise we offer the community makes us legitimate. We are not 
[directly] representing communities; we just assist the communities to 
represent themselves. We are facilitators between community and local 
government, for the issues to be dealt with in a democratic process‟ (Planact 
Director, personal communication: 2007). 
 
Although in most cases Planact rarely represented communities directly to 
government, Planact still saw itself as legitimate in representing marginalised 
communities. Planact‟s representation of communities Zandspruit was by 
facilitating representation as well as through „substantive representation‟ (when 
representatives take action on behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of and as 
a substitute for the represented). By speaking for the poor in this case, Planact 
represented informal settlements by writing funding proposals and formulating 
policies.  
 
Planact facilitated the representation and participation of Zandspruit 
community by assisting the community form representative structures to 
engage government effectively. Planact also promoted and advocated the needs 
and rights of Zandspruit community. This was one of the visions of Planact in 
assisting Zandspruit marginalised communities (Planact‟s Annual Report 2004: 
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i). This type of representation falls under Pitkin‟s substantive representation in 
terms of NGOs advancing policies that serve the needs of represented, or what 
Bebbington (2005:938) calls  
 
„[representation] that speak[s] of poor people and their livelihoods rather 
than representation that speak[s] for poor people. These representations 
occur in various spheres: casual discussion, project documents, policy and 
strategic statements, information gathering, monitoring and evaluation 
system‟.  
 
Hence, Planact‟s own sense of legitimacy was derived from many sources, 
including its successful activities in other marginalised communities. Planact also 
believes that its exit from Zandspruit did not undermine its legitimacy. Moreover, 
the experience in Zandspruit may not have been very important to Planact‟s 
overall perception of its own legitimacy, because Planact derive its sense of 
legitimacy primarily from successful work in other settlements. Planact Project 
Officer explained that,  
 
„its the work that we have done for different communities that makes us 
legitimate. For example, in Diepsloot there were many organisations that 
claimed to represent the community. Within a year we managed to unit [the 
community] and work together as a CDF‟ (Planact Project Officer, personal 
communication: 2007).  
 
It appears that this is why it was „easy‟ for Planact to exit Zandspruit. Planact sees 
the Zandspruit experience as a lesson which can be used to improve on its 
activities in different communities.  Planact commissioned a report in 2006 („Re-
membering Planact: Report on ‘the Planact Way’) on Zandspruit‟s development 
trajectory, indicating the challenges the organisation faced while working with the 
community. In addition, Planact‟s Director (2008) also stated that,  
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„[in] June 2006 and July 2007, the organisation has been training the 
[Planact] staff on strategic planning and highlighting areas of community 
development that the organisation needs to work with, and training in entry 
and exit strategy for the staff to feel comfortable beginning work in the 
communities‟ (Planact Director, personal communication: 2008). 
 
Further, Planact‟s project officer indicated that, in order to improve the 
legitimacy of Planact in the eyes of community, donors and government, „With 
communities, we go out there and do our level best for them to see we are 
delivering what we promise, so that they see us as legitimate structure. We 
work very hard to earn it‟ (Planact Project Officer, personal communication: 
2007).  
 
Planact‟s Project Officer further indicated that to improve Planact‟s legitimacy in 
the community, more staff and financial resources would be required, as these 
constraints limit Planact‟s performance: „We wish we had more staff so that we 
do not disappoint communities. Also lack of financial resources limits us‟ (Planact 
Project Officer, personal communication: 2007). 
 
7.3 Government officials’ views on Planact’s legitimacy 
 
The local government officials I interviewed see NGOs and their activities as 
legitimate because of the assistance some NGOs provide to government (Figure 
22). For example, one local government official indicated that although, in their 
view, some NGOs might be overstepping their boundaries in some of their roles, 
the government still sees NGOs‟ role in the community as important (Zandspruit 
Area Manager, personal communication: 2007). Government sees the role of 
NGOs as being the watchdog of community. Zandspruit Area Manager from 
Region C, argued that, 
 
„[some] NGOs might be overstepping in some of their roles but as 
government we need them especially in Zandspruit, as NGOs volunteer to 
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assist communities and this is helpful to government and makes them 
[NGOs] legitimate. I have not experienced the not so legitimate NGOs‟ 
(Zandspruit Area Manager, personal communication: 2007). 
 
One official argued that government does not see NGOs as „gap fillers‟ as the 
government can reach anywhere. Instead, this official saw NGOs as playing a 
facilitating role between community and government. The Project Manager City 
of Johannesburg for Region C noted that,  
 
„[NGOs] are the watchdogs of the community; they look at what the 
government is doing and inform people of what the government is doing. 
They are also the voice of community. We have a good relationship with 
NGOs‟ (The Project Manager City of Johannesburg, personal 
communication, 2007). 
 
My analysis from the interviews with government officials suggest that 
government officials assume that NGOs are playing an important role in 
marginalised communities. The mistaken assumption from government officials is 
however, that there are many NGOs working in informal settlements by, for 
example, assisting communities engage with government more effectively. 
Zandspruit Area Manager (personal communication: 2007) pointed out that 
„NGOs assist in training community members in leadership skills and it makes our 
jobs easier‟.   
 
During Planact‟s work in Zandspruit and during the time of this research, there 
were no other development NGOs working with Zandspruit community in terms 
of capacity building or facilitation of effective community engagement with 
government. The assumption is 
 
„[NGOs] assist in training community members in leadership skills and it 
makes our jobs easier. They also assist in terms of disasters like fires, 
providing counselling, clothes, food and they mobilise the community to 
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undergo training in preventing fires‟ (Zandspruit Area Manager City of 
Johannesburg, personal communication, 2007). 
.  
According to government officials interviewed, the role NGOs play in 
communities should provide NGOs with legitimacy. These respondents also saw 
NGOs playing a facilitating role in improving communication between 
government and community. This makes government‟s task easier when dealing 
with community. When the relationship between government and the NGO is not 
confrontational, NGOs do not suffer legitimacy challenges from the government. 
Planact appeared to have had non-confrontational relationship with Region C 
government officials because it was perceived as assisting informal settlement 
communities by training them in leadership skills and capacity building. Indeed 
the Planact Director (personal communication: 2007) indicated that,  
 
„[this] year provincial local government called us to train the ward 
committee in three districts of Gauteng. This indicates the view of 
government towards Planact‟s legitimacy as they want us to train‟ (Planact 
Director, personal communication: 2007). 
 
The role NGOs play in the communities differs from one NGO to the next. NGOs 
that are oppositional or challenge the government and therefore have a 
confrontational relationship with government are not seen as legitimate. This 
research revealed that government viewed Planact as legitimate, and therefore 
commissioned it to train the political representatives. One government official 
commented on Planact training saying  
 
„it provided good leadership training and Planact should have posted 
someone there [Zandspruit] who the government can call upon to assist‟ 
(Zandspruit Area Manager, personal communication: 2007). 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the government officials saw 
Planact as a legitimate organisation in „representing‟ the Zandspruit community. 
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Although Planact did not set out to assist government as such, the officials 
perceived Planact‟s work in Zandspruit to have assisted local government 
engaging with the community. Further, Planact helped Zandspruit represent itself, 
and also represented and acted substantively, and local government officials 
therefore saw Planact as representing communities. Views from interviewed 
government officials on whether they see Planact or other NGOs as legitimate are 
important, because NGOs operate within an environment in which government 
plays an important role. Planact demonstrated that it values being seen as a 
legitimate NGO in the eyes of government, because this improves the working 
environment for Planact. Planact Project Officer (personal communication, 2007) 
noted that „sometimes NGOs are not trusted, so there is need to work hard at 
developing relationships with local government‟. It is important to note that 
Planact also depended on government support to succeed in its objectives of 
assisting the Zandspruit community acquire land and housing. However, it did not 
succeed in achieving this.  
 
The government officials‟ views on Planact‟s legitimacy relate to the relationship 
between NGOs and the government in South Africa in general. As noted in 
Chapter Four, many NGOs in South Africa work in partnership with or for 
government. It has also been observed by Dicklitch (1998:25) that in Uganda, the 
„regime attempts to co-opt NGOs into its national development strategy, so that 
NGOs are vehicles of National Resistance Movement (NRM)-inspired and led 
development. This detracts from the ability of NGOs, particularly indigenous 
NGOs, to provide an alternative source of influence or accountability to the 
regime‟. Dicklitch (1998:24) explains that this occurs more in „states with little 
legitimacy [and therefore] highly suspicious of NGO activities‟. This is not the 
situation in South Africa as the government is perceived as relatively legitimate in 
terms of the various subsidies it extends to the development of the community. 
Planact relationship with government through its commissioned work and its 
simultaneous aim of unlocking government commitments for Zandspruit 
community cannot be seen directly as co-optation. Planact‟s approach to its work 
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in informal settlements, as exemplified in the Zandspruit case and the descriptive 
legitimacy it enjoys, must be understood in this context. 
 
7.4 Zandspruit community - Planact’s legitimacy  
 
Zandspruit community leaders and members saw the legitimacy of Planact 
through the perceived benefits the community derived from Planact (Figure 22). 
These benefits included leadership training, capacity building and assistance in 
the formation of the Joint Committee (JC). The training gave the community an 
ability to engage with government. 
 
Planact, though, was not very successful at Zandspruit as its efforts could not 
result in acquisition of the private land. The latter was the reason Planact 
withdrew from the community. Planact, in addition, did not have a clear mandate 
in the Zandspruit community it was not subject to formal accountability demands 
from the community. As a result, the failure to achieve access to land, services 
and housing does not seem to have affected Planact‟s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
community. Most of the community members and leaders I spoke to believed 
Planact made a positive difference in the community. There was a general 
agreement on the contribution Planact had made to the Zandspruit community. 
For example, the Joint Committee adviser, who was in the initial Joint Committee 
when it was formed, Moyo, said that  
 
„[Planact] helped form the Joint Committee, provided training, workshops, 
phoning ... engaging with government, money for transport for training. The 
training was mainly on leadership, provided workshops on xenophobia. 
[Planact also] provided leadership training because people didn‟t understand 
what it meant to be a leader and there was a lot of conflict in trying to form 
the Joint Committee. The training Planact provided helped a lot‟. 
 
A community leader from Section One indicated that „any NGO that promises to 
help the community is allowed to work with the community‟ (personal 
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communication; 2007). Although the residents indicated their collective 
willingness to work with any organisation for the sake of developing their 
community, there is no queue of NGOs approaching the Zandspruit community to 
help develop the area. With the community feeling marginalised by the 
government and no NGOs willing to assist them, this created a sense of 
desperation. It is not surprising that the Zandspruit community still felt Planact 
was legitimate even though Planact was not returning to assist the community 
access development. This underlined the community‟s desperation for assistance 
and explains why in part Planact could enter and exit the community without 
facing legitimacy challenges or without the community perceiving Planact as not 
being legitimate. 
 
Joint Committee members pointed out that all they require for an NGO to 
commence work with the community is information on what the NGO wants to do 
in the community. Section Two community leader indicated, „We agreed for 
Planact to come in, because the community is desperate for development‟. This 
view was supported by one community member, Zungu saying, 
 
„[yes], we agreed for Planact to work in the community. We agreed, because 
we needed help. Planact offered training on leadership. They were mainly 
working with community leaders. Planact‟s role was very important in the 
community‟ (Zungu, personal communication: 2007). 
 
However, the training of the Zandspruit leadership was not able to overcome the 
power struggle in the JC, and when Planact left the community, representation of 
the Zandspruit community was minimal. As Section Four community leader 
indicated that,  
 
„the Joint Committee is not that active now [2007] due to differences in 
community leaders as people fight for power and not development. People 
used to be happy with Joint Committee but now they are not happy due to 
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the infighting between leaders‟ (Section Four Community Leader, personal 
communication: 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, Section Two community leader agreed on the continued legitimacy 
of Planact‟s work in their community saying,  
 
„They do have a right to work in our community, because they gave us 
direction on how to engage with government. Before, we didn‟t know where 
to start talking to government‟ (Section Two Leader, personal 
communication, 2007).  
 
Planact was seen as bringing valuable skills to the community and promoting 
Zandspruit Private Property‟s interests, therefore the Zandspruit community saw 
the organisation as legitimate. Even though the Zandspruit community sees 
Planact as legitimate, Planact did not achieve a major impact in terms of 
development. It must be noted though that although Planact did not achieve 
development in the case of Zandspruit, it did not fail entirely. Planact achieved 
empowerment through training and this seem to have had a lasting effect in the 
eyes of the community. It is just that the broader aim of development could not be 
achieved, and therefore Planact decided not to continue the very effective support 
it was giving to the community leadership and also in making office facilities 
available. 
 
7.5 Planact’s descriptive legitimacy in a nutshell 
 
In the perception of its stakeholders, this study found that, by applying the 
descriptive approach to legitimacy, Planact faced no legitimacy challenges. It has 
been shown that Planact drew on the normative framework of legitimacy, in 
particular, representation and participation to explain its own perception of its 
legitimacy. Planact sees itself as legitimate, due to representation, the expertise 
offered to marginalised communities, and its performance in work done in other 
settlements. Planact used its website, reports and publications to construct or 
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portray this legitimacy to the outside world. The government officials saw Planact 
as legitimate because Planact was regarded as playing a facilitating role between 
communities and government. Views from government and Planact show 
perceptible reasons why Planact should be seen as legitimate. In the case of the 
community, there is nothing really discernible (other than training) to show why 
the community should regard Planact as legitimate.  
 
Planact’s own 
legitimacy
Planact’s 
legitimacy from 
government
Planact’s 
legitimacy from 
community
Planact’s descriptive 
legitimacy
History
MediaRepresentation
Expertise
Work in other 
informal 
settlements
Leadership trainingJoint Committee
Improved relations 
with community
Work done in 
communities
Capacity Building
 
Figure 22: Planact descriptive legitimacy in the context of its work in Zandspruit 
Private Property 
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The leadership training and capacity building (with the formation of Joint 
Committee as a representative structure) that Planact provided, was much 
appreciated by the community and the government, but did not help unblock 
tenure security or entice the government to secure the private land on which the 
community had settled. Although Planact‟s performance was limited, Planact was 
still seen as legitimate by government and Zandspruit community as set out in 
Figure 22.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the findings on the descriptive legitimacy of Planact. 
Planact‟s legitimacy was explored in the context of unresolved tenure and 
marginalisation. My analysis of how Planact‟s legitimacy is perceived in relation 
to its work in Zandspruit Private Property indicates that Planact faced no 
challenges to its legitimacy despite having exited Zandspruit without achieving 
development.  
 
The local government welcomed Planact‟s activities in Zandspruit because of the 
assistance Planact provided to the local government. Providing training to 
Zandspruit‟s leadership and assisting the community form the Joint Committee 
enabled the local government to engage with the Zandspruit community in a an 
effective manner. The community also saw Planact as legitimate because of the 
assistance Planact provided in leadership training and the formation of the Joint 
Committee. Although the Joint Committee had its internal challenges, which 
Planact was supporting it (and beyond) it was more effective in engaging with 
local government that the community.   
 
The illegal occupation of the private land resulted in the failure of the government 
to access land and housing for the community. Although Planact left the 
Zandspruit community without meeting the community‟s expectations, there 
remained hope in the community that Planact would return and help them address 
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their development problems. Planact still enjoys legitimacy in Zandspruit: The 
Joint Committee appears to be useful (despite power struggles and other 
limitations) beyond Planact‟s exit in 2003. The mere fact that the structure still 
existed in 2007 (when the interviews were conducted) suggests that Planact‟s 
initiative was significant. 
 
The unresolved tenure and marginalisation suggest limits in a 
normative/prescriptive approach to assessing Planact‟s legitimacy in relation to its 
work in Zandspruit. The normative framework indicates that NGO legitimacy 
depends on representation, participation and accountability. In reality, few poor 
communities get to participate in decision-making processes because they do not 
demand their right to participate (Cavill and Sohail, 2004). In the case of 
Zandspruit, being marginalised and desperate for assistance, the community had 
no basis to demand a higher level of representation, participation and 
accountability from Planact. Planact was also seen as legitimate by government 
officials, Planact itself and Zandspruit community.  
 
Although Zandspruit did not make any significant inroads into accessing land, or 
housing to the community, the Zandspruit community was satisfied with the 
training and community organisation provided by Planact. The training gave the 
community a sense of being more effective in its dealing with local government. 
In the context of marginalisation and insecurity of tenure, it was difficult for an 
under-resourced development NGO such as Planact to continue working with 
Zandspruit community. This was because the ability to assist the community to 
access basic services depended on legalisation of the occupation and there was no 
foreseeable progress on this front. This indicates that there is more at stake in the 
construction of NGO legitimacy in the context of unresolved tenure and 
marginalisation than the normative framework of representation, participation and 
accountability suggest. The question remains, what this means in terms of NGOs‟ 
claim to representing marginalised communities? This is discussed in Chapter 
Eight.   
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8.0 CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
Apartheid policies resulted in shortages of housing for impoverished black urban 
households. This pushed many such households into informal settlements (Adgate 
et al., 2008). Although since 1994 the democratic government has attempted to 
address the informal settlement problem through mass delivery of subsidised 
housing, there is still a growing number of urban households living in informal 
settlements (City of Johannesburg Council, 2004, Gauteng Department of 
Housing, 2005). Informal settlements are considered illegal or unlawful and this is 
one of the several factors that contribute to their marginalisation. Government 
policies and strategies dealing with informal settlements have mostly been 
negative, as these settlements are viewed as something that needs to be removed 
and replaced. Where strategies and policies have sought to support and integrate 
informal settlements, these have not been implemented effectively. 
 
According to the review of public goods theory, contract failure theory and 
functionalist theory in Chapter Three, NGOs exist to provide services and 
represent interests of the societies that are not provided for by the government and 
market. Often the existence of NGOs depends on their particular political 
relationship with government and availability of financial resources (Tvedt, 
1998). At global level, the influence NGOs in the approaches of global 
governance bodies has increased with the increased number of NGOs working in 
developing countries (Igoe, 2003; Hearn, 2007; Idahosa, 2008). This raises 
questions regarding NGO legitimacy. In defending themselves NGOs claim 
legitimacy through their role in representing the needs of marginalised 
communities (Atack, 1999; Edwards, 2003; Upadhyay, 2003; McDonalds, 2004). 
 
My interest in exploring the legitimacy of development NGOs arose from the 
growing number of questions around the legitimacy that NGOs derive from 
representing communities (Frantz, 1987; Ebrahim, 2003; Upadhyay, 2003; Brown 
and Jagadananda, 2007). Given that NGOs are normatively seen to be effective in 
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representing marginalised communities‟ needs and interests, and derive a 
prescriptive/normative legitimacy from this, I found it important to explore how 
development NGOs derive legitimacy when working in marginalised settlements, 
facing development obstacles that relate to unresolved tenure insecurity. This 
thesis explored whether the prescriptive approach to legitimacy is applicable in 
the context of unresolved tenure. 
 
Using a South African development NGO, Planact, I explored how a particular 
NGO constructed its legitimacy using representation, participation and 
accountability in the context of unresolved tenure in the Zandspruit Private 
Property informal settlement, located in the outskirts of Johannesburg. The 
governance context of this single case study is typical of the situation across 
South Africa. Mohamed‟s (2006) research examined challenges in involving 
informal settlement communities in decision making processes in the IDP in 
Johannesburg. Huchzermeyer (2009) notes the limited chance informal settlement 
communities have in influencing or shaping the decision making processes. One 
reason why informal settlements communities are not able to participate 
effectively in decision making is the ward system through which they ought to be 
represented. The ward system of representation is not a suitable means to 
represent marginalised communities in the informal settlements, because in many 
cases the ward councillor is from the formal part of the ward and represents those 
interests. In a situation of competing community interests, ward councillors tend 
to be biased towards communities in formal areas. In addition, ward councillors 
are not fulltime political office bearers and this limits their ability to engage and 
represent communities effectively (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008).  
 
Development NGOs working in marginalised communities attempt to help these 
communities exploit existing governance structures. These NGOs assist 
marginalised communities engage with government to secure service delivery. As 
far as security of tenure and access to services is concerned, this thesis, through 
the Zandspruit Private Property case study, explored to what extent development 
NGOs derive legitimacy from their activities in the informal settlements. The case 
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study explored the extent to which Planact succeeded in representing the actual 
interests, needs and aspirations of the Zandspruit informal settlement community. 
In this respect, Planact‟s role in facilitating improved community representation 
was explored. There was some evidence of Planact‟s direct representation of the 
community‟s needs to local government. Planact‟s challenges in constructing 
legitimacy using representation, participation and accountability in the context of 
unresolved tenure were also explored. 
 
NGO legitimacy in this thesis has been explored from the prescriptive/normative 
as well as descriptive perspective. The review of studies on the prescriptive or 
normative approach to legitimacy indicates that NGOs generally derive legitimacy 
through representation of marginalised communities that are largely neglected by 
government and/ have little interest to the market (Tvedt, 1998; Edwards, 2003; 
Upadhyay, 2003; McDonalds, 2004; Atack, 1999). To claim legitimate 
representation, NGOs must ensure that represented communities participate in the 
decision-making process of the NGO, such as those on community‟s interests and 
needs to be represented to government or donors. The NGO must also maintain a 
form of accountability to the community. Most authors refer to a range of 
participation from real participation to negligible levels of participation, 
depending on the relationship between the outsider, whether NGO or government, 
and the community. This relationship is influenced by the balance of power 
between the outsider and the NGO. Other factors include government support, 
community willingness to contribute resources for the participation process as 
well as community homogeneity and the differing needs of the community and 
outsiders (Abbott, 1996; Choguill, 1996; Imparato and Ruster, 2003).  
 
Mechanisms for ensuring an organisation is accountable to the represented include 
a demonstration of the representative and stakeholder accountability. From the 
review of theories on NGO legitimacy, I created a conceptual framework to 
explore whether the same approach could be used to explain Planact‟s legitimacy 
in the Zandspruit informal settlement.  
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I conducted field work exploring how Planact constructed representation in the 
Zandspruit informal settlement by ensuring participation and accountability, and 
to what extent Planact derived legitimacy from this. This analysis indicated that 
Planact did attempt to generate representation, participation and accountability at 
Zandspruit Private Property to a limited success.  According to the literature on 
NGO legitimacy, limited accountability, participation and representation means 
the NGO is not a legitimate representative of the community it claims to serve or 
represent. Normative/prescriptive legitimacy through representation, participation 
and accountability are not sufficient on their own in constructing the legitimacy of 
NGOs in relation to their work in informal settlements. Descriptive legitimacy in 
terms of the perception of the main stakeholders, in this case, the Zandspruit 
community and the local government, created Planact‟s legitimacy working in 
Zandspruit. This is mainly because in the informal settlement communities there 
are limitations in the application of representation, participation and 
accountability in constructing NGO legitimacy.  This initial finding led me to 
explore more deeply how various stakeholders perceived Planact‟s legitimacy.  
 
Descriptive legitimacy explored the legitimacy of Planact as seen by government, 
Planact and the community. Government had its own motives or reasons for 
seeing Planact as legitimate. The government officials thought Planact was 
legitimate through the training it conducted for the informal settlement 
community members. This was seen to improve the engagement between local 
government and the community. The capacity and leadership training also enabled 
effective engagement of the community and the local government. Despite the 
exit from Zandspruit without achieving its objectives, Planact still considers itself 
legitimate. This relates to its history of successful work in other informal 
settlements, Planact expertise, as well as the commissions it receives from 
government (which continues to recognise the value that Planact adds to society in 
general).  
 
Zandspruit community saw Planact as a legitimate organisation partly because 
Planact had no clearly agreed-upon mandate for its work in Zandspruit. My 
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respondents in the community believed that the training provided by Planact 
assisted the community in engaging the government, and if only Planact could 
stay longer they could have assisted the community further.  
  
The Zandspruit community felt marginalised by the local government, attributing 
the poor living conditions to the protracted illegality of the occupation or the 
inability to secure the land tenure to neglect by government. Zandspruit did not 
demand higher levels of representation, participation and accountability from 
Planact, the organisation that it felt was already assisting it significantly. Also, 
given a prolonged experience of not receiving assistance from the local 
government or any other organisation, the community could not ask for more 
from Planact. A large number of informal settlements in Johannesburg did not 
received assistance at all from development NGOs, volunteers or even wider 
grassroots social movements. Hence, the Zandspruit Private Property community 
was in no position to question Planact‟s accountability, participation or 
representation. 
 
The thesis finds important limitations in the normative framework in explaining 
Planact‟s legitimacy in the context of marginalisation and unresolved tenure at 
Zandspruit Private Property. Assessment of NGOs‟ legitimacy in informal 
settlements with unresolved tenure is not limited to representation, participation 
and accountability. In such settlements, descriptive legitimacy in terms of the 
main stakeholders (communities, local governments and the NGO itself) bear the 
most weight in the assessment of the NGOs legitimacy. This thesis is a 
contribution to the refinement of the theories of NGO legitimacy.   
 
In the case of Zandspruit Private Property, Planact is not seen as legitimate 
according to the prescriptive approach. The context of unresolved tenure created 
challenges in ensuring representation, participation and accountability. Planact 
attempted to ensure representation of the Zandspruit community by creating a 
Joint Committee. Ideally the Joint Committee was meant to be working with the 
local government through the ward system. But it was not possible to achieve this 
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due to the weakness of the ward system at Zandspruit. Other reasons for the poor 
working relationship between the Joint Committee and the government were 
attributed to the infighting within the Joint Committee. Therefore, although 
Planact attempted to ensure representation of the Zandspruit community, 
problematic representation structures resulted in limited participation of the 
Zandspruit community in decision making processes.  
 
Downward accountability of NGOs to the communities is important in ensuring 
empowerment and representation, but there is limited literature on actual 
processes of accountability to communities. In the case of Planact‟s accountability 
to the Zandspruit community, the lack of a „defined accountability path‟ to the 
community resulted in limited opportunities for the marginalised Zandspruit 
community to question Planact‟s accountability effectively (Kilby, 2006).  
 
Brown and Jagadananda (2007) indicate that „mutual accountability‟ is difficult to 
implement. In the case study in this thesis, Planact had alliances and stakeholders 
across different levels and regions. This created challenges for Planact to ensure 
mutual accountability to the Zandspruit community due to uncertainties of 
working with communities with unresolved tenure security. But because mutual 
accountability only binds members through values, aspirations and identities 
instead of contracts, Planact did not have to ensure its accountability to the 
Zandspruit community. This study shows that it is difficult for NGOs working at 
informal settlements where illegality of land exists, to demonstrate mutual 
accountability.  
 
This thesis finds that NGOs play an important role in assisting marginalised 
communities. However, the legitimacy that development NGOs generally enjoy 
by claiming to represent marginalised communities is blurred in communities 
where there are unresolved tenure issues. Such obstacles of unresolved tenure 
issues, as well as staff shortages, led to the withdrawal of Planact from Zandspruit 
Private Property. Therefore, the normative/prescriptive framework that links 
representation to NGO legitimacy needs to be refined for situations such as that 
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explored in this Planact-Zandspruit case study. Planact could not continue its 
work in Zandspruit largely due to limited tangible development progress, with the 
main obstacle being the delay in the local government acquiring the land from its 
private owners. Development NGOs such as Planact, with their limited financial 
resources are seldom able to assist the communities in buying land from private 
owners or compelling governments to do so. This was the main obstacle that 
prevented any progress in securing access to services, and in turn limited 
Planact‟s capacity to contribute in improving living conditions at Zandspruit. 
  
There is need for an enquiry into the way NGOs can be transformed to be able to 
secure more services for marginalised communities in the context of unresolved 
tenure. The normative framework according to which NGOs in this context derive 
their legitimacy may need to be refined. This can help create a better framework 
of NGO funding and assessment. However, this thesis did not explore in any 
detail the link between NGO funding and donors views on NGO accountability, 
particularly in the context of marginalised communities. There is need for further 
research to explore how donors construct NGO legitimacy, both from a 
prescriptive/normative framework and descriptive perspective. It is also important 
to understand how such legitimacy constructs may impact on NGOs working in 
marginalised informal settlements with unresolved tenure. Once a normative 
framework for NGO legitimacy is adopted by all stakeholders, development 
NGOs can begin to register a meaningful reversal of the marginalisation of poor 
urban communities.  
 
It is hoped that the results of this study may be useful to governments, especially 
local governments in South Africa, in understanding the constraints that NGOs 
face in their attempts to address the problems of informal settlements and service 
delivery. The lessons for the South African government, in particular local 
government, are that, while it may rely on development NGOs to train 
communities and improve engagement with government, these NGOs face 
challenges representing marginalised communities. Service delivery and to some 
extent the performance of development NGOs in the informal settlements is 
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significantly undermined in situations where community development requires 
overcoming lack of tenure security. The Zandspruit case study shows that, to 
improve the supportive role of NGOs in informal settlements, governments need 
to do more to prevent delays in securing of tenure or regularising land occupation.  
 
Donors should also appreciate the difficulty NGOs working with communities 
with unresolved tenure face in terms of accountability, participation and 
representation. This study also provides lessons for development NGOs and the 
development aid sector in general, regarding the way NGO legitimacy is derived, 
and accountability to communities is ensured, in marginalised informal 
settlements with protracted problems of tenure insecurity. NGOs and the 
development aid sector should be aware of tenure insecurity facing communities 
in informal settlements and should do more to find ways to support such 
communities during these delays. While it is important that the issues of tenure 
insecurity be dealt with expediently, the development sector should not abandon 
communities faced with unresolved delays. NGOs providing such support without 
clear development results should not face legitimacy challenges in relation to this 
work. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: List of persons interviewed 
Government Officials (City of Johannesburg Municipality) 
1. Project Manager City of Johannesburg. 17/07/2007. Region C offices 
2. Zandspruit Area Manager from Region C. 13/07/2007. Region C offices. 
Political Representative 
1. Ward Councillor – Maureen 22/07/2007. Zandspruit community centre 
2. Community Worker – Edward. Zandspruit community centre 
Planact Staff 
1. Planact Director. 27/06/2007. Planact offices 
2. Planact Project Officer. 09/07/2007. Planact offices 
Zandspruit Private Property Joint Committee leadership 
1. Section One Community Leader. 07/07/2007 
2. Section Two Community Leader. 15/07/2007 
3. Section Three Community Leader. 17/05/2007 
4. Section Four Community Leader. 26/04/2007 
Zandspruit Private Property Residents 
1. Precious  Mdau– Mbele Secton. 15/07/07 
2. Thabo Langa – Vukuzenzele Plot .02/02/07 
3. Zanele Moyo – Vukuzenzele 25/04/07 
4. Jackson Moloko – Brecker Brothers 14/05/07 
5. Olivia Zamani – Ernest Wolfe. 07/07/07 
6. Thomas Dlamini – Mbele Section. 17/07/07 
7. Mangi Moroka – Brecker Brothers. 14/05/07 
8. Khetsiwe Masondo – Brecker Brothers. 17/05/07 
9. Themba Khoza – Ernest Wolfe. 07/07/07 
10. Nomsa Mbele - Ernest Wolfe. 07/07/07 
11. Ron Langa – Ernest Wolfe. 07/07/07 
12. Janice Lunga – Vukuzenzele. 03/05/07 
13. Leone Manzini – Vukuzenzele. 25/04/07 
14. Yvette Magagula – Mbele Section. 03/05/07 
15. Patrice Zungu– Mbele Section. 15.07.07 
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Appendix B: Community members interview structure 
Name  
Date  
Name of the 
section  
Contact details  
 
Introduction 
My name is Georgina Ole Saibul. I am a PhD student from Wits University and 
this is my research assistant Emmanuel who is doing his first degree in Town 
Planning at Wits University. He will be translating for us. 
First I want to thank you very much for your time and agreeing to answer my 
questions. Please be assured this interview is anonymous and if you feel 
uncomfortable we can stop. 
 
Planact worked with Zandspruit Private Property between 2003 and 2004. I would 
like you to answer a few questions on the role of Planact and what Planact did for 
the community. I would also like you to answer some questions on the 
relationship between Zandspruit Private Property community, Joint Committee 
and local government (Region C).   
1. What role does the local government play in your community? 
a. Are there meetings organized by local government? 
b. How does the community participate? 
c. How do community members agree on what should be submitted 
as the needs and interests of community? 
d. Are there any other organizations involved in the participation 
process between community and local government? 
e. What role do they play? 
2. What role does the ward councilor play in the community? 
a. How is the community engaging with the ward councilor?  
b. What is the relationship the community and ward councilors? 
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c. Do you participate in ward committee meetings? 
d. Do you think the ward committee and councilor are effective in 
representing the needs of the community to government? 
e. What are the challenges working with ward councilors? 
f. How can these challenges improved? 
3. What could be improved with local government to ensure 
community‟s needs and interests are represented effectively to 
different levels of government? 
4. How did Planact get involved with this community? 
a. How did you get to know about Planact‟s involvement? 
b. Did you agree on Planact working in your community? 
c. Does Planact represent your interests? In what way? 
d. Do the residents of this settlement know Planact? 
e. What is their perception of Planact? 
5. What role does Planact play in your community? 
a. What expertise did they bring to the community? 
b. Is the role Planact playing in the community important? 
c. How does Planact get community member involved in their 
projects? 
d. Are you satisfied with community involvement in Planact‟s 
projects? 
e. Is Planact seen as being efficient in community projects? 
f. Could there be any improvements in the way community members 
participate in Planact‟s projects? 
6. Do you think Planact has a right to work in this community? Yes/ 
no…….why…….  
7. What gives NGOs the right to work in communities? 
8. Apart from Planact, which other NGOs are you affiliated to or seek 
help from? 
a. What role do they play in the community? 
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9. In your opinion, has the involvement of Planact been effective in 
involving community members in decision making on activities in the 
community? If yes how? In no, why? 
10. Do you feel your needs are recognised by Planact? Yes/no….if yes 
how….if no, why….. 
11. Should Planact continue to work in your community? 
Yes/no…………….why……. 
12. What do you know about Joint Committee? 
a.  How did you find out? 
b. Have you been contacted by the Joint Committee  
13. How do you select your Joint Committee leaders? 
14. What has the Joint Committee done for the community? 
a. Do you think the Joint Committee represents the needs of the entire 
community residing in this settlement? Yes/ no…. If yes, 
how?................If no, why…. 
b. What are community‟s needs/demands? 
15. Are there any other structures that represent your interests? Which are 
they? 
16. Have you attended a Joint Committee or any other organisation 
meeting?  
a. How do people in this community participate in these meetings? 
b. Are you satisfied with the involvement of community members or 
do you have any suggestions on how it could be improved?  
17. Do you feel represented by Joint Committee and any other 
organisations from your community? Yes/No………….If no, give 
reasons……………. 
18. How does the Joint Committee work with Planact?  
a. How does the community, Joint Committee and Planact work 
together to ensure effective representation of community‟s needs? 
b. Are community‟s needs and interests represented to Planact by 
Joint Community? 
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c. How does the Joint Committee represent community‟s needs to 
Planact? 
d. And how does Planact represent your needs and interests to the 
government and financial institutions?  
19. Do you think the representation of needs and interests as implemented 
by Joint Committee and Planact is effective in representing 
community‟s interests? What more could be done? 
20. Have you been involved in community meetings?  
a. Who organised the meeting? 
b. What were they about?  
c. Were decisions made, or just information given? 
21. Have there been any conflicts in the community meetings on projects? 
a. What kind of conflicts? 
b. Did the Joint Committee intervene? 
c. What were the competing interests? 
d. How was the conflict resolved?  
22. How do you participate in the public meetings organised by local 
government and the Joint Committee? 
23. How would you like to be involved in the decision making process? 
24. Do you think it is important for Planact to report back to community 
on their processes and progress in community projects? 
a. Did Planact provide reports and statements back to the community 
on their work on a certain project in the community?  
25. Do you think the fact that you are in an informal settlement which is 
illegal limits your ability to participate in the participation process 
according to the government policies? If yes, how? 
a. Does the illegality of the settlement make NGOs less willing to 
support the settlement?
1
 
26. Are there any improvements in this community since the community 
has been working with Planact? Yes/no…. give reasons….. 
 
                                                 
1
 I realise in retrospect that this was a leading question. I have taken this into account in my 
analysis (See section 7.2). Same as question 19 appendix C.  
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Appendix C: Interview guide used for Joint committee 
Name  
Date  
Name of the 
section  
Contact details  
 
Introduction 
My name is Georgina Ole Saibul. I am a PhD student from Wits University and 
this is my research assistant Emmanuel who is doing his first degree in Town 
Planning at Wits University. He will be translating for us. 
First I want to thank you very much for your time and agreeing to answer my 
questions. Please be assured this interview is anonymous and if you feel 
uncomfortable we can stop. 
Planact worked with Zandspruit Private Property between 2003 and 2004. I would 
like you to answer a few questions on the role of Planact and what Planact did for 
the community. I would also like you to answer some questions on the 
relationship between Zandspruit Private Property community and local 
government (Region C). 
1. What is the role of Joint Committee in Zandspruit? 
a. When was it formed? 
b. Were there other community organisations before Joint 
Committee?  
c. How was the Joint Committee created? 
d. How is it structured? 
e. How often do you elect the representative in the Joint Committee? 
f. What is on your agenda regularly? 
g. What other items have you discussed in the Joint Committee?  
h. What role do you play in settlement development? 
i. What has the Joint Committee achieved that might have been 
difficult without it? 
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2. What role does the local government play in your community? 
a. Are there meetings organized by local government? 
b. How does the community participate? 
c. How do community members agree on what should be submitted 
as the needs and interests of community? 
d. What role do they play? 
3. What role does the ward councillor play in Zandspruit? 
a. How does the Joint Committee work with ward councillor and 
ward committee? 
b. What are the challenges working with ward councillors? 
4. How does the Joint Committee deal with political parties? 
a. How many political parties are active in Zandspruit? 
b. Does any particular political party dominate the Joint Committee? 
c. Do the different political parties bring any challenges to 
Zandspruit? 
5. What could be improved with local government to ensure 
community‟s needs and interests are represented effectively to 
different levels of government? 
6. Are there any NGOs working in Zandspruit? List them 
a. What gives NGOs the right to work in this community? 
b. What role do NGOs play in informal settlements? 
c. What is the nature of the relationship between Joint Committee and 
NGOs? 
d. Are there any challenges the Joint Committee faces working with 
NGOs? 
7. How did Planact get involved with this community? 
a. How did Planact work with Joint Committee? 
b. What expertise did Planact bring into the community? 
8. Apart from Planact, which other NGOs you affiliate to or seek help 
from? 
a. What role do they play in the community? 
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9. How does the Joint Committee represent the needs and interests of 
community high levels of government? 
a. Are there any other structures or organisations that represent the 
needs of community to higher levels of government? Which ones 
and how? 
b. What are community‟s needs/demands? 
c. How are there needs established and represented? 
10. How does the Joint Committee work with Planact in representing 
community‟s needs?  
a. How does the community, Joint Committee and Planact work 
together to ensure effective representation of community‟s needs? 
b. Are community‟s needs and interests represented to Planact by 
Joint Committee? 
11. Do you know of any community projects in Zandspruit? 
a. How did you find out about the projects? 
b. Who initiated the projects? 
c. How did you participate in the projects? 
d. What has been your contribution to the project? 
e. Do you feel your participation was rewarding and your 
contribution was taken into consideration? 
12. How does the Joint Committee get communities involved in 
community meetings?  
a. Who organise the meeting? 
b. What were they about?  
c. Were decisions made, or just information given to communities? 
13. What role did Planact play in assisting Zandspruit take part in decision 
making processes? 
a. How did Planact interact with the community in Zandspruit? 
14. In your opinion, has the involvement of Planact been effective in 
involving community members in decision making on activities in the 
community? If yes how? In no, why? 
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15. Was there an incident were the interests or needs of Zandspruit 
community were conflicting in the four sections? 
a. What were the competing interests? 
b. How were the conflicting interests resolved? 
c. Did The Joint Committee intervene? How? 
d. Did Planact assist in conflict resolution? How 
16. Do you think it is important for Planact to report back to community 
on their processes and progress in community projects? 
a. Did Planact provide reports and statements back to the community 
on their work on a certain project in the community?  
17. What is it that makes development difficult in Zandspruit? 
18. What do you think makes it difficult for an NGO like Planact to work 
with this community? 
19. Do you think the fact that you are in an informal settlement which is 
illegal limits your ability to participate in the participation process 
according to the government policies? If yes, how? 
20. Does the illegality of the settlement make NGOs less willing to 
support the settlement? 
21. Are there any improvements in this community since the community 
has been working with Planact? Yes/no…. give reasons….. 
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Appendix D: Interview guide for Planact Director 
Name  
Date  
Location  
Contact details  
 
Introduction 
My name is Georgina Ole Saibul. I am a PhD student from Wits University. First 
I want to thank you very much for your time and agreeing to answer my 
questions.  
Planact worked with Zandspruit Private Property between 2003 and 2004. I would 
like you to answer a few questions on Planact‟s work in Zandspruit, questions 
about Planact‟s legitimacy, representation, participation and accountability. I 
would also like you to answer some questions on the relationship between Planact 
and government.  
1. What were Planact‟s objectives working in Zandspruit Transit Camp and 
Zandspruit Private Property 
2. Did Planact achieve its objectives in these areas? 
3. Where they any challenges? 
4. What were the reasons for exiting Zandspruit Transit Camp and Private 
Property? 
5. What does Planact‟s exit from Zandspruit mean for its commitment to 
participation and accountability to community? What is Planact‟s mission?  
6. What role does Planact play in informal settlements? 
7. How does Planact work with local government structures? 
8. Questions have been raised about NGO legitimacy, what makes Planact 
legitimate?  
9. Is it important for Planact to be seen as legitimate by community, 
government and donors?  
10. How does Planact represent the needs and interests of communities to 
government and financial institutions? 
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11. How does Planact work with Joint Committee in Zandspruit? 
12. Do you think the Joint Committee represents the needs of the entire 
community residing in Zandspruit? Yes/ no…. If yes, how?................If no, 
why…. 
13. Are there any other structures that represent the interests of the 
community? Which are they? 
14. How do communities and Joint Committee work with Planact in 
community meetings to ensure effective representation of community‟s 
needs and interests?  
a. How do people participate in these meetings? 
b. How does Planact deal with different power relations within 
communities when implementing community participation? 
c. How does the Joint Committee represent community‟s needs to 
Planact? 
d. Do communities feel represented by Joint Committee and Planact? 
Yes/No………….If no, give reasons……………. 
 
15. How did Planact ensure Zandspruit community members participate in the 
decision making processes? 
16. With multiple accountability challenges NGOs face, how does Planact 
balance their accountability demands to donors, community and 
government?  
17. Does the illegal occupation of the settlement create any challenges on the 
role of Planact in communities living in informal settlements? 
18. Does the illegality and other complications of the settlement make Planact 
less willing to support the settlement? 
19. Is Planact focused on working in communities where there is potential for 
positive results due to donor pressure to perform? 
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Appendix E: Interview guide for Planact project officer 
Name  
Date  
Location  
Contact details  
 
Introduction 
My name is Georgina Ole Saibul. I am a PhD student from Wits University. First 
I want to thank you very much for your time and agreeing to answer my 
questions.  
Planact worked with Zandspruit Private Property between 2003 and 2004. I would 
like you to answer a few questions on Planact‟s work in Zandspruit, questions 
about Planact‟s legitimacy, representation, participation and accountability. I 
would also like you to answer some questions on the relationship between Planact 
and government.  
1. What is the focus of Planact‟s work? Does it work in informal settlements 
only?  
2. What role does Planact play in informal settlements? 
3. What particular challenges has Planact identified in relation to working in 
informal settlements? 
4. What is the nature of the relationship between Planact and local 
government structures in settlements Planact is working in? 
5. Are there and challenges working with local government? What 
challenges? 
6. How does Planact engage with the ward councillor?  
7. How does Planact ensure communities participate in ward committee 
meetings and engage with government? 
8. What are the challenges working with ward councillors? Can these 
challenges improved? 
9. What were Planact‟s objectives in Zandspruit Private Property? 
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10. Why did Planact exit Zandspruit Private Property were the objectives 
achieved? 
11. Was Planact unique in its work in Zandspruit Private Property or were 
there other NGOs doing the same work? 
12. How did Planact begin working in Zandspruit Transit Camp and why did 
Planact leave, were objectives met? 
13. Questions have been raised about NGO legitimacy? What gives Planact 
the legitimacy to work in informal settlements? 
14. Is it important for Planact to be seen as legitimate by community, 
government and donors? 
15. How does Planact represent the needs and interests of communities to 
government and financial institutions? 
16. What accountability responsibility does Planact have to donors? 
17. Are there any other structures that represent the interests of the 
community? Which are they? 
18. How is community participation implemented in the informal settlements? 
19. How did Planact get the communities to participate in projects in 
Zandspruit? 
20. Do you think community organisations are satisfied with the participation 
process between their organisation, community members, Planact and the 
local government? 
21. What challenges did Planact face working in illegally occupied 
Zandsapruit Private Property? 
22. Does the illegality of the settlement limit the ability of communities to 
engage local government? 
23. Does the illegality and other complications of the settlement make Planact 
less willing to support the settlement? 
24. Is Planact focused on working in communities where there is potential for 
positive results due to donor pressure to perform? 
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Appendix F: Interview guide for government officials 
Name  
Date  
Location  
Contact details  
 
Introduction 
My name is Georgina Ole Saibul. I am a PhD student from Wits University. First 
I want to thank you very much for your time and agreeing to answer my 
questions.  
Planact worked with Zandspruit Private Property between 2003 and 2004. I would 
like you to answer a few questions on the role and legitimacy of NGOs in general 
in South Africa and Planact in particular. I would also like to ask you questions on 
how local government ensures participation of informal settlements communities 
considering issues of illegal occupation.  
1. Who are land owners in Zandspruit Private Property? 
2. What are development plans for Zandspruit Private Property? 
3. How is Zandspruit community involved in the development process? 
4. What is the role of the municipality in Zandspruit and other informal 
settlements in this municipality? 
5. What is the nature of the relationship between municipality and Planact? 
6. What is the role of NGO in communities? 
7. What is the role of Planact in the community participation process? 
8. What is the role of Planact in informal settlements? 
9. Do you think Planact works with communities effectively and represent 
the needs and interests of communities? 
10. Where do you think Planacts‟ loyalty lies? With donors, communities or 
them selves? 
11. What is the role of ward councilors and committees? 
12. How did the Joint Committee work with committees? 
288 
 
13. How does the Zandspruit community participate in the decision making 
processes? 
14. What challenges do ward councilors and committee face in implementing 
participation processes? 
15. What challenges do ward councilors face in their activities 
16. Are ward committee members provided with any training? Who provides 
it? 
17. How are disagreements between ward committee members dealt with? 
18. What is the role of CBO leaders in community participation in informal 
settlement? 
19. How important is it to get communities to participate in the decision 
making processes? 
20. What are the obstacles to community participation with informal 
settlement dwellers? 
21. At what level are communities involved in decision making processes on 
certain projects? 
22. What are your views on legitimacy issues facing NGOs? 
23. Is the role of NGOs in communities legitimate? If yes, what makes them 
legitimate? If no, why? 
24. Does the informality/illegality of the settlement create any challenges on 
their ability to participate in government policies? 
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Appendix G: Interview guide for ward councillor  
Name  
Date  
Location  
Contact details  
 
Introduction 
My name is Georgina Ole Saibul. I am a PhD student from Wits University. First 
I want to thank you very much for your time and agreeing to answer my 
questions.  
I would like you to answer a few questions on the role and legitimacy of NGOs in 
general in South Africa and Planact in particular working with communities in 
informal settlements. I would also like to ask you questions on how local 
government and ward committee works to ensures participation of informal 
settlements communities considering issues of illegal occupation.  
1. What is the role of ward councilor? 
2. What is the role of ward committee? 
3. What is the nature of the relationship between ward councilors and ward 
committee? 
4. What is the nature of the relationship between ward councilors, committee 
and community members? 
5. What is the role of Planact in this community? 
6. What is the role of Planact in the community participation process? 
7. What is the nature of the relationship between Planact and ward councilors 
and ward committee?  
8. Do you get feedback from Planact in terms of reports and statements of 
their activities? 
9. Do you think Planact has an important role to play in this community? 
10. How does the Joint Committee and ward committee work together in one 
community? 
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11. What are the challenges of working with communities in informal 
settlements and how are they addressed? 
12. How do community members participate in the decision making processes 
in this community? 
13. What challenges do ward councilors and committee face in the 
participation processes in the community? 
14. Are ward committee members provided with any training?  
15. Does the informality of the settlement create any challenges on the 
community participation process?  
 
 
